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Preface 
WORM stands for “Working group for Occupational Risk Model”, which is a large 
project that was conducted in The Netherlands between 2003 and 2008 and financed by 
the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. 
 
Dan-Worm is the term used for the Danish version of WORM. 
 
This report describes the results of the Dan-Worm project, the goal of which was to give 
Danish companies the opportunity to use the results from the Dutch project. An additional 
intention of the DanWorm project was to attempt to simplify the results from WORM in 
such a way to allow knowledge and tools to be implemented into small and medium-size 
companies. 
 
The report contains a thorough introduction to the theory of accident prevention, a 
description of the Dutch WORM project and the tools that have been developed in the 
Dan-WORM project. The report presents proposed applications of the tools and 
prevention processes. 
 
The Dan-WORM project is being financed by the Working Environment Research Fund 
(Arbejdsmiljøforskningsfonden) and has also been included in the Centre for Research in 
Production, Management and the Working Environment in Small Enterprises (Center for 
forskning i produktion, ledelse og arbejdsmiljø i mindre Virksomheder) “DAVID”, for 
which the National Research Centre for the Working Environment (Det Nationale 
Forskningscenter for Arbejdsmiljø), NFA, has been responsible.  
Kirsten Jørgensen             Nijs Jan Duijm  Hanne Troen 
DTU Management Engineering    DTU Management Engineering Kemi Risk aps 
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Introduction  
In 2004 a major project was initiated in The Netherlands to chart the risks of occupational 
injuries and identify the safety measures (safety barriers) that can prevent injuries. This 
consisted of the in-depth analysis of 9,000 serious occupational accidents and those 
requiring hospitalisation in depth based on the studies conducted by the Dutch working 
environment authority for such cases. In order to be able to calculate the probability of the 
risk of injury the exposure time has also been charted, i.e. by means of surveys 
investigated how many people are exposed to different types of risk and the extent to 
which the requisite safety barriers are in place and the conditions of these barriers (RAM 
2008). 
 
On the basis of these analyses and survey data an electronic program, ORM 
(Occupational Risk Model) has been developed that enables the risk of an occupational 
accident for a specific job to be calculated by stating your work tasks and how these takes 
are performed. Using the information that is entered and the information contained within 
the program, provides an indication of the types of injury that you are at greatest risk of 
and the type of prevention that is the most effective both in terms of the working 
environment and cost. 
 
The problem with this program is that a fairly large quantity of information is required 
before you can calculate the probability of injury. Not least, a magnitude of information is 
involved that small enterprises would probably never have the resources available to 
collect. The program is therefore of little interest to these enterprises. 
 
One of the goals of the DanWorm project is to secure a Danish version of the Dutch ORM 
program in the form of a Danish translation. Another goal is to investigate and develop a 
version of ORM that can be more easily accessed by small enterprises in particular. A 
final goal of the DanWorm project is to investigate whether on the basis of data from both 
the Dutch and Danish project it is possible to develop a targeted auditing system for small 
enterprises. 
 
This report has the following content:  
 
Chapter 1 contains the most important conclusions that have resulted from DanWorm. 
This conclusion section goes across the chapters of the report with the aim of highlighting 
the messages of and the relationships between the chapters of the report. This provides us 
with a general overview of the content of the report and of the primary results.  
 
Chapter 2 contains the theoretical basis for the research project including an 
understanding of the prevention of occupational accidents, an understanding of the 
significance of management in prevention, an understanding of the barrier concept and 
finally an understanding of the small enterprise and its ability and opportunities to act 
proactively in relation to occupational accidents. 
 
Chapter 3 contains a description of the Dutch development project on which the present 
project is based and in which it has a stake. There is also a presentation of the 
methodology development and the results from the work in The Netherlands. 
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Chapter 4 contains a presentation of the Danish research project, DanWorm, including 
methodology, processes and development elements. 
 
Chapter 5 contains a presentation of the results from DanWorm and the various tools that 
were developed during the project as well as their general application. 
 
Chapter 6 places these results and tools within the framework of the preventative 
arrangements within a company and the application of APV and audits. An attempt is 
made to illustrate the simple method for the small enterprise. 
 
 In addition, comprehensive supplementary material has been produced, which includes: 
A. 17 INFO chart on accident risks 
B. A list of 64 hazards with indications of safety barriers and quality parameters 
C. A presentation of exposure data within industries and trade groups for 64 hazards 
D. DanWorm data material for the enterprises in the data collection and data for 
carpenters and caretakers and their exposure files 
The main report, the supplementary report and programs to be used for data collection 
have been published on a CD ROM. 
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Chapter 1. Conclusions from the project 
Everybody would naturally prefer to avoid occupational accidents, both for ourselves, for 
our acquaintances, for our co-workers, etc. The question is whether we are prepared to 
invest the energy that is required and to have the focus to avoid injuries when none have 
occurred for some time. 
With accidents you do not know what should have been done until after the accident has 
taken place, by which time it is too late. This is why we study accidents in order to 
understand and learn, but usually without this learning being passed onto others. We often 
take the blame and believe that we have done something wrong, which is of course not 
much use to others.  
Many accidents are just put down to being something that just happens. They are viewed 
as being furtuitous events, unless we are talking about major catastrophes for which 
somebody has to take the blame.  
Finally, if an accident becomes the subject of a closer investigation, this is usually done 
for the purpose of establishing liability and a liability to pay damages and very rarely to 
chart the fundamental causes. 
The following metaphor can be used: 
”An accident occurs more or less as randomly as a lightning strike. We are fully aware of 
the conditions that form the basis for lightning and also the conditions that cause it to 
strike where it does, but we never know when and where it will occur… It is the same with 
accidents. However, there is the problem when accidents are investigated that we often 
only investigate “the place where the lightning struck” and rarely the conditions that 
formed the basis for the “occurrence of the lightning”, i.e. the underlying causes.” 
When we discover that the immediate causes are perfectly normal everyday conditions 
that do not usually give rise to an accident, we do nothing and are happy to say to those 
affected  
Be more careful next time – watch out – let it be 
This chapter will suggest alternative courses of action. The chapter is a summary of the 
report and includes the five most important suggestions that have been drawn on from 
across the other chapters of the report.  
1.1 Learning from the large number of accidents 
1.1.1 The message  
Each individual accident will always be unique. Only when the large number of accidents 
and their underlying causes have been analysed will the risks over which it is vital to gain 
control and the measures that should be implemented be identified. 
This is not to say that we should not investigate individual accidents in order to learn 
from them, but rather that the knowledge that is gained from individual accidents is 
limited and we must never construe it so that if we ensure that this accident does not 
happen again, we would have done all that we could to prevent other accidents. 
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1.1.2 Background 
The investigation of occupational accidents is an investigation into what occurred by 
looking back and attempting to reconstruct the course of events. There is always a 
charting of what we know occurred and with the benefit of hindsight stated what went 
wrong, cf. Chapter 2. 
In the vast majority of cases it is easy to see when the injured party could have done 
differently in the situation and thereby have avoided the accident. We therefore talk about 
human behaviour as being the factor that triggers the accident. 
However, from a more detailed analysis of very commonplace accidents it also emerges 
that there will be a large number of other factors of significance to the situation with 
which the injured party is faced and which influence his or her behaviour.  
It also emerges that it is the simultaneity of different factors that causes the accident 
rather than individual causes. 
It is the simultaneity of there being a person on a scaffold that has a faulty guard rail and 
the person trips over a board, loses balance and consequently falls from the scaffold. 
It is the simultaneity of a saucepan standing on the floor, the contents of the saucepan 
being very hot and the saucepan standing in the way of a trainee chef who is so busy the 
he does not see the saucepan and consequently steps on the saucepan and burns his foot. 
It is the simultaneity of a person who is descending from a ladder whilst carrying a heavy 
load with both hands, who does not see where he is putting his feet and is unable to break 
his fall if he were to stumble and is also rushing as he is pressed for time who 
consequently stumbles, falls down and breaks his leg. 
In all of these situations an accident would not have occurred if all of the causes were not 
present. This has two significances. 
1. The person believes that there is no risk when he is in similar situations, and 
where only some of the causes are present that nothing will happen and therefore 
believes that he can cope with the situation, and.  
2. That it is difficult for the person to perceive “simultaneities” that can arise in 
actual situations. Vigilance and very quick reactions are required as these can arise 
spontaneously and instantaneously. Furthermore, the combination of 
simultaneities is manifold and requires considerable experience and insight. 
However, in a large number of situations people are able to look after their own safety, 
they see the risk factors and take the necessary precautions.  
It is therefore when a person is not fully prepared for the situation that he finds himself in 
and has not taken the necessary precautions that we can point to that person as having 
failed. 
The question is therefore: 
 How do we ensure that such simultaneities of factors that can result in accidents 
do not arise? 
 How do we create awareness that “simultaneities” can occur so that people have 
an opportunity to take the appropriate action? 
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 How do we ensure that people what they should do when they are in situations 
where a simultaneity of factors arises that can lead to an accident? 
It is a question of knowledge and competence, of the ability to act and of the willingness 
to be vigilant. 
1.1.3 Accident risk   
It is necessary to know initially the situations in which a risk of accident is associated. 
The Dutch WORM project in its analyses of in excess of 9,000 serious occupational 
accidents identified 64 hazards, cf. Chapter 3. 
The Danish project has worked with these 64 hazards and grouped them in a way that 
makes this knowledge simple to use, cf. Chapter 5. 
The hazards have been divided into 
4   -   17   -   64 groups respectively. 
The first stage that consists of dividing the hazards into 4 includes the following 
situations: 
A. The surface that is being travelled on or being worked on, i.e. be 
careful, risk of falling 
B. The surroundings that are being travelled or worked in, i.e. see if 
there is a risk in your surroundings of something colliding with you 
from outside, or of you colliding with something, etc. 
C. What is being worked on or with, i.e. look at what you are working 
on and the risk of you becoming caught up/jammed in something, 
stabbing yourself, cutting yourself, straining yourself, etc. 
D. Surroundings of a particularly dangerous nature. i.e. conditions that 
require particular vigilance. 
The second stage that consists of diving into the 17 risk situations as follows: 
A. 1. Work at height 
2. Work at the same level 
B. 3. Work where objects can fall 
4. Work where objects can fragment 
5. Work where you can be struck by objects, collide with something or 
become caught up/jammed in something 
6. Work where you can become buried 
7. Work with people and/or animals 
C. 8. Work with machinery and tools 
9. Work with/on vehicles 
10. Work with/in the proximity of electricity 
11. Work with/in the proximity of heat and/or cold 
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12. Work with/in the proximity of chemicals 
13. Work with heavy lifting 
D. 14. Work with/in the proximity of high voltage 
15. Work with/in the proximity of flammable materials or processes 
16. Work where there is a risk of suffocation, lack of oxygen 
17. Work with/in the proximity of explosive materials or processes 
 
The third stage that consists of diving into the 64 risk situations as follows: 
Characteristi
cs 
Activity Risk Hazards 
A. 
The surface 
that is being 
travelled on 
or worked 
on; 
1. Work at 
heights 
Falls from 
heights 
1. Falls from heights - movable ladders 
2 Falls from heights – fixed ladders 
3 Falls from height – stepladders  
4 Falls from heights – rope ladders 
5. Falls from heights – mobile scaffolding 
6. Falls from heights – fixed scaffolding 
7. Falls from heights – erection/dismantling of scaffolding 
8. Falls from heights - roofs 
9. Falls from heights – areas, floors with large differences in level 
10. Falls from heights – fixed platforms 
11. Falls into deep holes (e.g. in the earth, floors) 
12 Falls from heights – mobile platforms 
13. Falls from heights – stationary vehicles 
14. Falls from heights – other work at height without protection 
 
2. Work at 
the same 
level 
Falls from the 
same level 
15. Risk of stumbling or skidding on the same level 
16.3 Falls from steps or inclined surfaces 
 
B. 
The 
surroundings 
that are being 
travelled on 
or worked 
on; 
3. Falling 
objects 
Being struck 
by falling 
objects 
17 Being struck by falling objects – cranes or hoists 
18. Being struck by falling objects - mechanical lifting (e.g. cranes) 
19. Being struck by falling objects – from conveyances or conveyor 
belts 
20. Being struck by falling objects – from manually lifting 
21. Being struck by falling objects – other objects at height 
 
4.Fragments Being struck 
by fragments 
22. Being struck by fragments – from machinery or hand tools 
23. Being struck by fragments – from objects under pressure/stress 
24. Being struck by fragments – that are blown by the wind 
 
5. Colliding 
against, 
between, 
being struck  
by 
Being struck 
by moving 
objects, 
becoming 
caught 
up/jammed, 
crushed. 
25. Collision with vehicle 
26. Being struck by rolling/sliding objects 
27. Being struck by hand tools held by another person 
28. Being struck by objects held by another person 
29. Being struck by swinging objects 
30. Becoming caught/jammed between objects 
31. Colliding against/with objects 
 
6. Sliding of 
materials 
Becoming  
buried 
32. Buried under loose material 
 
7. Violence 33. Exposure to aggressive people (violence) 
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Characteristi
cs 
Activity Risk Hazards 
Aggression 34. Exposure to the behaviour of animals (falls, bites, stings, kicks) 
 
C. 
What is being 
worked on or 
with; 
8. Technical 
aids 
Being struck 
by moving 
objects, 
becoming 
caught 
up/jammed, 
cutting 
35. Being struck by own hand tools 
36. Being struck by moving parts of machinery - operating 
37. Being struck by moving parts of machinery - maintenance 
38. Being struck by moving parts of machinery - preparing 
39. Being struck by moving parts of machinery - cleaning 
 
9. Vehicles Collisions 40. Loss of control over vehicle 
 
10. 
Electricity 
Electric 
shock 
41. Contact with electricity – electrical equipment 
42. Contact with electricity – when installing/repairing 
 
11. Heat or 
cold 
Burns 43 Burns - frostbite/burns from cold/hot 
surfaces or naked flames 
44 Fires – combustion from “hot” work 
 
12. 
Chemical 
Poisoning, 
etching 
45. Discharge of hazardous chemicals from open containers 
46. Contact with uncovered hazardous chemicals (without discharge) 
47 Release of chemical risk from closed containers - 
work/filling/draining 
48 Release of chemical risk from closed containers - without 
transportation 
49. Release of chemical risk from closed containers – when closing 
containers 
50. Release of chemical risk from closed containers – work in the 
proximity 
of a discharge 
 
13. Lifting, 
heavy loads 
Strain 
injuries 
51. Extreme exertions – heavy lifting 
52. Extreme exertions – inappropriate movements 
 
D 
Surroundings  
of a 
particularly 
dangerous 
nature. 
14. High 
voltage 
Electric 
shock 
53. Contact with electricity – high voltage cables 
 
15. Fire Fire 54 Fire – flammable and easily combustible substances 
55. Fire – fire extinguishing 
 
16. Lack of 
oxygen and 
water 
Suffocation, 
poisoning 
or drowning 
56. Suffocation/poisoning – work in confined spaces 
57. Suffocation/poisoning – work with respirators 
58. Drowning – work in/under the water or liquids 
59. Drowning – work above/in the proximity of water 
 
17. 
Explosion 
Explosion 60. Physical explosion 
61. Chemical explosion – vapour or gas 
62. Chemical explosion - dust 
63. Chemical explosion - explosives 
64. Chemical explosion – exothermic reaction 
 
 
These risks are therefore a result of an analysis of a large number of accidents and thereby 
form a good basis for an application of the knowledge gained from these accidents. This 
knowledge can be used to assess the risks that can be encountered in different situations 
and how to assess the possibility of a simultaneity of factors occurring that could lead to 
an accident. 
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1.1.4 Application of this knowledge 
Many people will say that we are well aware of the sources of risk and that we are also 
vigilant of these risks. However, the advantage of having them specified and grouped, as 
shown above, is as following: 
 There is a structure to accident risks that can be used to assess the risk and in 
particular for drawing up an APV of the accident area. 
 There is a complete listing that ensures that you can cover everything in a 
systematic way. 
 This is a step by step approach to the many different types of risks that allows one 
step to be worked on at a time and in this way limits the amount of data that will 
be looked at in a step by step analysis. 
It is recommended that the company‟s APV is structured for accidents using the three 
steps shown in the paragraph above in order to ensure that all accident risks are examined 
in a work place assessment. 
In connection with this it should be remembered that the individual risks will be present at 
any given time. They will occur ad hoc during a period of work, which means that the co-
workers‟ actions at work will need to be followed over time in order to ascertain which 
risks they are exposed to and the duration of the exposure. It is necessary to know the 
extent to which the co-workers are exposed to accident risks during the course of their 
working day. 
One method of charting this is by simply asking each employee questions, however a 
proper survey can be conducted by using the electronic tool for risk observations, which 
was developed during the DanWorm project, cf. Chapter 5. 
This is a small program that can be incorporated into a PDA and which will allow you to 
follow a person through the course of one or more working days and thereby record their 
risk exposure. 
There is also the option of using the average risk exposure, which resulted from the Dutch 
project in its extensive survey of 30,000 employees in The Netherlands.  
The Dutch project has worked out a number of diagrams that show the risk exposure 
within a number of industries and trade groups, which is one set of results from the Dutch 
project. 
Such a survey of the accident risk and risk exposure is a necessary tool to:  
 know how a change should be made in order to reduce the accident risk in a 
company,  
 to be able to monitor and conduct audits with a view to determining whether the 
initiatives that are implemented cf. Chapter 6 have been fruitful. 
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1.2 Prevention by means of safety barriers 
1.2.1 The message 
It is impossible to remove and minimise all risks. Accident risks will always be present 
where people travel, act, work, develop and live. Accident prevention is not about 
achieving ZERO risk, but rather about achieving ZERO accidents. 
This is achieved by ensuring that safety barriers are designed appropriately, that they are 
installed and functional, that they are cleaned and maintained, that instruction in their use 
is provided and finally that people are motivated to act in a safe manner. 
1.2.2 Background 
A safety barrier is something that prevents an undesirable event or action from occurring, 
or something that is able to limit the harmful consequences of the accident, cf. Chapter 2. 
A number of different methods have been developed to discuss and describe safety 
barriers. 
Firstly, there is the one that quite simply divides safety barriers into passive and active 
barriers. 
 Passive safety barriers are those that are incorporated into the technology, process, 
procedures, etc. and which prevent undesirable events from occurring. These 
include technical safety precautions, automatic process procedures, targeted safety 
routine, etc. 
 Secondly, active safety barriers are those that need to be learned by the individual 
so that he or she through his or her behaviour prevents undesirable events from 
occurring. These include safety instructions, safety procedures, safety standard 
and routines. 
Another way of viewing the safety barriers is by their mode of operation. We talk about 
preventative safety barriers, protective safety barriers and limiting safety barriers. 
 Preventative safety barriers are those that passively or actively ensure that neither 
undesirable events nor undesirable actions occur, cf. above.  
 Protective safety barriers are those that protect the individual from becoming 
injured, even if an undesirable event of action occur, such as a line or net should 
the individual fall, a helmet should something fall from a height, goggles or 
clothing where harmful particles, etc. are being sprayed. 
 Limiting safety barriers are those that can contribute to limiting an in jury should 
the accident occur. These include rapid first aid response, sprinklers in the event 
of a fire, eye protection to protect the eyes against splashes, etc. 
The most developed way of viewing safety barriers is by looking at their nature and 
function. Here safety barriers are broadly defined as something that can have both a 
physical nature and something that has an influence of people‟s behaviour. 
With regards to physical safety barriers, the importance of the following is pointed to: 
 That they are constructed and designed appropriately 
 Installed according to purpose,  
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 Used as prescribed,  
 Checked continually and 
 Maintained in good condition 
 
With regards to behavioural safety barriers, factors that can exert an influence over 
people‟s behaviour are pointed to. These are: 
 Procedures, plans, rules and goals 
 Availability of good personnel and planning 
 Competences and adaptation of personnel and tasks 
 Commitment, involvement and endeavouring to resolve conflicting situations 
 Coordination and communication 
1.2.3 Risk-safety barriers-quality parameters  
In total in excess of 9,000 accidents were analysed during the Dutch project. This was 
done with the aid of an electronic program called “Storybuilder” that allows the course of 
events of accidents to be recorded in a structured format and at the same time indicates 
the safety barriers that failed in one way or another. 
The model behind this program is called a “Bowtie model” since it can be illustrated as a 
bow tie, cf. Chapter 3. 
The centre of the event is first defined, which corresponds to the damaging hazards 
indicated above.  
The right-hand side of the analysis is an impact analysis where the consequences of the 
accidents for each damaging source of danger are charted. Any protective and limiting 
safety barriers that have failed or been inadequate are included here. 
The left-hand side of the analysis is a fault tree analysis where all of the correlations that 
resulted in the source of danger causing the injury are charted. The preventative safety 
barriers that have either failed or been inadequate are included here. 
On the basis of this analysis 64 generic “bowties” were produced that describe the 
hazards and their requirements for safety barriers on one side and the seriousness of the 
consequences on the other. 
The results are as follows: 
An identification of the most important physical safety barriers that are associated with 
each source of danger, supplemented by the behavioural safety barriers in the form of the 
individual‟s ability to act in a safe manner. 
An assessment was also made of whether the problem with the physical safety barriers 
had been: 
 Obtained and was therefore present 
 Used and used correctly 
 Maintained and in good condition 
 Monitored and checked 
 
And for all safety barriers there was an assessment of managerial factors such as: 
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 Inadequate procedures 
 Inadequate equipment 
 Poor ergonomic design of equipment 
 Availability of equipment 
 Inadequate competence 
 Inadequate communication 
 Inadequate motivation and involvement 
 Inadequate solutions to conflicting situations 
 
These assessments have resulted in the drawing up of a series of quality parameters that 
are used to establish the effectiveness of each safety barrier. In the Dutch project these 
quality parameters were termed “PIEs”, which stands for “Probability Influencing 
Entities”, i.e. factors that are of significance to the probability of a safety barrier failing, 
which influences the probability of an accident occurring, cf. Chapter 3.  
 
The Dutch project has made the entire list of 64 hazards with indications of all significant 
safety barriers and associated quality parameters based on the 9,000 analyses conducted 
in The Netherlands. 
1.2.4 Application 
The most difficult aspect of observing accident risks is the fact that risks vary over time. 
They are influenced by an infinitely large number of factors and change from day to day, 
from job to job. They are present within tasks of a very short duration, the conducting of 
an APV for which has not been considered. 
It is therefore difficult to predict all risks and it is difficult to predict when the 
simultaneities can occur that result in an accident. The alternative it to ensure: 
1. that the most important physical safety barriers are: 
 Obtained and put in place 
 Used and used correctly 
 Maintained and in good condition 
 Monitored and checked 
 
2. that the managerial conditions that will support both the behavioural and the physical 
safety barriers are in place. 
In doing this we are able to shift our focus from risks that may be difficult to observe and 
control to a focus on the safety barriers that lend themselves much more to being 
observed and controlled, especially if the quality parameters at present at a high level. 
That is to say that the APV and auditing, risk assessments, etc. are able to control the 
safety barriers and their quality parameters rather than control risks. 
In this way we will have managed to create an overview, by means of analyses and a 
structured procedure, of what should be risk assessed and how this assessment is to be 
conducted. 
The Danish programme developed for a PDA that is discussed in Section 1.1.5 allows the 
safety barriers for each individual source of risk to be recorded and for the quality 
parameters of each safety barrier to be assessed, cf. Chapter 5. 
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1.3 Prevention by means of risk awareness 
1.3.1 The message 
Since there will always be risks in our everyday lives that do not usually result in 
accidents, people often believe that this will always be the case and consequently become 
blind to risks.  
By increasing our abilities to see risks and safety barriers as well as to continually assess 
their quality parameters, we can create a greater degree of risk awareness amongst 
employers, managers and employees. 
A greater degree of risk awareness amongst those involved will enable us to: 
 Continually recognise and control risks, 
 Discover and deal with new risks  
 Keep the safety barriers intact 
 Replace one safety barrier with another should it become necessary to remove this 
safety barrier 
 Control and maintain the quality parameters of the safety barriers 
 
This will contribute to maintaining a high level of safety and prevent accidents from 
occurring. 
1.3.2 Background  
Part of the proactive prevention consists of making people aware of the risks associated 
with a situation at a given time and place and being able to observe and assess whether 
the relevant safety barriers are in place and in order. This can be termed a ”Situational 
Awareness” (SA), which is an essential ability that people must possess in order to be 
able to perform their jobs safely. Such a SA places a number of demands on the 
individual, his or her work conditions, the management, supervision, training, knowledge, 
experience, motivation, etc., cf. Chapter 2. 
A critical parameter of an SA is often the time that is available from the initial indication 
that something is about to happen or is not as it should be until the time that an 
inopportune event occurs. In addition, the dynamics of the majority of situations mean 
that there is always a need to understand and evaluate changes, to observe details and 
information, to transform this information into an understanding and review your 
perception of the situation and its possibilities henceforth. 
People are also limited by their work-related memory and awareness and by their 
understanding and prioritisation of information that they perceive to be the most 
important. Customs go hand in hand with mental processes, where experiential decision-
making uses customs and traditions to understand situations and to react to them. 
Expectation, understanding and motivation are based on what the individual perceives as 
being important. It is therefore appropriate to influence the individual's expectations and 
acknowledgement of risks and safety barriers through instruction, training and 
communication of goals and consequences. 
A simple 4-stage division of competence levels of people can be used with advantage to 
assess who is in need of instruction and training: 
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 Step 1 - Unconscious Incompetence, where the individual does not know what he 
or she needs to know. 
 Step 2 - Conscious Incompetence, where the individual knows what he or she 
needs to know but does not yet possess this knowledge. 
 Step 3 - Conscious Competence, where the individual knows what he or she needs 
to know and also actually knows this, i.e. the professional person. 
 Step 4 - Unconscious Competence, where the individual knows what he or she 
needs to know and knows this , but reacts automatically, which can lead to 
inattention. 
The majority of young people and new employees typically belong to groups 1 and 2, 
which may explain why they are more prone to meet with accidents than other more 
experienced people. Whilst we  can also see in the statistics that there are a proportion of 
older people who meet with accidents, even if they have been in the same job for many 
years, which could suggest that they belong to group 4, i.e. they are unable to maintain 
the necessary awareness of changes. 
This must at the same time been seen in the light of the fact that the majority of accidents 
are due to risks that are underestimated as they do not usually result in accidents, or when 
they do so do not cause serious injuries. This applies to risks such as the risk of falling, 
collision, handling loads, operating tools and technical equipment, etc. 
We are much more careful when working with hazardous chemicals, materials where 
there is a risk or explosion or fire, heights, etc. since these immediately signal a risk of 
death or mutilation. 
The result is that there are still many accidents, including serious accidents, that are 
caused by underestimated risks and gradually, quite a few accidents caused by the risks 
that are perceived as very dangerous, cf. Chapter 2. 
1.3.3 INFOmap    
To assist in creating a greater degree of risk awareness a number or INFOmaps have been 
devised in order to support instruction in situational awareness in relation to risks and 
safety barriers, cf. Chapter 5. 
An INFOmap is structured for a specific risk area and includes: 
 What is to be observed, what are the safety barriers 
 What is to be assessed, what are the quality parameters 
 What is to be acted on, which depends on the deficiencies that are discovered. 
An INFOmap can be prepared for each of the 64 sources of risk and for specific tasks, 
technical equipment, if necessary. 
In this report INFOmaps have been devised for the 17 risk areas, cf. Appendix A. 
One result from the DanWorm project is an acknowledgement of what individual 
employers are able to observe and control in relation to each employee‟s work conditions. 
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The employer or the supervisor have a duty and an opportunity to ensure that the safety 
barriers are in order in advance, which procedures are in place, that training and 
instruction have been provided, that there is work being carried out in motivating 
employees to work safety, etc. 
In order to accomplish this work the employer needs to be able to observe, assess and act 
in advance before starting the employees on their work tasks. 
However, in many organisations, especially in medium and small organisations, the 
employees are left to their own devices when performing their tasks. Employees of, for 
example, handicraft organisations are away from the premises of the enterprise, i.e. have 
varying work locations and work conditions. 
In these situations it is necessary for the employees themselves to be able to observe, 
assess and act instantaneously in the situations in which they find themselves and under 
which they are to work. 
Two sets of INFOmaps have therefore been devised: 
1. The first set is aimed at employers and supervisors, which will ensure that he or 
she ensures that the risks and safety barriers that can be secured in advanced are 
secured in advance. 
2. The second set is aimed at employees, which will ensure that he or she ensures 
that the risks and safety barriers that currently exist are secured.  
cf. Chapter 5 and Appendix A. 
1.3.4 Application 
The INFOmaps can be used in a number of ways, but it is essential to show both the 
employer and the employee how risks can be observed and assessed as well as what 
actions are required. 
The 2 x 17 INFOmaps can be considered as being very general and succinct. However, 
they have been devised to be used for the initial introduction and to create an 
understanding at a general level. The INFOmaps may even appear to be confusing when 
first encountered. 
However, the aim is to create clarity of and accessibility to the knowledge about risks, 
safety barriers, quality parameters and to transform this into something that can be used in 
the daily work place. 
The INFOmaps are intended to be used for the daily continuous assessment of risks that 
needs to take place in work places where risks vary from job to job and from time to time, 
etc. 
However, the INFOmaps may also be used for instruction and training that can make 
employers, supervisors and employees more aware of risks, safety barriers and their 
quality parameters. 
The INFOmaps may also be used to communicate the risks that are present particularly 
frequently in some jobs and the safety barriers and quality parameters that we should be 
particularly aware of in each job. 
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That is to say that the INFOmaps may be used both internally by the organisations 
themselves and by training establishments as well as by organisations and authorities to 
communicate their information. 
1.4 Prevention by means of management involvement 
1.4.1 The message 
” Safety begins with management or it does not begin at all”. If the management do not 
prioritise safety in a way that enables the employees to understand it and believe in it, the 
employees will not do so either. 
Good safety can only be achieved when employers, supervisors and employees work out 
how to cooperate so that everybody becomes involved in the agreements and activities 
that need to be implemented in order to achieve safety. Only when this has been 
accomplished can commitment to and co-responsibility for safety throughout the whole 
organisation be created. 
1.4.2 Background 
A frequently employed preventative strategy that only investigate the accidents that occur 
and on the basis of this ensures that there is no repeat performance. This very reactive, 
preventative strategy has been termed ”the Accident Cycle”. What most commonly 
happens is that you relax after great efforts in achieving a decrease in the accidents 
statistics and then after a period of time accidents start to happen again to the great 
frustration of those who have made the efforts, cf. Chapter 2. 
A better preventative strategy would be if the management were to decide that safety 
needed to be increased and put a series of campaigns and initiatives into operation in 
order to achieve a low level of accidents. If the efforts are clearly driven by the 
management with rules, incentives, penalties and instructions and the strategy is top-down 
controlled and is based on how well you perform in relation to the demands that have 
been made, the efforts will usually have an effect up to a certain level. In this way a new 
safety platform has been created that assesses on the basis of the number of accidents per 
million working hours and is termed calculating prevention. 
With this proactive prevention focus is shifted away from looking at accidents and risks 
to looking at safety and safety barriers. It has been initiated and supported by the 
management but is driven by the employees and takes place in an interaction and 
cooperation between the two parties. The starting point is a thorough knowledge of risks, 
causes and indications that safety is not as it should be. This knowledge is coached and 
embedded into each employee as part of his or her professional foundation. 
It is pointed out again and again in the literature that safety must be integrated into the 
whole organisation and function at all management levels and involve all employees in 
their daily work tasks. In this context transformational management is cited as being the 
most successful type of management in achieving low accidents frequencies. 
When talking about management here, this refers to general, tactical and strategic 
management, which in large organisations may involve different people, while in small 
organisations this may be a single person. However, there are different types of 
considerations, decisions and actions at each of these three levels. 
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Two management styles in particular are cited as being effective in achieving a high level 
of safety. 
1. Management through target management and positive feedback. 
2. Change management. 
These are both recognised management styles even if they are usually used in areas other 
than that of safety.  
However, the literature has described some very positive experiences of the use of both of 
these management styles in organisations. Operating these management styles in 
conjunction with the development of a good safety culture will make very good sense.  
The important factors that characterise a good safety culture are said to include: 
 Commitment to safety and involvement that can both motivate and secure the 
necessary resources, etc. 
 Competences consisting of access to the correct information and training so that 
the correct action can be taken. 
 Awareness of the specific hazards, risk and safety barriers that are absolutely 
necessary elements in maintaining safety. 
The following are also said to be just as important in achieving a good safety culture: 
 A genuine and sustained management commitment to safety, that is to say 
prioritising safety over production, a sustained high profile at safety meetings, 
personal participation of the managers at safety meetings and in inspection rounds, 
face-to-face meetings with the employees with safety as the topic and completed 
job descriptions that contain a type of safety contract. 
 Communication of safety topics, that is to say widespread formal and informal 
communication and regular meetings regarding safety issues between the top 
management, middle management, the general management and the employees. 
 Involvement of the employees, that is to say allowing the employees to attend to 
safety issues, to delegate responsibility for safety and to encourage the employees 
to commit themselves to the organisation‟s target for the safety level. 
1.4.3 Management tools 
Safety is therefore a management task that must be integrated into the whole organisation 
and have the total involvement of the employees. It is a task that consists of many 
elements and which takes time to accomplish.  
The tool developed by the Dutch WORM project for use by management in its 
prioritisation is an electronic calculation program (ORCA), which can show the risks 
present within an organisation, i.e. the probability of a serious accident occurring and the 
measures that are worth while implementing from an economic and risk perspective, cf. 
Chapter 5. 
ORCA is available in two versions.  
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The first version is a ”stand-alone” application that contains the full and very specific 
calculation program.  
The second version is a simplified web-based system (WebOrca) that is a light version of 
the full ORCA inspired by the simplification developed by DanWORM. This web version 
is available in Danish, English and Dutch. 
Web Orca is available by contacting www.weborca.nl. 
In order to be able to perform the calculations, some information is required on the work 
that you wish the calculation to be performed on and the conditions under which this 
work takes place. This information is: 
 Indication of the professional groups contained within an organisation, for 
example. 
 Indication of the number of people included in each professional group and the 
number of these who are over 50 years old. 
 Details of their working hours with hours per day, days per week and weeks per 
year. 
 Division of tasks for each professional group. The purpose of this is to delimit 
specific work tasks that can be assessed for sources of risk, exposure times and the 
quality of the safety barriers. 
 Indication of the risk situations/hazards associated with each work task given that 
the 4-17-64 risk situations can be chosen from. 
 For each work task an indication of the amount of time used to perform the task as 
a percentage of the total working hours. 
 An assessment of the safety barriers that the system identifies on the basis of the 
specified risk situations. A simple five-stage scale is used here, ranging from 
”poor-unreliable-average-good-excellent”. 
In other words, there is a need for quite a lot of information, both on the whole 
organisation and on each employee and his or her specific work tasks. In return for this a 
risk calculation and a risk profile are obtained that can clearly be used as prioritising tools 
for an organisation‟s initiatives regarding accidents. 
The tools that were developed by the DanWorm project are the previously described 
methodologies used to chart APV, describe safety barriers and their quality parameters 
and the INFO maps that have been devised. In addition to this, the DanWorm project has 
entered into a an ongoing collaboration with the WORM project, in particular into a 
dialogue regarding the presentation of data to make this data more easily accessible, cf. 
Appendices B and C. 
1.4.4 Application 
The various tools can be included in the management‟s strategy and implementation of 
initiatives to achieve a high level of safety and a good safety culture within an 
organisation. 
In this report reference is made to a management concept that is a combination of change 
management and target management, i.e. feedback, cf. Chapter 6. 
A change concept is suggested that comprises: 
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A learning process in which all of those involved gain knowledge of the safety 
problems that really need to be resolved and how these should 
be resolved. 
A political process in which those involved in the process are assigned roles and 
responsibilities, possibly special privileges and powers and 
where a coalition of participants is established to measure the 
changes. 
A symbolic process in which a new culture is given an identity by means of 
symbols, rituals, rewards, story telling and its own language. 
Integrated into this concept is the target management concept using feedback, 
cf. Chapter 6. 
A four stage training programme is suggested. 
1. Stage one is an educational programme in which instruction is given into risks, 
safety barriers and quality parameters as well as management objectives and 
prioritisations. 
2. Stage 2 is a period of training on the job in which the knowledge that has been 
acquired during the educational programme is translated into a method for 
applying this new knowledge into daily work. 
3. Stage 3 is an accessibility of all information, new knowledge, recovery of 
knowledge from the educational programme, etc. so that everybody knows where 
they can find the necessary information. This also includes knowledge about 
accidents, knowledge about materials and technical equipment, APV's that have 
been conducted, user instructions, etc. 
4. Stage 4 is a recording and analysis of accidents and near misses that can be used 
in any subsequent reviews of the prioritisations and to keep an eye on any areas 
that the training has not fully reached. 
A four stage organisation programme is suggested: 
5. Stage 5 is the involvement of the employees in the changes that are to be 
implemented. This includes incorporating the employees‟ knowledge of risks into 
their daily duties and their opinions as to what is most important. 
6. Stage 6 is to ensure a daily dialogue regarding safety between the employee and 
the general manager in order to create awareness of prioritisation and to maintain 
focus. 
7. Stage 7 is a holding of toolbox meetings where there is need for special awareness 
of safety problems prior to commencing work. This is important, for example, 
when the tasks concern additional people and/or people from outside of the 
organisation. 
8. Stage 8 is a review of risks and safety barriers in order to follow goals, strategies 
and initiatives and determine whether these have achieved results. 
A two stage symbolic programme is suggested: 
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9. Stage 9 is a relatively frequent walkaround by the top executive where she or she 
will show his or her visibility and awareness of safety. 
10. Stage 10 is a series of symbolic events that can create stories and pride and lead to 
the awarding of prizes, adulation and glory. 
Tools and knowledge about risks, safety barriers and quality parameters have been 
developed in all of these stages and calculation programs and recording methods have 
been integrated where appropriate. 
An idea can also be given as how the development of an APV should be tackled and to 
conduct an audit, cf. Chapter 6. 
 
1.5 Prevention in small organisations 
1.5.1 The message 
The prevention of accidents in small organisations must be realised on the basis of the 
same principle that apply to large organisations but in accordance with small organisation 
conditions. 
Where large organisations have an organisation and resources to implement targeted 
initiatives regarding safety, others outside of the small organisation must assist in creating 
the basis on which the small organisation is able to act. 
A high level of safety in small organisations cannot be achieved until there exists a 
general desire for this an discourse in society. 
1.5.2 Background 
In Denmark in excess of 178,000 organisations with employees and in excess of 121,000 
sole trading organisations are registered. Among the organisations with employees 85% 
have less than 20 employees, 10% between 20 and 50 employees, 3% between 50 and 100 
employees and only 2% have more than 100 employees.  
Hasle et al 2004 conducted a literature analysis that describes the problems associated 
with safety initiatives in small organisations, cf. Chapter 2 thus: 
- That the safety within small organisations is largely determined by the culture and 
understanding that the employer and the owner of the organisation has in relation to the 
aspect of safety. It is the owner who is the focal point for the tasks and duties of the 
organisation and who is responsible for the way in which safety is prioritised and 
implemented into daily work. At the same time, the owner has many different duties that 
must be attended to in his or her daily work and he or she will usually perceive systematic 
work environment initiatives as one of the more peripheral duties. 
- That systematic work environment initiatives in small organisations are usually limited, 
and that the same applies to all other types of systematic planning and management. The 
employer or the owner has a tendency to surrender responsibility for safety to the 
employees. The employer usually views safety as an individual problem and only the 
necessary safety equipment is provided. 
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- That it is important to recognise that employers and employees in small organisations 
are witness to very few accidents and therefore have limited opportunities of gaining their 
own knowledge of the hazards that can lead to accidents. For this reason, among others, 
the understanding that safety is an important topic is similarly limited. 
- That over the last 5-10 years a number of different methods and tools have been 
developed, which have been trialled in small organisations, but the general experience is 
that it is difficult to disseminate and create interest in the results within small 
organisations. Small Organisations need to realise that these results provide then with 
something they can use in their daily work. Something that can make the average day a 
bit easier and which is immediately understandable as regards why and how these should 
use these results. It is also known that the employers of small organisation are motivated 
by personal contact and when they are given the opportunity to exchange experiences 
with colleagues.  
- That small organisations in the traditional regulated market do not have the resources at 
their disposal that are required by the paperwork for a safety management system in a 
rule-based system. Employers within small organisations need to relay in their 
employees‟ abilities and the mutual more informal communication to a far greater extent. 
Kogi 2006 has amassed a number of experiences of successful initiatives implemented 
within small organisations and has come up with two primary criteria:  
1) that improvements are best achieved if local knowledge of best practices is used 
2) and assistance is given in disseminating this knowledge via dialogue between 
local groups. In connection with this, the importance is highlighted of the 
objective for the small organisation being the use of good local practices, to be 
shown self-help actions at a low level of cost and to provide an experienced 
facilitator with support for a continuous process.  
3) That a starting point has been taken in the positive features of small organisations 
that include the informal style of management. Also the use of local people as we 
communicate best with people that we already know. 
This is illustrated by a five stage action plan: 
1. To learn good local practices through good examples via photographs, video, brief 
descriptions 
2. To check up on practical solutions, action checklists and lists of low-costs ideas. 
3. The implementation of simple improvements using available action manuals on 
how to act quickly and with ease without the need for a large number of resources. 
4. To confirm the gains by means of, for example, success stories, recognition, any 
easing with regards to the authorities and insurance. 
However, the first major problem in starting a process is creating an understanding within 
the small organisation that safety is important for the organisation and that an initiative 
into this area should be prioritised cf. Chapter 2. 
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1.5.3 DanWorm observations 
The goals of the DanWorm project include investigating the opportunity to use the results 
from the WORM project so that these may be used by small organizations, cf. Chapter 4. 
The first acknowledgement is that the electronic calculation program (ORCA) is too 
complicated and requires too much information in order for a small organisation to want 
to use it. 
The conclusion is that other people will have to collect the information and present the 
results to the small organisation. The DanWork project has conducted two case studies in 
which the data for two professional groups has been gathered, namely carpenters and 
caretakers. 
Data has been gathered on the risk exposure, safety barriers and quality parameters for 
these two professional groups. Data has also been input into ORCA, which can then 
display a general risk profile for the work of the two professional groups in small 
organisations. 
For this purpose the structure of the 64 risks in the 4-17-64 classification has been 
developed as a suitable method with which to conduct a systematic risk observation. 
The observation program for PDA has also been developed as a tool to enable a work 
environment expert to conduct observations. 
Observations have been conducted for a total of 20 individuals per professional group, 
where each individual is monitored over the course of three whole work days. That is to 
say that 60 days of observations were conducted for carpenters and caretakers all of 
whom were employed in small organizations, cf. Chapter 4. Finally, observations were 
conducted for a total of 20 individuals per professional group, where each  
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1.5.4 Application 
The DanWorm project has in this way discovered a method to devise risk profiles for 
employees of small organisations to provide them with an insight into which areas they 
should focus on from a safety perspective. 
A simple information tool has been developed in the form of INFOmap to determine what 
should be observed in the daily work and the appropriate action to take. 
In all of the small organisations in which DanWork has conducted observations an 
organisation report has been produced with 10 points of recommendations for the 
employer and the employee. 
However, the DanWorm project has not intervened in these organisations, i.e. the results 
were not tested in the organisations in order to see if there was anything that they thought 
needed working on, or if suck knowledge would change anything at all in their method of 
planning and performing work. 
The small organisations that participated in the DanWorm project are characterised by 
having a certain prioritisation of safety, which was the reason why they agreed to 
participate in the project. 
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On the other hand the demands of the working day were such that there were no resources 
for much else than showing interest and friendliness. All were invited to receive a further 
introduction into the meaning of safety and accident prevention. All gave the impression 
of wanting to hear about this and that they wanted to find a time to assemble all 
employees for a joint dialogue. None have contacted us in order to implement the 
initiative. 
This is not because they do not want to, but there are not the resources for anything that is 
still seen as being a little unnecessary. That is alright. 
A targeted initiative at industry level could be conducted by industry associations where 
work environment professionals could assist in the development of industrial risk profiles 
and a dialogue about the risks that it is important to take action over. 
Small organisations are so varied and so numerous and with different cultures, resources, 
prioritisations, etc. that the initiatives to motivate and create focus need to take place at a 
general level, i.e. nationally or perhaps at industry level. 
1.6 Future research and development 
The Worm and DanWorm projects have resulted in expanding our knowledge of risks, 
safety barriers and quality parameters for the prevention of accidents. 
However, as has been stated, it is not sufficient to have knowledge and tools. Knowledge 
needs to be disseminated, opportunities need to be created for its use and there needs to be 
a desire for safety.  
There is still insufficient research into how this could be achieved in these areas, with 
regards large and small organisations. 
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Chapter 2. The theoretical basis 
”Knowledge is prediction – Prediction is prevention" (free quotation from Sartre), this is a 
perspective that fits in with the prevention of occupational accidents. However, the 
question is how do we create such knowledge. A good deal of research has been 
conducted into the causes of accidents and their prevention over the last 100 years with a 
development from identifying those who are prone to accidents for the technical measures 
and onto looking at human behaviour, to more systematic and safety-cultural forms. 
This section does not provide a complete review of this research, but is rather an attempt 
at gaining a contemporary overview of the most recent theoretical approaches to 
understanding the causes of accidents and to achieve improved safety at work. This 
should also be placed into the context of the small organisation and its opportunities for 
creating safety for its own employees. 
The theoretical basis is illustrated by three approaches:  
1. The first part concerns an understanding of occupational accidents as a concept 
and the mechanisms behind the explanations of causes and consequences. Here 
the starting point is the accident and the knowledge that can be gained by looking 
at what has occurred. The goal is to create an understanding for the elements that 
need to be activated in order to achieve a proactive prevention of accidents. 
2. The second part concerns an understanding of safety initiatives within 
organisations consisting of the knowledge of proactive prevention before the 
accident has occurred. This focuses on areas such as management, behaviour, 
securing of safety barriers and safety culture. 
3. The third part concerns the small organisation, its style of management and 
function and the research that has thus far been conducted into safety and accident 
prevention in small organisations. 
2.1 An understanding of the occupational accident and its causes 
In order to be able to prevent accidents it may be appropriate to understand how they can 
happen before they happen. However, the possibilities of the occurrence of an accident 
are manifold and therefore even if we believe that everything is as it should be, accidents 
will happen, just like a flash out of the blue. The surprise and the acknowledgement that 
we were unable to cope with the situation and foresee what could have gone wrong means 
that there is a large focus on investigating accidents when they occur. This is often 
connected with establishing responsibility, but an investigation into an accident can also 
provide us with a good basis for learning. 
Investigations and analyses of accidents have produced both method-based and 
theoretical models that attempt to create order in the numerous conditions of significance 
should an accident occur. In this section the most important results from the last few years 
will be presented.  
2.1.1 The concept of the Occupational Accident 
Within the field of accident research attempts have been made to define and describe “the 
accident and the occupational accident” in a number of different ways. However, 
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common to the definitions is that the sequence consists of, to a lesser or larger extent, the 
causes, the critical event and the subsequent consequences (Rasmussen 1997, Jørgensen 
2002). In this report the following concept is defined as: 
The Occupational Accident 
A sudden and unexpected event or series of events occur or occurs when work is 
performed that results in something injurious causing injury or damage to people, 
materials, processes, etc. 
 
Related to this concepts such as the near miss and dangerous situations and dangerous 
actions have been developed as important elements of prevention.  
These two concepts can be defined in parallel to the concept of the accident in the 
following way (Jørgensen 2002): 
The near miss 
”A sudden and unexpected event or series of events that contains or contain something 
that can cause injury or damage, but due to fortuitous circumstances does not have 
injurious consequences”. 
 
Dangerous situations and dangerous actions 
” Situations or actions that have the potential for the occurrence of sudden and 
unexpected events, which contain a source of danger that can cause injury or damage”. 
 
This concept particularly related to the event “Accident” and a delimitation of the levels 
from the potential event to the event that leads to an undesirable consequence.  
A further two concepts will be presented, namely the concept of Danger – Hazards and 
the concept of risk. 
Danger – hazards 
”Danger or a source of danger is usually placed in relation to one or another type of 
energy that can cause injury or damage is it is released in an incorrect manner”.  
 
The danger therefore lies in our losing control over the energy. Here energy can be 
understood in a very broad sense in order to cover all of the types of injurious 
circumstances that can cause injury or damage in a sudden and unexpected event. 
Risk 
” The concept of risk is usually expressed as the probability of a given undesirable 
consequence occurring”. 
 
However, the concept of risk is not a precise concept and is dependent on who the risk 
concerns and what the risk comprises. What represents a risk to one individual can quite 
easily represent an advantage to another individual, cf. Section 2.1.4. 
2.1.2 The hindsight of accidents 
Kirkegård‟s theorem that life is understood in reverse but must be lived in forward, 
expresses a central problem in the attempt to understand the causes of accidents and their 
prevention. With the benefit of hindsight it is always easier to understand why an accident 
occurred. A good question is how can we identify and asses a risk for an accident and not 
least foresee the possible consequence that an accident could involve and be able to act on 
this basis. 
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But how do we foresee that an event will occur at this very time and place 
and affect this or these very individual or individuals? 
Generally we are unable to do so and this is why we have to use other aids in an attempt 
to prevent an accident. We may well believe that there is a possibility but not necessarily 
know where and when. 
In the previous research into occupational accidents the research was targeted at the 
individual, i.e. the victim as it was believed that the individual was the cause. He or she 
could of course have acted more appropriately and could have foreseen the situation. This 
view that the injured party "is to blame" is still prevalent even though research has long 
since departed from this view of the cause of accidents.  
The reason is that each specific accident often occurs in situations that are “common”, i.e. 
situations that are well-known to the injured party and those in his immediate 
surroundings. Where it can be obvious after the fact what he or she "did wrong” in the 
situation or what he or she should have done differently. However, the question is 
whether it is correct to predict the correct and incorrect way for the injured party to act by 
noticing before the accident occurred and whether he or she is able to act differently. 
When a person takes a chance in a situation there are always a series of fact that motivate 
the person‟s actions (Krause T.R. 1995). As an example of this is the following analysis: 
” A group of repairmen fail to collect a ladder when they are about to repair some pipes. 
They instead climb up onto railings to reach the pipes.” 
An analysis of the causes of this behaviours include: 
1. The work group has a lot of tasks to complete and is under time pressure. 
2. There is limited access to ladders that can be used. 
3. It is a long way to where the ladders are to be collected. 
4. The group has the attitude that that they can easily manage the task. 
5. None has otherwise received any form of training or instruction into how the 
problem is to be solved. 
An analysis of the consequences of the chosen behaviour shows the following picture: 
1. Since the group decides not to spend time in collecting a ladder they will complete 
the task faster. 
2. In this way the group will be able to have a longer break before the next task. 
3. There is a risk of somebody falling, but this rarely happens. 
4. By being able to work without using a ladder the group feels that they are 
mastering a difficult task and are therefore capable. 
5. The group also avoids having to wait around until one of the others collects the 
ladder. 
6. The group avoids further work pressure from their supervisor as they complete the 
task quickly.  
As can be seen, there are a large number of good reasons for the risky behaviour and a 
number of positive consequences that contribute to the group‟s choice of method. Only 
when and if somebody falls down will they all be able to see that they should have 
allocated time to collecting a ladder. 
In the majority of accidents a thorough charting of the course of events shows that there is 
always a series of causes that explain why the accident occurred  
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Burnt foot and ankle 
He stepped on a saucepan  
There was scolding hot  
food in the saucepan 
He had to walk  
round the cooker  
The saucepan had  
been placed where  
he was walking    
He did not see the saucepan 
The food had just  
been cooked  
He was very busy He was operating  
two cooker plates  
It had not been  
possible to push the  
saucepan in under the  
cooker 
 
 
There was no  
other available space  
The layout of the 
kitchen and the task 
necessitated this  
The saucepan was 
completely full and 
difficult to move  
There were a large 
number of simultaneous 
orders in operation  
There is no depositing area 
for prepared food  
Figure 1 
(Andersen 1991, Rasmussen et al 1987, Jørgensen 2001, 2002). There is therefore a series 
of sequences of causes and a simultaneity of causes that create the accident.  
This can be illustrated by an example: 
”A trainee chef suffers burns to his foot and ankle when he steps on a saucepan 
lying on the floor containing a scolding hot meal”. The saucepan has been placed 
on the floor at the end a cooker. There are other people working on both sides of 
the cooker and at some of the cooker plates. The trainee chef is performing a task 
that requires him to operate cooker plates on both sides of the cooker. It is very 
busy. What usually happens is that saucepans containing prepared food that are 
awaiting being taken away are placed on the floor under the cooker and not beside 
the cooker”. 
The accident analysis that applies a fault tree analysis shows the following sequences as 
the series of causes to the consequences of the accident, see Figure 1:  
Figure 1 illustrates a fault tree analysis for the accident example of the trainee chef who 
burnt his foot. 
The example can illustrate, among other things, that the individual causes is not in itself 
sufficient for the accident to occur. For example, he would not have fallen over the 
saucepan if he did not have to go round the cooker or of if he had seen the saucepan. Nor 
would he have fallen over it if it had been pushed under the cooker. It is therefore the 
simultaneity that is the “guilty party”, i.e. the fact that he had to go round the cooker, the 
fact that there was a saucepan where he was walking and did not see it. 
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The phenomena can be compared with an image of a Swiss cheese with holes (Reason 
1997). The accident occurs when the safety barriers have “holes”, i.e. are not working 
properly, and that these "holes” occur simultaneously, which results in a latent risk 
becoming an accident and resulting in a loss. 
Figure 2 shows Reason’s model for the path from risk to accident by the Swiss cheese 
with holes in the safety barriers (Reason 1997). 
This ”simultaneity” of barrier failure is basically what creates the opportunity for the 
accident to occur. For large technical devices this can possibly be something that can be 
taken into account, but for the more common, day to day accidents this is an unknown 
quantity as there are a vast number of ways in which the safety barriers can fail. This is 
difficult for an individual to predict in an instant. This also means that if we want to 
safeguard ourselves against all causes, this will immediately make our daily lives very 
complicated and we do not of course want to be wrapped in cotton wool. 
There is always risk where people are present and travel. The individual learns from 
childhood what is dangerous and what can cause injury. For example, it is well known 
that a knife can cut, that a fall of two metres can cause injury, that ice is slippery and 
makes it difficult to keep balance, that a hot plate can burn, etc. Despite this accidents do 
happen again and again through such fairly commonplace hazards. 
Is this because people do not understand how to behave appropriately and does this lead 
us back to the old fashioned view of the accident prone person? It is frequently said that 
in order to prevent occupational accidents “human behaviour” needs to be looked at. The 
only problem is that this has been done for a very long time without it having been of any 
significant help to the occurrence of accidents. However, let us nevertheless look at what 
the research has to say about human errors and faulty actions, which have been in 
particular focus within the area of “Major Hazards”. 
2.1.3 Errors and dealing with errors 
Since it is people who operate, maintain, design and manage technological systems, it is 
difficult to get round the fact that when something happens that should not happen, one or 
more people at one place or another within the decision-making and action process should 
have made different decisions and acted differently. In principle every error within a 
manmade system is a human error. Therefore we also see evidence for a minimum of 
90% of all accidents being due to human errors and therefore reach the logical conclusion 
Accident 
 Danger 
Figure 2 
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that human behaviour needs to be addressed. However, the question is which people and 
at what point in the decision-making chain do the faults occur, which will not be 
answered here. The following is just a description of different ways to view faults and 
incorrect actions. 
Over the years a number of researchers have attempted to identify and categorise faults 
and incorrect actions. (Rasmussen 1987 et al) talks about cognitive levels, as: 
• Experience-based errors, i.e. 
•  errors in performance 
•  errors in memory 
• Rule-based errors (incorrectly applied rules) 
• Knowledge-based errors and misunderstandings 
This categorisation is further illustrated by Reason (1990) by the following model,  
Figure 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows Reason’s structure and understanding of errors and incorrect actions, 
(Reason 1990) 
Others have compiled lists of errors types, among these, Koornneef offers the following 
categorisation of error types (Koornneef 2000): 
1. Materials and equipment, such as faulty or incorrect equipment, faulty or incorrect 
materials, faulty reinforcement, welding, soldering, etc., faults in the manufacture 
of the consignment and labelling, electronic or instrumental noise, contamination. 
2. Procedural problems, such as faulty or inadequate procedures, lack of procedures. 
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3. Personal errors as a consequence of an inadequate work environment or other 
personal-related errors, such as inattention to detail, non-compliance with 
requirements or procedures, verbal communication problems.  
4. Design problems, such as insufficient human-machine interface, faulty design, 
incorrect choice of equipment or materials, errors in diagrams, specifications or 
data.  
5. Training or education faults, such as no training provided, inadequate practical 
and hands on experience, inadequate content, inadequate re-training, inadequate 
presentation of the material. 
6. Management problems, such as inadequate administrative control, inadequate 
planning and organisation, inadequate supervision, inadequate resource allocation, 
inadequately defined, communicated or implemented policy, other management 
problems. 
7. External problems and phenomena such as the weather and other problems in the 
surroundings, energy failures or short-term energy supply, fire or explosion, theft, 
sabotage, vandalism or forgery, etc. 
These error types can in many ways be compared with the explanations of the cause of 
accidents. 
Groeneweg (1996) has specified generic error types, i.e. conditions that contribute to the 
creation of unsafe conditions and unsafe actions. Such generic error types are as follows: 
 Design faults – inadequate design in everything from the whole organisation‟s 
physical framework to tangible aids 
 Hardware faults – inadequate condition or availability of aids, tools and machines 
 Procedural faults – poor quality or inadequacy in the procedures that are to be 
operated under 
 Faults in the working conditions – poor working conditions and conditions that 
encourage the possibility of misunderstandings 
 Order and cleanliness – in the form of mess and disorder 
 Incompatible goals – health and safety cannot be maintained die to time pressures 
and lack of resources 
 Communication – inadequate or deficient communication between the line, 
between departments and between colleagues 
 Organisation – management and the way in which the organisation operates is 
inadequate 
 Maintenance – deficient maintenance procedures 
 Safety barriers – deficient or poor safety measures in place for risky situations 
In this sense of faults occurring at several levels within the decision-making and action 
processes, Reason (1997) form the following explanatory model: 
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Figure 4 shows Reason’s explanatory model for the causes of accidents (Reason 1997) 
Where faults and actions on the basis of this can be grouped into: 
1. Incorrect actions that are specific faults carried out by the individuals in the 
performing part at operational level 
2. Malfunctions that are latent faults as a result of decisions taken by the line 
management, designers and planners at tactical level. 
3. Source errors that are based on the decisions that have been taken by the top 
management, the client or the architect at strategic level. 
This is further supported by Kjellen (2000), who instead talks of types of fundamental 
faults, types of functional faults, types of condition faults and unsafe actions. 
In this way a broad perspective of faults has been provided, which explains how accidents 
can occur. It can be discussed whether faults are always involved or whether it is only 
factors that through their conditions and contexts create latent risks and thereby become 
part of the cause complex. We will explore this in a subsequent section. 
However, there are therefore many types of mistake that can be made by many different 
parties, both among those who make decision and those who act. But in order not to make 
mistakes knowledge of the risk is required. 
2.1.4 The understanding/perception of risks 
”Safety must be created and recreated every day, there are no final solutions, 
unfortunately” (Hovden 2001) 
Professor Jan Hovden´s motto for the Norwegian safety days is ” the only certain thing is 
that nothing is certain.”, (Hovden 2001) 
In a lecture on ” Our ignorance of risks”, Jan Hovden expresses his philosophical 
observations of arrogance, of the belief in our own superiority, that we are able to manage 
40 
everything, can also be considered as one of the seven deadly sins in a safety-related 
context. Such arrogance can be and is deadly. The truth and the solution to avoiding 
dangers is quite simply not to be found in an area such as this, which contains so many 
and cross-disciplinary specialist areas, continues Jan Hovden and at the same time says 
that despite this must not lead to resignation, but only to a humility and continued search 
for more knowledge, experience and  understanding of which hazards we are being 
exposed to and how accidents can be prevented (Hovden 2001). 
The fact of the matter is that there will always be a certain risk of injury whenever we 
travel and what ever we do. The task is to make it possible for the individual to observe 
and tackle the dangers that he or she encounters and thereby prevent accidents, or at the 
very least minimise the probability of the accident occurring. This tasks includes three 
important prerequisites (Sundström-Frisk 1991):  
1. The ability to recognise and know which risk is being taken. 
2. The ability to know how the recognised risks can be tackled and the ability and to 
avoid them. 
3. The willingness and desire to do what has to be done.  
How great a risk can be run in a specific situation can be difficult to recognise, understand 
and assess and at the same time possess the necessary knowledge to act accordingly.  
It is very difficult to achieve a good understanding of risks. Research has shown that a 
misunderstanding of  the probabilities of accidents, influences from media of risk levels 
and misleading personal experiences often create incorrect assessments in the form of 
underestimating or overestimating the risk. (Lin et al 2007) 
A distinction must be made between the limited risk, which is usually based on statistical 
data, which is often termed “objective” or “actual” risk and the experienced risk, which is 
a subjective assessment of the risk.  
As regards the subjective risk, a distinction is made between the general subjective risk, 
as an expression of the generally experienced risk and the specific subjective risk, which 
is an expression for what an individual experiences in the situation in question . (Hovden 
1984, Jørgensen 2002, Lin et al 2007) 
There now follows an overview of the factors that in one way or another have an 
influence on the subjective risk experience divided into the factors that cause the 
objective risk to be underestimated and the factors that cause the objective risk to be 
overestimated. (Lin et al 2007) 
Diagram 1 
Underestimation of the objective risk Overestimation of the objective risk 
Non fatal risk Fatal 
Voluntary risk Involuntary, compulsive 
Natural risk Industrially conditional 
Scientific well-known risk Scientific unknown or new 
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Well-known risk Unknown risk 
Risk that can be controlled by the 
individual 
Risk that is controlled by others 
Risk that is in the hands of a reliable 
source 
Risk that is in the hands of an unreliable  
source 
Risk that is dealt with responsibly Risk that is dealt with irresponsibly 
Risk where the consequences are reversible Risk where the consequences are 
irreversible 
Risk where the consequences are 
immediate 
Risk with delayed effect 
Risk to which children are not exposed Risk to which children are exposed 
Risk that is not unethical or immoral Risk that is perceived as unethical and 
immoral 
Risk that is not remembered Risk that is remembered 
Risk that is perceived as coincidental Small risk that is expected to lead to 
catastrophe 
Risk with little media attention Risk that receives a lot of media attention 
When the risk of perceived to be statistical, 
irrelevant 
When the risk is perceived to be relevant 
Diagram 1 shows a free translation of Lin et al’s diagram for when the subjective risk 
experience is usually overestimated or underestimated (Lin et al 2007)  
The calculated risk is usually expressed as the probability of a specific undesirable 
consequence occurring and can in its form appear unrealistic to the individual. 
The reason for this is partly because the probability for an accident is determined by 
situation and party, with the influence of many visible and hidden factors at the same time 
as a undesirable consequence can be in “competition” with other undesirable 
consequences of the situation.  
Where there is an undesirable consequence for a party, this can, for example, involve a 
desired consequence for another party. For example, when employees take the risk of 
quickly completing a piece of work, this usually benefits the employer or the customer 
(Hovden 1984). 
Even those who are taking the risk will often gain from the situation, if the risk-
conditional consequence otherwise fails to materialise. It is this dualism that is at play and 
which complicates the basis for creating prevention. 
The perception of risk is influenced by a number of factors, which means that the 
perceived risk can be far removed from the actual objective risk. 
The following are examples of factors that can influence on inappropriate perception of 
risk (Glendon et al 2007): 
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 The self-serving bias, where the individual is prepared to take the credit for 
successes achieved but lays the blame on other when things go wrong.  This factor 
contributes to causes and contexts being perceived as something that lie outside of 
his or her area of responsibility. 
 The seriousness of the consequence is of significance for who ascribed which 
responsibility. This comes from the idea that more serious consequences are the 
responsibility of the manager as this is something that must be able to be 
controlled, in contrast to the less serious consequences that are the responsibility 
of the individual. 
 False agreement is when the individual believes that the perception of risk that he 
or she has is the same as that of everybody else and it is therefore the correct one. 
 The variation in situational behaviour is underestimated, where it is believed that 
you can act in exactly the same way as you did before with success, without 
reassessing whether you are actually in the same situation. 
 People give negative information a higher weighting than positive information, 
which is experienced in successful situations, but where a single little negative 
point can drown out everything else. 
 The availability of “easy” explanations as to what is dangerous, which are used to 
simplify problems that are difficult to access. The media and press coverage can 
contribute to creating a general understanding that is easy to use, but which can 
lead to fundamentally incorrect conclusions. For example, the fact that cancer is 
more dangerous than asthma, even though far more many people die of asthma 
than of cancer. 
 The representativity of what has happened before is of greater significant for an 
assessment of the future than an actual assessment of the future probability. For 
example, when the number of accidents rises, this is also interpreted as an increase 
in the risk and as the risk decreasing when the number of accidents falls, even if 
temporary fluctuations may be involved that will always be statistically present. 
 Few situations can make people perceive something as being more probable than 
the number of situations can actually provide a basis for establishment. 
 Where perceptions that were once established can be difficult to change regardless 
of how good evidence exists of anything to the contrary. 
 Belief in knowing what is right and in believing in one‟s own abilities, even if 
they often prove to have made the wrong assessment. 
 Hindsight, where you can always see what is wrong after the accident has 
occurred and where expressions such as “I knew this could happen” are made, 
even if nobody had reacted to the risk beforehand. 
Whilst the individual is able to think logically, people are not naturally logical thinkers in 
situations and are generally limited in their approaches to exercise any control over their 
surroundings. The results of this include: 
 That our learning from everyday existence is not structured to develop a 
recognition of control 
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 That we use simple and often simplified models of how the world functions 
 Our ability to process information is exaggerated 
 That we have a limited insight into the integration methods of information 
 That we are not proficient in using acquired knowledge 
”Knowledge gained from our day to day learning therefore may well be incorrect” 
quotation (Kreiner 2008) 
In other words, safety cannot be based solely on the individual‟s own assessment and own 
actions. There is need for training, reliable information, the systematic design of systems, 
detailed planning and control, expert systems in specific areas, clear auditing methods and 
evaluations of performance, which can ain combination whole result in a better 
understanding of risk and therefore a better safety culture. 
2.1.5 The causes and causality of occupational accidents 
The anatomy of accidents is described by many diverse models. Seen on the basis of a 
system theoretical approach, the majority of models have common features, which 
Rasmussen illustrates by the following chain of events, see Figure 5 (Rasmussen 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the cause – consequence chain in an accident (Rasmussen 2000) 
This model must not be interpreted as if there is a simple relationship between the five 
elements; on the contrary, the connection from one element to the other is quite 
complicated. However, the model does provide a structure to this complexity by 
illustrating the cause chain to thereby allow different types of preventative strategies to be 
differentiated and targeted. Such preventative strategies could, for example, be to remove 
the fundamental causes, to introduce safety barriers into the chain of events, to prevent 
the critical event, to minimise the effect process and to consider the target/victim. 
A more developed model for the anatomy of accidents is based on the attempts of thirteen 
different researchers to illustrate the causality of occupational accidents is shown, see 
Figure 6 (Jørgensen 2002): 
Where the left side is the expression of the cultures, standards and values of the people 
who are involved and the right side if the expression of the technological opportunities 
that exist to examine and assess risks. 
The single boxes in the model correspond to Rasmussen's five boxes and also contain the 
elements that a large number of other researchers have incorporated into their modulation 
of the causality of accidents. (Jørgensen 1982, Bird&Germain 1985, Groeneweg 1996, 
Andersson 1991, Raouf 1994, Koorneef & Hale 1995, Hale et al 1997, DePasquale & 
Geller 1999, Rasmussen & Svedlung 2000)  
Root 
causes 
Causal 
chains 
Critical 
event 
Flow of 
effects 
Target, 
victims 
Figure 5 
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The boxes also constitute the decision-making hierarchy of the people who determine 
work conditions and work processes and therefore both risk and safety conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows a taxonomy for causes and causality for occupational accidents 
(Jørgensen 2002) 
Injuries and loss include all of the consequences of accidents, which concerns both the 
human injuries and the losses that are associated with production stoppages, destroyed 
materials and equipment, etc. At this level there is a certain, but absolutely limited, 
preventative effect, e.g. if the basis is created for the quick treatment of the injuries and 
other types of injury-limiting devices. 
The undesirable events contain the hazards that cause the injuries and the undesirable 
events that result in the hazards causing the injuries. At this level it is important to be able 
to observe the hazards and that those who are exposed to the dangers know how to act. It 
is similarly important that there are built-in signals or devices that can come into effect if 
and when an undesirable event occurs. 
The immediate causes are at operator level and will usually be the causes that are noticed 
when the accident occurs. At this level the accident can usually be characterised by the 
occurrence, either on the personnel side or the technical side, of one or other type of error 
that can explain the event. At this level attention will also be directed to the behaviour and 
actions of the personnel and also to their knowledge and abilities to discover dangers and 
control these appropriately. 
The underlying causes lie in the organisational and technical conditions that exist, such as 
instruction, the layout of the work place, aids, motivation, work pressure, design, etc. and 
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the conditions that determine the performance of the work. Here it is the way in which the 
general management deals with is of great significance for how the employees act and 
also whether the general management has the ability and opportunity to understand what 
creates accidents and know what should be done. 
The control-related causes lie at the more strategic level, i.e. the goals and policies that 
govern the development and conditions to be able to function for the whole organisation. 
It is here where the policies are placed, consciously or unconsciously, which create the 
framework for the way in which the work is performed and the conditions under which it 
is performed. Herein also lie the safety-related objectives, strategies and reactions that are 
used to manage and control at the tactical and operational level. 
The external influences come from legislation and inspection practices of the authorities, 
but are also influenced by market mechanisms, demands by customers, conditions from 
suppliers, opportunities offered by technologies, etc. 
Good examples of how prevention can work down through these decision-making layers 
are the initiatives regarding mechanical safety. EU legislation and standardisations have 
brought about a significant development in technical safety at the same time as the 
authorities have exercised a certain amount of control in this area. This has provided 
organisations with improved opportunities to delivery safety technical equipment, with 
improved technical safety measures and visual warnings, instructions, etc. This means 
that the very usage provides the people who are to perform the work with a significantly 
safer work place than before. The fact that this has been effective is clearly borne out by 
the statistics from the last 30 years with a continually descending curve for the number of 
accidents when using stationary machines.  
2.1.6 The paradoxes of the risk of injury and prevention 
In order to understand accidents the accidents that occur must be investigated and 
analysed. However, if we are to prevent accidents this must be done before the accidents 
occur and without knowing whether anything will happen at all. This paradox is 
fundamental to the prevention of accidents. 
The knowledge gained from the accidents that occur can essentially only be used to learn 
from and to gather information on the fundamental causes that have create the basis for 
the accident as well as the flow of actions, events and situations that led to the accident. 
A frequently used preventative strategy is one that only investigates the accidents that 
occur and on the basis of this ensure that there is no repeat performance. This very 
reactive preventative strategy has been termed “the Accident Cycle”. What usually 
happens is that we relax after great efforts in achieving a decrease in the accidents 
statistics and then after a period of time accidents start to happen again to the great 
frustration of those who made the efforts. This accident cycles is illustrated in Figure 7. 
(Krause 1995).  
A better preventative strategy is, according to Figure 7, when the management takes the 
position that safety must be improved and therefore implements a series of campaigns and 
initiatives in order to achieve a low level of accidents. The initiatives are clearly driven by 
the management with rules, incentives, penalties and instructions. The strategy is 
generally top-down controlled and is based on how well we perform in relation to the 
demands that are placed on us. Such an initiative will usually have an effect up to a 
certain level. A new safety platform is created for implementation, which is measured on 
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the basis of the number of accidents per million working hours and is termed calculating 
prevention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 shows Krause’s illustration of three different preventative strategies and their 
effect on the accident level (Krause 1995) 
With this proactive prevention focus is shifted away from looking at accidents and risks 
to looking at safety and safety barriers. It has been initiated and supported by the 
management but is driven by the employees and takes place in an interaction and 
cooperation between the two parties. The starting point is a thorough knowledge of 
hazards, causes and indications that safety is not as it should be. This knowledge is 
coached and embedded into each employee as part of his or her professional foundation. 
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2.1.7 Scope of the problem 
 Research into accidents is predominantly based on looking at the dangers that in the 
event of an accident can result in extensive injuries to people and damage to the 
surroundings, i.e. “Major hazard”, which are completely unacceptable at a society level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 illustrates how different risks require different methods at the same time that 
they are subject to different attention (Rasmussen 1997).  
The question is how far the results from this research can be used for "the more common 
accidents”. In Figure 8 Rasmussen (1997) states the differences in the dependence of the 
types of accidents on the probability of the accident occurring and the consequence of the 
accidents. 
It is though-provoking that the vast majority of serious accidents are accidents in which 
only a single person is injured. Therefore the number of occupational accidents globally 
with fatal outcomes has been estimated to be 345,000 and non-fatal occupational 
accidents withy at least 3 days of absence from work to three billion, of which the 
industrialised countries account for 16,000 fatal occupational accidents and 12 million 
non-fatal occupational accidents with at least three days of absence from work  
(Takkala 1999) 
2.2 Proactive prevention of occupational accidents 
The proactive prevention of accidents aims to minimise the probability of accidents being 
able to occur.  
In this section we will concentrate on a number of proactive preventative methods that 
focus on methods at operator level and at management level and those than can cause 
- Closely-connected system creating accident anatomy 
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these two ends to meet and fuse together in a common space that will create a long-term 
basis for a good safety culture.  
Understanding of accidents and their causes in Section 2.1 shows that the risk of accident 
can be difficult to assess and predict, especially in our day to day work. However, we can 
use the knowledge gained from the many accidents that have occurred to create an 
awareness of the safety barriers that will prevent these accidents from occurring. By 
focusing on the safety barriers instead of the accidents we have an instrument that is 
observable.  
The concept of safety barriers and a method for situational awareness will therefore be 
looked at below. Finally a method termed “message maps” will be described, these are a 
structured method of showing who is to observe and act on what. These three methods are 
important tools in proactively creating safety.  
2.2.1 The concept of safety barriers 
The concept of safety barriers has, as much else within the area of safety and accident 
research, been developed for more serious accidents, i.e. within the area of “Major 
Hazards”. Safety barriers are here defined as obstacles that either safeguard against 
(Hollnagel 1999):  
1) an undesirable action being performed, or 
2) an undesirable event occurring, or  
3) that limit the damaging consequences  
When an accident occurs, one or more safety barriers will have failed, either because the 
number of safety barriers was not sufficient, did not work as intended, or were not 
adapted to the situation. It is therefore essential in accident analyses to be able to identify 
and map the safety barriers that have failed for one reason or another. 
One important reason for focusing on the safety barriers is the fact that they can be 
observed, controlled, initiated, secured, etc.  
A distinction is made between the safety barriers that (Hollnagel 1999): 
 prevent undesirable events,  
 operate after an undesirable event has occurred, but which prevent injury,  
 protect or limit injury when the accident has occurred.   
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Figure 9 shows Hollnagel's illustration of the use of the barrier concept  
 (Hollnagel 1999) 
A further distinction is made between active safety barriers that require the active actions 
of equipment or people and passive safety barriers that function without being activated 
by anything or anybody externally.  
An active safety barrier is, for example, an alarm that automatically stops a process or 
notifies the parties that they need to act in a specific way, whilst a passive safety barrier 
can be a set of railings, a wall or a screen that always works regardless of what is 
happening.  
Safety barriers were originally viewed as physical safety barriers that would protect 
against an undesirable spread of energy being able to cause injury to people (Haddon 
1973). Since that time the concept has been under discussion and there has been a 
development in the understanding of the safety barriers concept so that it is now described 
by various forms and types. This development is related to the development in 
preventative theories in general, which will be described below.  
Taylor (1988) stipulates a number of requirements for safety barriers, which are a type of 
quality requirements: These are: 
 that the safety barriers must be adequate, i.e. capable of preventing accidents 
within their function and design, satisfy requirements stipulated in standards and 
rules, must not be able to be exceeded by the primary system and be equipped 
with others that can take over if the barrier is not sufficient. 
 that the safety must be accessible and stable, i.e. all signals must be able to be seen 
when this is necessary. The safety barriers must be failsafe and be able to be tested 
and be in place and be inspected. 
 that the safety barriers must be robust, i.e. be able to withstand external influences 
and must be able to be deactivated by other safety barriers or be affected by other 
factors. 
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 that the safety barriers must not be able to lead to other types of accidents that 
those that they are to prevent. 
Safety barriers have a number of limitation, which can be described on the basis of  
1) how practical they are, i.e. whether they can be used and are economically feasible 
2) how stable and maintained they are, i.e. whether they can completely or partly fail and   
3) whether they will be used, i.e. whether they are available or they are just not 
appropriate to use.  
Hollnagel (1999) has compiled different types of safety barriers into a classification of the 
functional significance of the safety barriers as inspiration in the choice of safety barriers 
for different types of risk. 
Hollnagel acknowledges that classifying safety barriers is no simple task as they often 
mesh and overlap as regards function, symbolism and physical state. However, the 
division and categories in Diagram 2 do provide a basis for how safety barrier systems 
and barrier functions should be viewed.  
Hollnagel has also remarked about people being safety barriers of a special type. For 
example, a person is able to adopt all types of safety barrier, e.g. a doorman is a physical 
barrier, the administrator allocating passwords is a function barrier and a policeman in the 
street can be viewed as a symbolic barrier for the behaviour of traffic. 
Diagram 2 
Barrier 
system 
Functions of safety barriers Examples 
Material or 
physical safety 
barriers 
Relimit and protect  
Physical obstacles that either 
prevent a hazard from leaving 
or entering a specific location. 
Walls, doors, buildings, access 
restrictions, railings, screens, filters, 
containers, tanks, pipe routings, etc 
Retain and prevent movement 
or displacement 
Safety belts, harnesses, hoarding, 
grilles, bolts, supports, etc 
Cohesion force, tensile 
strength, robustness, hardness 
Components that cannot fracture in 
sections, e.g. fracture-proof glass 
Energy absorbent, able to 
absorb released energy, 
transmitted energy  
Airbags, sprinkler systems, fire 
extinguishers filters, soft surfaces, etc 
Function 
safety barriers 
Prevent movement or action 
(mechanical, physical) 
Locks, direction control, e.g. rails, 
coupling, synchronising, brakes, etc 
Prevent movement or action 
(logical, mental) 
Passwords, access codes, access 
restrictions, advance requirements, 
access characters 
Hindrances or making more 
difficult 
Distance (too low for a person to 
reach), maintenance (dead man‟s 
control), delays, synchronisation. 
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Symbolic 
safety barriers 
Countering, impeding 
Interfaces that are visual or that 
require touching, design 
Function codes consisting of colours, 
shapes, position, warnings, signs. 
Assistance with the correct action is 
often just as good as warnings against 
incorrect action 
Regulation Instructions, procedures, precautions, 
conditions, dialogue 
Indications, status of system or 
conditions 
Signals, signs, visual, auditory, 
movement-related, alarms, warnings 
Permissions or authorisation Work Permits, work programmes 
Communication Clarifications, approval, acceptance 
Intangible 
safety barriers 
Transition, supervision Control, inspection, checklists 
Regulations Rules, restrictions, laws, ethical 
standards, guidelines, prohibitions 
Diagram 2 shows Safety barrier systems and safety barrier functions according to 
(Hollnagel 1999) 
A further development of the concept of safety barriers is made by Hale & Guldenmund 
(2003) as a discussion paper as to how safety barriers should be used. Safety barriers are 
here defined as: 
”the preventative measures that can both block the development of a hazard into 
something that is able to cause injury and the injury itself”. 
This sense of the concept is based on the ARAMIS project‟s discussion of a classification 
of safety barriers and the elements a barrier consists of, which are the following (Hale & 
Guldenmund 2003): 
A. Passive physical safety barriers (i.e. no moving mechanisms, but instead fixed 
objects such as walls, tanks, pipe routings, screens, etc.). 
B. Active physical safety barriers (often associated with one or other type of piece of 
electronic equipment, but which operates without human intervention, (e.g. 
automatic closing devices, sprinkler systems, airbags). 
C. Passive behavioural safety barriers (behaviour that consists of keeping away from 
specific areas, refraining from touching or altering specific parts of 
systems/materials/technologies and where these safety barriers exist without any 
physical involvement, e.g. safety distances, exclusion zones). 
D. Active behavioural safety barriers (where the behaviour consists of acting in 
specific ways and where this behaviour alone constitutes the safety barrier without 
any physical involvement, e.g. by performing safe working methods and following 
safe procedures). 
E. Combination of safety barriers A-D, where both physical and behavioural safety 
barriers are involved. 
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The delivery system that is relevant to a management team will be different for the 
different types of safety barriers. A particular distinction can be made between the 
physical safety barriers and the behavioural safety barriers. 
The requirement for the physical safety barriers is that they should be decided on the basis 
of a risk assessment and a sufficient specification of their function and what they are to 
protect. The lifecycles of such safety barriers must also be looked at: 
A. Whether they were acquired and constructed in accordance with their 
specifications 
B. Installed correctly in the correct location 
C. Adjusted and used in accordance with the specifications within the defined area 
D. Inspected and measured to verify that they are still in good working order 
E. Maintained and repaired when they are out of order or in poor condition 
F. Adjusted as required by changes in the safety system 
This purpose of this lifecycle assessment is to ensure that the barrier is available, where it 
is needed and adjusted and able to fulfil its function. All of these steps include people 
having to perform an action and display a type of behaviour that ensures that this lifecycle 
functions. 
Behavioural safety barriers also have lifecycles, which must however be analysed in 
greater detail since they are dependent on different managerial functions. Seen from a 
lifecycle perspective, the behavioural safety barriers must be assessed in accordance with 
the physical safety barriers and established on the basis of a job analysis. They consist of 
the following steps:  
1) Acquisition (e.g. of personnel, communications equipment),  
2) Development (e.g. training, motivation, instruction),  
3) Use (e.g. choice of abilities at specific times and of specific equipment),  
4) Measurement and maintenance (e.g. through behaviour auditing and supervision). 
The managerial functions that must be able to support these behavioural safety barriers 
have been established as follows (Hale and Guldenmund 2003): 
1. Procedures, plans, objectives and rules that define which behaviour should be exhibited 
where and when, formally formulated or informally delivered to groups or individual 
development. The step has been designed explicitly in relation to behaviour since 
behavioural rules are necessary to communicate to the people they concern how, for 
example, the physical conditions work, how the work is designed, how systems are 
programmed, constructed, installed, etc. 
2. Ensuring that people are able to behave in the desired way, including planning of 
workforce, recruitment policies, contracts, worksheets, timetables, plans for special tasks 
such as, for example, maintenance stoppages, emergency situations, etc. 
3. Abilities and adaptation to be able to behave in the desired way, which covers physical 
factors such as visual range, weight, endurance as well as to knowledge, experience and 
learning. 
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4. Obligation to be aware of when a specific type of behaviour is necessary and to act in the 
correct manner as well as to resist all conflicting pressures that can make incorrect 
behaviour seem attractive. 
5. Coordination and communication between people whose collective behaviour creates the 
barrier when they work together towards a specific goal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 shows an illustration from ARAMIS of the element that safety barriers can 
consist of (Hale & Guldenmund 2003) 
When a barrier consists of both physical and behaviour elements, this will determine 
managerial support for the functioning of the safety barriers. Requirement have also been 
made on the design of interface between the two barrier types, e.g. that they are 
ergonomically appropriate and user-friendly, that account has been taken of layout, that 
easy access has been provided, that they are easy to use, that signals are clear, that the 
safety barriers are well-maintained, etc. 
Such an understanding of the barrier concept is therefore directly connected to safety 
management and thereby links the employees‟ behaviour and involvement in the 
maintenance of a high level of safety to the management‟s tasks to ensure that this is 
possible.  
2.2.2 Situational Awareness  
Part of the proactive prevention consists of making people aware of the risks associated 
with a situation at a given time and place and enabling people to observe and assess 
whether the relevant safety barriers are in place and in order. This has been termed 
“Situational Awareness”, which is an important quality that people must be able to 
embrace in the execution of their jobs. Such situational awareness places a number of 
demands on the individual, his or her work conditions, the management, supervision, 
learning, knowledge, experience, motivation, etc. Endsley (Endsley et al 2000) has 
defined situational awareness as follows: 
Barrier chosen, defined & 
specified
Hardware barriers Combined barriers Behavioural barriers
Delivery of specification, 
suitability, availability = 
Life cycle
1. Purchase/construct
2. Install
3. Operate
4. Inspect/monitor
5. Maintain/repair
Interface Procedures, plans, rules and 
goals
Availability, manpower 
planning
Competence, suitability
Commitment, conflict 
resolution
Coordination, communication
Spares delivery
Figure 10
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”The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future”,  
A good ability to exercise situational awareness includes a language of training and 
experience of the signs that are important to observe and what they signify. however, with 
the enormous quantity of information that surrounds us in our daily lives and at work, it 
can be difficult to ascertain what is necessary to know and how knowledge is to be 
interpreted. 
The following model (Figure 11) illustrates what happens in a dynamic decision-making 
process: (Endsley et al 2000). 
Stage 1 contains the ability to perceive signs and information in the situation, this is 
fundamental. Without this ability the possibility of misunderstanding the current risk 
picture will increase significantly. Within this is the knowledge of dangers and safety 
barriers and the knowledge of the signals that show that something is not as it should be. 
Step 2 contains the ability to understand the situation on the basis of the signs and 
information contributed by Step 1. This contains the ability to combine, translate, 
interpret, save and remember information so that it can be converted into an action. This 
also includes integrating the multitude of perceived information and the ability to convert 
this into what is relevant to the individual‟s goals. A person that masters Step 2 will be 
able to derive the relevant activities and actions from the knowledge provided by Step 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 shows a model for situational awareness in a dynamic process  
(Endsley et al 2000). 
Step 3 constitutes the highest level of situational awareness since it contains the ability to 
predict what could happen in the near or not so near future on the basis of the observation 
and information occasioned by the present time and the situation.  
People who are capable of all three steps can be termed experienced or professional 
people. 
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A critical parameter of situational awareness is often the time that is available from the 
first indication that something is about to happen or is not as it should be, up to the point 
when an inopportune event occurs. The time aspect is therefore an important parts of 
Steps 2 and 3. 
The dynamics of the majority of situations also mean that there is a need to understand 
and assess changes, to observe details and information, to convert this into an 
understanding and review the perception of the situation and its opportunities for the 
future. 
Endsley also maintains that situational awareness must be viewed as being separate to 
decision-making and the action as he states that it is possible to have a perfect perception 
of a situation and still therefore reach an incorrect decision. He therefore stresses the fact 
that decisions are reached on the basis of situational awareness and that situational 
awareness is shaped by the decisions that are reached and concludes that situational 
awareness, decision-making and action can, in purely theoretical terms, be seen as being 
separate steps that influence each other in a continual cycle, but that they can become 
disconnected through a number of external factors. 
People construct models in their minds as a way in which to understand the world. These 
mental constructions or models, which are also termed ”Mental Models”, see Figure 12, 
allow people to use their own premises to assess what will happen and how things will 
behave (Bellamy et al 2008). 
Figure 12 shows ”The Mental Model” and the processes that this involves (Endsley & 
Garland 2000) 
Endsley and Garland (2000) indicate that a number of factors influence how precisely and 
how completely people perceive a situation in their work environments, including the 
fact that people are limited by their occupational memories and awareness. It is important 
to establish the way in which awareness is influenced in a complex environment with a 
multitude of competing factors and which aspects of situations will be used to form the 
situational understanding. The information that is perceived needs to be integrated with 
other information and compared against goals for future events at the same time as being 
controlled by the work-related memory bank.  
Figure 12 
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Furthermore, the perception and understanding of information is prioritised by how 
important the individual pieces of information are perceived to be, which area again 
controlled by the work-related memory bank and the goals and prioritisations contained in 
the work. 
Customs go hand in hand with mental processes, which facilitates the development of 
situational awareness. It has thereby demonstrated that the experiential decision-makers 
uses customs and traditions to recognise information of a specific type in order to 
understand the situation. Objectives are central to the development of situational 
understanding.  
Fundamental is the person‟s processing of information within a complex system driven by 
the interaction between that which is data-driven and that which is driven by objectives. A 
person usually actively searches for the information that is necessary in order to achieve a 
goal at the same time as goals acting as filters in the interpretation of the information that 
is perceived.  In addition, new data and the processing of information can indicate that 
new goals need to be activated. 
This dynamic interchange is important in order to perform effectively in many 
environments.  
Endsley lists a number of factors that are of significance to what a person has his or her 
attention drawn to and states that goals determine the direction of attention 
and how situational awareness is perceived and understood. Endsley therefore concludes 
that if we do not understand what the objectives are of a person in a specific situation, the 
information within the environment will not make any sense.  In addition to this, 
prejudices and expectations have an influence on situational awareness. People have a 
certain expectation of what they wish to see and hear in specific situations. These 
expectations influence awareness and the ability to perceive the information that is 
available, i.e. there is a tendency for people to see what they expect to see. 
The expectations that a person has are based on his or her ”Mental Model” and what he or 
she perceives as being significant. It is therefore appropriate to extend the person‟s 
expectations picture by, for example, instruction and training or through communication. 
Finally, the automatic reaction, which has been developed through experience, can 
influence situational awareness. From experience, the customs awareness/ choice of 
action sequence will become part of the procedure that develops a certain level of 
automatism.  This can produce good results since attention does not need to be directed 
towards many elements, but can be concentrated on specific tasks. But is can also be 
inopportune if it means that external, unexpected information will not be captured and 
therefore not become part of the understanding of the situation. 
In reality people must act on the basis of more than the immediate information from the 
situation. They must be able to combine information and imagine events that extend 
beyond their experiences. They must be proactive and not just reactive. They must act on 
the basis of objectives and be able to act with a certain amount of automatic and 
intelligent behaviour. 
When people are experienced and professional and the environment appears to be clam 
and routine, attention may decrease and the process of drawing conclusions that can guide 
decision making may become much more automatic. However, such automatism can 
become dangerous if the situation changes without the person noticing.  
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Quite a popular learning model for awareness competences are the following four 
competence steps, which can be used for the purpose of training, see Figure 13. 
Figure 13 shows the four competence steps according to (Bellamy et al 2008) 
When people unconsciously make a mistake in one way or another, this can be termed a 
fault, in the ”Mental Model”, in their understanding of the situation in which they find 
themselves. On the other hand, the positive aspects of human psychology can function 
well for people who are intelligent, are aware, have knowledge and experience and are 
able to compensate for poor working conditions (Sundström-Frisk 1991).  
But the conditions can change in relation to what the person expects and when he or she 
believes that everything is going well. People do what they have learned, but without 
necessarily knowing that it will not work in certain situations. Therefore, when we talk of 
mistakes, in most situations we mean that it is what the person has learned that is 
incorrect and not the person in him or herself.  It is important to maintain this distinction 
when we are to look at people‟s behaviour and ways in which to influence this behaviour 
(Bellamy et al 2008). 
This has an influence on what people believe that their manager expect of them. This can 
mean that a person's goal for a specific task can be formulated so that it runs contrary to 
his or her own safety. For example, in order to complete the work faster you carry a 
greater weight and even rewarded with praise, rather than complete the work more slowly 
and safety. 
Many factors can in this way threaten your opportunity and ability to reach the correct 
decisions, including the following (Bellamy et al 2008): 
 The fact that the situation changes from being routine and involves new risks 
 The fact that the situation is so routine that it leads to automatic behaviour 
 The fact that the situation is perceived on the basis of incorrect objectives 
 The fact that a person‟s capacity is limited due to: 
 An exaggerated belief in one's own memory 
 Interruptions 
 Work pressure 
 Tiredness 
 Confusion 
 Ignorance 
• I don’t know what I need to know 
• I know what I need to know 
• I know what I need to know and I know this 
Step 4 Unconscious Competence 
Step 3 Conscious Competence 
Step 2 Conscious Incompetence 
Step 1 Unconscious Incompetence 
• I know this, but do it automatically 
Figure 13 
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An important element in being able to create safety is the understanding of which 
competences are needed in a certain situation in order to enable a person to observe, 
understand and act in such a manner that exposure to dangers does not lead to an accident. 
Lack of competence in this regard may explain why accident frequencies are higher for 
young people and new employees. 
2.2.3 The “message maps” concept 
The ”message maps” concept was developed to communicate risks. The concept was 
developed by Vincent Covello in the early 1990ws and subsequently refined by Rhona 
Flin. The United States Environmental Protection Agency has used the method in its 
instruction of Risk Communication in Action and the method has also been used by the 
HSE in the UK in the area of Major Hazards (Bellamy et al 2008) 
The concept is constructed with a number of hierarchically structured questions that are 
answered in relation to customers/users, i.e. those who are exposed to dangers and who 
need an answer. 
The principles of risk communication can be determined in conjunction with the 
development of these “message maps”. Message maps are an organised way of presenting 
important information about risks. The development of these helps to adapt the 
information of the most important recipients as well as to: 
 Identify the most important recipients early on in the communication process 
 Anticipate questions from those exposed to risks before these questions arise 
 Organise thoughts and ideas and prepare messages with regards to the concerns 
and questions that users/those exposed to risks may have. 
 Promote an open dialogue on messages and information both internally and 
externally in an organisation 
 Create spokespeople for specific risks in a user-friendly guide 
 Ensure that an organisation has consistent information and messages 
 Ensure that the organisation speaks with one voice 
”Message maps” is a diagram consisting of three rows and a number of boxes. In the top 
box are identified the users/those exposed to risks that a specific risk concerns and the 
question that will be addressed and answered. In the second row are formulated three key 
messages, which answer the overall question. From the third row and downwards is 
formulated the supplementary information that elaborates on the key messages. As an 
example, in diagram 3 is shown information on the risks of an influenza epidemic: 
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Diagram 3 
Users – relevant recipients of the message: Primarily health care employees - 
the general public 
Question: What do the general public need to know about an influenza epidemic 
Key message 1 Key message 2 Key message 3 
Vaccination is the top 
priority for: 
Symptoms Very infectious 
Supplementary 
information 1-1 
Supplementary 
information 2-1 
Supplementary 
information 3-1 
The elderly Fever Avoid direct contact with 
others 
Supplementary 
information 1-2 
Supplementary 
information 2-2 
Supplementary 
information 3-2 
Health care employees Coughing, burning in the 
throat 
Avoid sharing food and 
drinking with others 
Supplementary 
information 1-3 
Supplementary 
information 2-3 
Supplementary 
information 3-3 
Immune to vaccine - 
frail and week people 
Aching and painful muscles Stay in bed and wash linen 
Diagram 3 shows an example of a ”message map” (Lin & Peteresen 2007) 
After this the task is to identify the correct users and those exposed to risks and ask the 
correct questions. One step in the development is creating the basis for users and those 
exposed to risks being able to gather information themselves and understand what it 
means and from this able to reach the necessary decisions. 
Flin et al (2006) developed a type of taxonomy for ”Not-Technical Skills for Surgeons” 
(NOTTS), which can be used to give structure and content to the information and 
messages that need to be communicated. For example, this may be information on 
accident risks or safety barriers, cf. Diagram 4. 
Diagram 4 
Category Elements 
Situational awareness Gathering information 
Understanding information 
Planning and predicting the next step 
Decision-making  Assessing options 
Selecting and communicating remedies 
Implementing and assessing the decision 
Communication and cooperation Exchanging information 
Establishing common understanding 
Coordinating the group's activities 
Leadership Establish and maintain standards 
Support the group 
Able to manage tasks under pressure 
Diagram 4 shows Flin’s taxonomy for NOTTS (Flin et al 2006) 
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This taxonomy is used, among other things, to review what is understood by good and 
bad behaviour. The following diagrams 5-8 have been developed for accident risks. 
Diagram 5 
Situational awareness 
Here this means the development and maintenance of a dynamic awareness of the 
situations that a person finds him or herself in during work. The task is the gathering of 
data from the environment and the surroundings, understanding the significance of this 
information and thinking ahead as what may subsequently happen: 
Gathering of information – means actively searching for information in the work 
situation about the dangers that may be present or are present  
Good behaviour is: 
 to look for dangers when you are 
travelling and assess the risk of 
falling 
 to look for dangers in the 
surroundings and assess the risk of 
colliding with, being struck by, 
crushed between something, etc 
 to look for dangers in manual work 
to assess the risk of cutting 
yourself, stabbing yourself, burning 
yourself, injury from acids, 
poisoned, or exposed to heavy 
lifting, etc 
 to see whether any of the risks that 
rarely have consequences are 
present  
Bad behaviour is: 
 being delayed and hurried without 
the energy to observe and assess 
risks 
 to begin the task without any type of 
observation or considerations of the 
circumstances 
 to carry out your own work without 
considering the influences or impact 
it may have on the surroundings and 
other people‟s situations 
 to forget to check special 
instructions 
 to ignore instructions from 
colleagues and the general manager 
or signs 
Understand information – means that your mental image of the conditions is updated by 
interpreting the gathered information and comparing this information with your own 
existing knowledge of the situation in relation to the expected situation 
Good behaviour is: 
 acting on the basis of observations 
 directing questions to relevant 
people if there is information that 
you are not sure about 
 to forward observations to 
colleagues and the general manager  
Bad behaviour is: 
 ignoring information about risk 
factors 
 disregarding important signals 
 misunderstanding the signals and 
thereby acting inappropriately 
 to take chances because this is easier  
Planning and predicting the next step – means predicting what may happen in the near 
future as a result of possible actions or if no action is taken 
Good behaviour is: 
 planning the tasks that must be 
performed on the basis of the 
knowledge that has been gathered 
 to consider and obtain the 
equipment that is to be used 
 to communicate considerations and 
decisions with the relevant parties 
Bad behaviour is: 
 continuing to work without 
considering what could go wrong 
 failing to discuss potential problems 
with other parties 
 acting far outside you own area of 
experience 
Diagram 5 shows examples of good and bad behaviour in relation to the subject of 
situational awareness 
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Diagram 6 
Decision-making 
Experiences of diagnosing situations and reaching an assessment for the purpose of 
deciding upon an appropriate way in which to act 
Assessing options – means being able to generate alternatives or directions in which to 
act in order to complete the task. Assessing risks and considering threats and advantages 
and the possible courses of action 
Good behaviour is: 
 recognising and articulating the 
problems 
 initiating a balanced discussion of 
the options for and against with the 
relevant parties 
 to ask colleagues their opinions and 
for solutions 
 to look for any written instructions 
Bad behaviour is: 
 failing to discuss options 
 failing to gather opinions from 
other parties 
 ignoring written instructions 
Choosing and communicating remedies – means choosing a solution to the problem 
and making all relevant parties aware of the chosen remedy 
Good behaviour is: 
 reaching a decision and 
communicating the decision 
 to devise a plan B and also 
communicate this plan 
 to explain why the chosen solution 
has been decided on 
Bad behaviour is: 
 forgetting to inform others what 
you intend to do 
 being aggressive if a plan is 
questioned 
 to close a discussion about other 
solutions 
 only doing what he or she believes 
is what needs to be done 
 choosing an inappropriate solution 
that leads to complications 
Implementing and assessing the decision – means setting about performing the solution 
on the basis of what has been decided and continually assessing its suitability in the light 
of the circumstances and working conditions. Demonstrating flexibility and ability to 
change the plans should this prove to be necessary in order to achieve the desired goal. 
Good behaviour is: 
 implementing the decision 
 updating all those involved during 
the course of the implementation 
 reassessing the plan in the light of 
changes or if problems arise 
 acknowledging of plan A is not 
working and then moving over to 
plan B 
 calling for assistance if there proves 
to be a need for this 
Bad behaviour is: 
 failing to implement the decision 
 repeating the same mistakes several 
times 
 failing to reassess the chosen 
solution 
 continuing with plan A even if a 
alternative course of action would 
be better 
 being rash or hasty in order to meet 
a tight schedule. 
Diagram 6 shows examples of good and bad behaviour in relation to the subject of 
decision-making 
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Diagram 7 
Communication and cooperation 
Experience in working in groups and ensuring that everybody in the group has an 
acceptable shared view of the situation that means that they are able to perform the task 
efficiently and safely  
Exchange of information – means giving and receiving knowledge and information at 
the right time in order to create a shared understanding amongst the members of the 
group. 
Good behaviour is: 
 talking about how the task is 
developing 
 listening to concerns within the 
group 
 communicating should the plans 
change 
Bad behaviour is: 
 forgetting to communicate concerns 
to others 
 attempting to resolve problems 
alone 
 failing to listen to the group 
 failing to explain what is expected 
of any assistance should this be 
needed  
Establishing a shared understanding – means ensuring that the group does not only 
have the necessary information but also understands what it means and accepts what the 
situation is, the task includes and what is to be done by each member of the group. 
Good behaviour is: 
 briefing and clearing up facts and 
goals before the group starts on the 
task 
 ensuring that the whole group 
understands the operational plan 
before starting 
 to receive questions and points of 
view from all those in the group 
 ensuring that everybody in the group 
is comfortable with the decision 
 checking that any assistance in what 
the task is about 
 debriefing the group after the task 
has been completed in order to learn 
from what went well and what gave 
problems 
Bad behaviour is: 
 failing to discuss the plan with the 
group 
 failing to devote time to a collective 
dialogue and assessment 
 forgetting to discuss the matter in 
advance with new members of the 
group 
 failing to try to discuss problems 
that arise during implementation 
 showing dislike in subsequently 
discussing actions, decisions and 
implementation should somebody 
ask questions 
Coordinating group activities – means that you must cooperate with other group 
members in order to perform the knowledge-based and physical activities in an 
appropriate and coordinated manner. 
Good behaviour is: 
 checking that the others in the group 
are ready to start the task 
 to stop performing the task should 
other in the group experience 
problems 
 ensuring that the group works 
efficiently at organising the 
activities in a timely manner 
Bad behaviour is: 
 failing to wait until everybody is 
ready 
 to continue with the task without 
ensuring that all equipment is 
available and ready for use 
 continuing the task yourself if there 
are others in the group who are 
experiencing problems 
Diagram 7 shows examples of good and bad behaviour in relation to the subject of 
communication and cooperation 
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Diagram 8 
Leadership 
Leading a team and indicating the direction in which the work is to be performed as well 
as demonstrating a high level of safe working practices and at the same time being aware 
of what each member in the group requires with regards to knowledge and guidance 
Set and maintain standards - means providing a safety and quality-based 
maintenance of the principles for the performance of the work through the application of 
good and safe working practices and following the applicable rules and procedures 
Good behaviour is: 
 introducing yourself and the 
standards to the group and in 
particular to new members 
 setting a clear standard for 
following rules and procedures 
 requiring that all members of the 
group observe the standards that 
have been set 
Bad behaviour is: 
 forgetting to observe whether 
standards are being observed 
 breaching the stipulated standards 
and rules yourself 
 showing a lack of respect for the 
task and its performance 
Supporting the group – means providing both knowledge-based and emotional 
assistance to members of the group. Assessing the abilities of the various members and 
adapting the management style accordingly.  
Good behaviour is: 
 adapting your behaviour according 
to the training needs of the 
individual 
 conducting constructive criticism of 
each group member 
 ensuring that the assignment of 
tasks is appropriate 
 giving praise and rewards for work 
that has been well-done 
Bad behaviour is: 
 failing to notice work that has been 
well-done 
 forgetting to be attentive to the 
needs of others 
 only looking at your own narrow 
resolution of the task looking at 
what tasks and options others have 
 demonstrating hostile behaviour 
towards individuals, e.g. through 
sarcasm, irony, etc 
Accomplish tasks under pressure – means demonstrating calm behaviour in stressful 
situations and emphasising to the group that you have control over things. Adopting a 
suitable forceful attitude if necessary without undermining the roles of other group 
members. 
Good behaviour is: 
 remaining calm under pressure 
 highlighting what is important in 
the situation possibly by raising 
your voice 
 taking responsibility for critical 
situations 
 taking the necessary decisions 
under pressure 
 delegating tasks so that the task 
may be resolved 
 continuing to lead the group 
through crisis 
Bad behaviour is: 
 stifling concerns about problems 
 demonstrating a lack of ability to 
reach decisions under pressure 
 failing in leadership when, for 
example, technical equipment 
requires your full attention 
 blaming everybody else for 
mistakes and failing to take any 
personal responsibility 
 loosing your cool, getting angry and 
scolding 
Diagram 8 shows examples of good and bad behaviour in relation to the subject of 
leadership 
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This system and mindset has been devised to be used in the training of inexperienced 
people as a basis for being able to structure observations and for assessing and providing 
feedback in a training situation. 
The various models that are presented for the safety barrier concept, mental mind, 
situational awareness and message maps have been combined by Bellamy et al (2009) to 
form a special type of message maps with a focus on safety barriers to accidents. The 
method has been termed “Barrier Intelligence".  
The purpose of this type of  “message maps” is to develop a basis for instruction and 
training. Focus is on the information that is to be observed in relation to safety barriers 
and dangers and which can provide the best basis for decision-making and the subsequent 
actions. Bellamy´s illustration of how she combines the various models is shown in 
Figure 14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 shows Bellamy’s illustration of knowledge-ability-action in relation to safety 
barriers and ”message maps”, etc. (Bellamy et al 2009) 
This summary is subsequently expressed in the design of targeted “message maps” for 
specific types of dangers and safety barriers. These can be used in training situations and 
feedback systems to create situational awareness and enhanced safety competences. 
Diagram 9 contains an example of the design of a simple “message map” in which the 
risk relates to “Being struck by a moving object” and where the safety barrier is to ensure 
control over the moving objects that may be in the immediate surroundings of a specific 
person. 
Barrier
Message Map

Long term memory
Real world situation
Data selection
guided by mental model –
questioning approach 
INFORMATION GATHERING
Real world situation
Response
ANTICIPATION, DECISION 
MAKING & RESPONSE
*Images
*Scripts about processes
*Language set (restricted 
vocabulary)
*Assumptions and relations
*Possibilities
*Related mental models
UNDERSTANDING
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Diagram 9 
Risk: Being struck by a moving object 
Safety barriers: Control over moving objects in the immediate surroundings 
Gathering information Understanding 
information 
Prediction and reaction 
Where there are moving 
objects in the vicinity 
Assess whether the 
movements can result in 
their striking you 
Securing moving objects 
and their movement paths 
The way in which they 
move 
Assess whether the 
movements vary and 
whether there is any need 
for adjustments 
Adjust, signal, note, 
communicate with the 
surroundings 
Can their movement get out 
of control 
Assess what can lead to the 
movements getting out of 
control 
Check safety devices and 
information to the 
surroundings 
Can I enter into the 
movement path of the 
object 
Assess what type of 
behaviour I should 
demonstrate in order not to 
enter into the movement 
path of the object 
Adapt your own behaviour 
Diagram 9 shows an example of a ”message map” for the risk “being struck by a 
moving object” 
It is clear that this diagram could contain much more specific information if we were to 
choose to specify, for example, “being struck by a truck” or “being struck by a machine 
part”, which would also mean that the information in the diagram could be made 
significantly more specific and targeted. 
The more specific we are in specifying a job and the type of risk and safety barriers the 
more specifically we will be able to specify what is to be observed, how the information 
is to be understood and how dangerous situations can thereby be predicted and countered. 
The concept is also not solely directed at employees, but can equally we used with 
regards to general managers, middle managers and top management, obviously with 
adapted content.  
2.3 Management concepts and control methods 
The development in preventative theories through the years has evolved into a number of 
phases where the conclusion is that prevention cannot be created using a theory or a 
method, the perspective for this is far too complicated. On the other hand, there is use for 
creating an understanding for the various elements of accident prevention and to combine 
different methods and initiatives. 
We speak of orchestrating prevention, i.e. cause many different initiatives to interplay 
(Lund and Aarø 2004). 
Over the course of many years the prevention of occupational accidents and the aspect of 
safety has been associated with a technical prevention, which has led to dramatic 
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improvements in machinery and equipment as well as a large number of technical 
instructions, rules and procedures. 
Between 1970 and 2000 focus was moved toward the management aspect of safety and 
people's behaviour and behavioural control. This occurred in particular within high-risk 
areas in which research and focus on risks has been greatest, just as the majority of 
experiences have been created based on large international groups. (Hale & Hovden 
1998) 
In this context, there are a number of results from companies that have shown that they 
are able to achieve a high level of safety. These include the following: (Glendon et al 
2007, Hovden 2001, Herrero et al 2002, Kjellen 2000) 
 That safety begins with the top management  
 That the most important improvements require changes to the managerial culture 
 That a long-term commitment to safety from the top management is necessary to 
create change 
 That it is not enough for the top executive to state that he or she supports a high 
level of safety. He or she must also demonstrate this through his or her behaviour, 
actions and leadership. He or she cannot delegate this part. 
 That safety will not result solely from checks and inspections, but primarily 
through developing and improving processes 
 That the top management has a tendency to make employees responsible for 
conditions over which they have no control. People work in the system that the top 
executives create, he or she is therefore the only one who is able to change it.  
It is pointed out again and again that safety must be integrated into the whole organisation 
and function at all levels of management, just as it must involve all of the employees in 
their day to day work. Similarly, the importance of emphasising training in safety, good 
communication, good order and a stable workforce is repeated. (Cohen et al 1975, Smith 
et al 1978, Glendon et al 2007, Kjellen 2000). 
Finally, the role that both the top executive and the general managers have in creating a 
good level of safety within the organisation is highlighted in repeated studies (DePasquale 
and Geller 1999, Glendon et al 2007, Kjellen 2000). 
Proactive prevention is also about process and organisation, where the manager has a 
major importance, including his or her ability to involve both middle managers and 
employees in the safety work. The understanding of the concept of safety culture and in 
particular the methods of creating a good safety culture therefore naturally follow in the 
order of methods to achieve a high level of safety.  
2.3.1 Strategic, tactical and operational management 
The guidance of both the top management and the general managers has both a direct and 
indirect significance on the behaviour of the employees. The direct behaviour relates to 
the establishment of standards for working practices and procedures for the performance 
of the work. 
The direct effect relates to the management‟s perception of safe and unsafe behaviour and 
their influence on the behaviour of the employees through observation and monitoring. 
The management‟s actions influence both directly and indirectly the expectations and 
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motivation of the employees and thereby also influence the probability of specific types 
of behaviour being repeated or suppressed. (Flin and Yule 2004). 
In some of the publications of recent years the significance of management and styles of 
management to safety has been looked at including the difference between transformal 
(agreement) and transactional (change) management inspired by Bass 1985. (Glendon 
2007, Flin and Yule 2004)  
Where transactional management is characterised by: 
 Honouring good work and results with rewards 
 Meeting problems halfway and then acting by measuring the behaviour of the 
employees 
 Focusing on and correcting mistakes made by employees when problems arise 
Whilst transformational management is characterised by: 
 The manager showing interest in the professional development of the employees 
and acting as a type of monitor as well as being attentive to needs. 
 The manager meets challenges, takes a certain amount of risk and attempts to 
follow employees‟ ideas, stimulate and encourage them to be creative and 
innovative 
 The manager inspires others towards achieving goals and creates meaning, 
optimism, enthusiasm and articulates visions that appeal to and inspire others. 
 The managers creates trust and is perceived as being charismatic, behaves in ways 
that allow the employees to identify with him or her. 
Glendon et al 2007 mention a number of researchers who have placed transformational 
management into a context with low accident frequency in the organisation. 
Leadership and safety management must function at all levels within a management 
structure. For example, this can be illustrated by what is to take place at the strategic 
level, i.e. by the top management, at the tactical level, i.e. by the middle managers and at 
the operational level, i.e. by the general management, supervisors, team leaders, etc. In 
Diagram 10 Flin and Yule (2004) give their understanding of the styles of management 
and the way that safety management at the three management levels can be characterised.  
Traditional safety management with a active and professional safety manager who 
controls and monitors the employees‟ compliance with the organisation‟s safety-related 
standards and procedures. The are familiar with the rules and regulations and the 
information about new regulations, conduct inspections and audits, take charge of the 
investigation and analysis of accidents and put forward recommendations for future 
accident prevention. (Herrero et al 2002). Traditionally, professional safety managers 
adapt the employees‟ behaviour through motivational activities, e.g. incentives, prizes, 
etc. (Smith 1996) 
This style has a positive effect on safety up to a certain level, but this does not always 
mean that safety is appreciably improved, especially if focus is primarily placed on the 
technical equipment and the short-term results and if action is only taken when an 
accident occurs. 
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Another limitation of the traditional safety system is that safety measures are isolated 
from other functions within the organisation. Responsibility for the safety programme is 
placed with the safety manager, who has a position within the company that in many 
cases does not give him or her the authority to create change. 
 
Diagram 10 
Safety management Transactional 
management (agreement 
management) 
Transformational 
management  
(change management) 
General management – 
the operational level 
- Observe and enhance the 
employees‟ behaviour with 
regards to safety 
- Participate in the 
employees activities with 
regards to safety 
- Perform the activities that 
have been established at 
tactical level 
- Support initiatives with 
regards to safety 
- Motivate and encourage the 
employees to take initiatives 
with regards to safety 
Middle management – 
the tactical level 
- Involved in activities with 
regards to safety 
- Observe and enhance the 
general management in its 
behaviour with regards to 
safety 
- Establish frameworks and 
methods for the 
implementation of the vision 
- Emphasis safety taking 
precedence over productivity 
- Emphasis a decentralised 
management style 
- Provide a cooperative vision 
of safety in relation to the 
general management 
The top management – 
the strategic level 
- Ensure compliance with 
legal requirements 
- Allocate resources for a 
comprehensive safety 
programme 
- Establish the company‟s 
vision for future safety 
within the organisation 
- Demonstrate a visible and 
enduring commitment to safety 
- Show care and concern for the 
employees 
- Encourage a participative 
management style amongst the 
middle managers and the 
general management 
- Allow time for safety 
Diagram 10 shows Flin and Yule’s understanding of the relationships between 
management style and management level with regards to safety (Flin and Yule 2004). 
Canadian studies also show that in the organisations that are able to demonstrate a high 
level of safety, safety is not seen as a separate problem, but on the contrary as an integral 
part of production, competition and profitability. It is not immediately apparent that safety 
and profit are incompatible goals, but are rather complementary since the share the same 
driving forces where integration is the key (Warrack 1999). 
The general management 
The foreman, the team leader or the supervisor, i.e. the general manager is the key person 
in the prevention of occupational accidents. His or her understanding of the art of guiding 
 69 
and controlling the employees‟ activities is the most important factor in successful 
accident prevention (Heinrich 1959). 
The immediate manager of employees has the primary responsibility for ensuring that the 
work is completed. He or she structures, coordinates and facilitates the work-related 
activities. (Flin and Yule 2004) 
It has been shown, among other things, that when the general manager talks more about 
work-related matters with his or her staff and this is supported by activities, the safe 
behaviour of the employees increases (Zohar 2003).  
Other studies substantiate that general management involvement in safety has a positive 
effect on the behaviour of employees (Barling et al 2002). 
Including the extent to which the general manager is able to communicate and initiate 
discussions regarding safety with his or her staff and how he or she is able to support the 
staff in relation to the work tasks and provide them with positive feedback. (Mattila et al 
1994, Simard et al 1994). 
t has also been demonstrated that the employees work more safely when they have been 
involved in the decisions regarding how the work is to be performed, when they have a 
specific and appropriate responsibility or their own tasks, when there is purpose and 
authority behind the tasks and when they are provided with immediate feedback to their 
work. (Cohen and Cleveland 1983) 
In organisations with high levels of safety the general manager assists in a number of 
activities: (Simards et al 1994) 
 they allow the safety staff to spend a large proportion of their time on safety-
related matters 
 they involve themselves together with the staff and other managers in the 
development of safety procedures and programmes 
 they involve themselves together with the staff in safety inspections of the work 
places and in the investigation of any accidents 
 they take responsibility for training new members of staff in safety 
Tactical management, middle managers 
The middle managers have received less scrutiny in safety research, but there is a lot of 
evidence that they are of vital importance to the level of safety within an organisation 
(Flin and Yule 2004). 
Studies show, among other things, that the safest organisations have middle managers 
who are able to demonstrate that they are committed to safety and the organisation‟s 
safety systems and that they involve themselves in safety-related activities. Their 
management style therefore influences the safety-related results. It has also been shown 
that the middle management of organisations with high levels of safety often have a close 
working relationship with the staff and one-to-one safety meetings, whilst organisations 
with lower levels of safety are characterised by their middle managers fully surrendering 
safety issues to the safety organisation (O´Dea and Flin 2003,Smith et al 1978, Kivimaki 
et al 1995).  
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t is often said that the middle management is the mineral wool layer between the top 
management's vision of safety and the ability to bring this vision out into the operational 
level, i.e. the middle management is a wheel chock for the process in the management 
chain. This has not been immediately demonstrated in research, but is an often expressed 
understanding. (Flin and Yule 2004). 
Strategic management, the top management 
In larger organisation it is not uncommon for top management to be geographically 
located in a different location to the actual organisation. Their responsibility is on the 
strategic level and is focused on long-term planning. However, they have the ultimate 
responsibility for the organisation‟s level of safety. (Flin and Yule 2004) 
The top management is able to demonstrate its commitment to and prioritisation of safety 
through a number of strategic initiatives, such as providing resources for an extended 
safety programme, by showing care and concern for the employees, by showing 
involvement and commitment towards the middle management and the general managers 
and by being clear and consistent in their support of and focus on safety, which includes 
exhibiting a transformational management style. (Flin and Yule 2004, Simard et al 
1994,Cohen and Cleveland 1983) 
Decisions reached by the top management have an influence on the prioritisations, 
attitudes and behaviour of both managers and employees further down in the hierarchy, 
which are critical factors that are of significance to the general manager‟s choice and 
balancing between safety and productivity in the daily work. 
One of the findings of a study of the significance of top management to safety included a 
number of facts relating to the behaviour of top management. (Flin and Yule 2004, 
Smallman 2001) 
These include the ability to: 
 be able to articulate an achievable vision for future safety performance 
 to demonstrate personal commitment to safety of a symbolic type 
 to be able to engage everybody with relevant experience of making decisions 
within the subject of safety 
 to be clear and transparent with regards to safety-related matters 
2.3.2 Objective and feedback as indicators 
Objective and feedback are indicated as being effective means of creating altered types of 
behaviour and attitudes (Smith et al 1978, Zohar et al 1980, Saari 1989, 1994). The basis 
for this is a method to motivate and learn. The philosophy is that we are motivated partly 
through the reward that is achievable and partly through the joy achieved by an individual 
in having influence and satisfaction in a job well done (Glendon et al 2007).  
One example of a successful programme includes (Cooper et al 1994): 
 A list of critical types of behaviour was drawn up for a department based on an 
analysis of accidents. 
 Observers were recruited and trained to observe how and when the critical types 
of behaviour were being exhibited. 
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 A four-week observation period was used to establish the level that would be the 
basis for an initiative. 
 Objectives meetings were held between all of the employees and managers 
including the top management. During these meetings agreement was reached at 
all levels as to the future goal and what could be committed to in an improvement 
process for both management and employees. 
 A sixteen week intervention period followed with weekly feedback on how good 
the individual units were in fulfilling the goals that everybody had agreed. This 
feedback was presented on posters where everybody within the organisation could 
see how things were going and who had performed well and who had performed 
less well. 
The result was that a 70 % improvement could be observed in types of behaviour in the 
critical areas at the same time as the number of accidents had fallen by over 20 %. 
In order to achieve success in such a programme, an important element is the way in 
which the employees are involved in the programme and the extent to which the 
employees believe in the management's intentions and have faith in its ability to 
implement the programme and maintain it. This is best done when management at all 
levels are included in the process and clearly supports the process in its allocation of time 
and resources. (Glendon et al 2007, DePasquale and Geller 1999). 
A frequently used method to create awareness of safety and to motivate towards safe 
behaviour amongst the employees is through one or other type of incentive such as prizes 
or rewards. Where this has taken place in an appropriate manner, i.e. where the reward is 
made, for example, on the basis of specific rules being observed or specific types of 
behaviour exhibited, good effects are achieved (Glendon et al 2007, DeJoy 2005, Krause 
et al 1999, Lund and Aarø 2004). 
However, it is also pointed out that short-term initiatives often have short-term effects, 
meaning that when focus disappears from a specific subject, the behaviour also disappears 
and safety is thereby back at the same level as before. It is therefore not sufficient to 
change a type of behaviour without also changing attitudes and positions, which can 
ensure that the new behaviour will be learned so well that it will also become a good 
habit. 
That, as studies show, which has a such a confidence-building effect on the employees 
includes (Cox et al 2004): 
 When the managerial culture is that safety is a first priority and when the 
management shows its commitment to safety during the implementation of the 
programme. 
 When effective motivating methods are employed, including employees receiving 
praise when they work in a safe manner. 
 When greater opportunity for individual learning is provided and by enhancing the 
joy and usefulness the employees experience in exhibiting the desire behaviour 
and achieving the safety-related results. 
 When there is greater opportunity for organisational learning through 
communication and knowledge-sharing between the employees and when there is 
greater awareness of safety and work place values. 
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In many respects it is a change management task to implement a safety programme within 
an organisation with the objective of changing awareness and behaviour in relation to 
risks and safety barriers. 
2.3.3 Changing safety 
It is when accidents occur or increase in extent and when in some other way a lack of 
awareness is registered toward hazards that the management become aware that a change 
must occur. However, it is not uncommon for people to sort of live with the accident level 
that is present as if it could not be different.  
However, the methods behind change management can be of great significance where 
change is really wanted. A review of the theories behind change management will not be 
given, but only a fundamental methodic understanding will be presented, which can be 
the inspiration to a method for changing the level of safety. 
In their book on change management, Kamp et al (2005) describe the dynamics of change 
by means of three sub-processes strongly inspired by Patrick Dawson (2003). This takes 
place through a learning process, a political process and a symbolic process: 
”The learning process is seen as a condensed form of knowledge, a learning opportunity 
that forms the basis for learning within the organisation. The learning process facilitates 
a flexible adaptation to new requirements. Focus is on who the organisation (the inner 
context) acts as a learning environment, on the opportunities and obstacles to reflection 
posed by the learning. The employees and managers’ changes, their assimilation of new 
competences and altered view of goals, resources and relationships are vital for the 
organisation to be able to learn. Broad local involvement and ownership are therefore 
keywords in the learning process.” 
”The political process is seen as a political programme that does not neutrally offer the 
organisation adaptation to new requirements, but which has a built-in preference 
structure, a specific way in which to view the future of the organisation in which specific 
managers and employees to some extent have a privileged role in the change process. The 
programme is carried forward by a coalition of participants within the organisation. 
Focus is placed on how this programme is negotiated in an attempt at extending and 
retaining its legitimacy and to create support within the organisation. The context is a 
negotiated order that has with time become natural, but which will be renegotiated 
during the change process.” 
”The symbolic process is seen as the carrier of symbolic meanings. The concept often 
forms the fashion as the symbol for the new and to appear to be a modern organisation. 
This is of significance for internal and external branding. The symbolic process provide 
the employees within the organisation with a new language and in this way allows them 
to create image and status when they acquire “modern” logic. From a symbolic 
perspective, the change project can to a certain extent be window dressing and primarily 
serve to enhance the organisation’s identity and image. However, symbols can also 
create changes within the organisation when new symbols are incorporated into the 
existing narratives and transform them, which has an effect on the universe of myths, 
stories and rituals.” 
This structuring of the change process is believed to be appropriate in relation to the 
question of creating a change to safety, where it is absolutely necessary to focus on 
methods, content and participants. 
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2.3.4 Safety culture and safety climate 
Creating a high level of safety within an organisation is a difficult undertaking, which 
largely requires managerial involvement and constant focus. This is not only a question of 
having the correct equipment, procedures or safety organisation, etc., but also that 
everybody within the organisation has an understanding for safety and for committing 
themselves to take responsibility for safety in all endeavours and at all times. 
It became particularly apparent from the major nuclear power accidents of the 1980‟s 
where the investigations showed that the formal conditions were in order, but that the 
management and employees did not have a constant focus on safety. This became a 
question of attitudes and behaviour and since that time there has been a significant focus 
on topics such as safety culture and safety climate. 
The literature contain a diverging perception of what safety culture and safety climate 
cover, but generally a picture is drawn of safety culture being an expression of the 
standards and values of the individual in relation to safety, whilst safety climate is an 
expression of the organisation‟s generally expressed standards and values that are often 
demonstrated through measurements and questionnaires and with a focus on the 
managements and its ability to disseminate these standards and have them accepted 
within the organisation. 
Nor will a review of safety culture theories and methods be given here, instead some of 
the most important elements that create a good safety culture will be stated. 
For example, Reason (1997) points out three significant factors (the 3 Cs) for a good 
safety culture. These are: 
 Commitment – i.e. a commitment with regards to safety that is able to both 
motivate and secure the necessary resources, etc. 
 Competence – i.e. to gather the correct information and train, practice, etc. so that 
the correct action can be taken. 
 Cognization – i.e. to be aware of the hazards, risks and safety barriers that are 
completely necessary elements in maintaining safety. 
Means et al (2003) points to another three themes as being important for success in the 
area of safety. These are: 
 A genuine and continued management commitment to safety, i.e. prioritising 
safety over production, a sustained high profile at safety meetings, personal 
participation of the managers at safety meetings and in inspection rounds, face-to-
face meetings with the employees with safety as the topic and implemented job 
descriptions that contain a type of safety contract. 
 Communication of safety topics, i.e. a widely-extended and pervading channel of 
formal and informal communication and regular meetings about safety matters 
between the top management, middle management, the general management and 
the employees.. 
 Involvement of the employees, i.e. allowing the employees to attend to safety, 
responsibility for safety is delegated and the employees are encouraged to commit 
themselves to the organisation‟s safety level target. 
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The top management has the primary influence on an organisation‟s safety culture where 
it needs to constantly demonstrate the very best visible commitment to safety for the time 
that it spends on safety-related issues (Flin and Yule 2004).  
A method to differentiate between different safety cultures includes the one used by Shell 
illustrated in Figure 15. It is based on a five stage scale comprising confidence in the 
management, its responsibility and ability to inform and communicate aspects of safety.  
Figure 15 shows a moderated version of Shell’s five stages of organisation safety cultures 
This classification is based on Westrum‟s (1993) five stage development scale for safety 
culture in which: 
1. Pathological or neglectful management has absolutely no interest in safety, but is 
more aware of how to avoid discovery by inspections conducted by the 
authorities, for example, whilst. 
2. Reactive management primarily focuses on safety when an accident has occurred. 
Therefore the accident is investigated, but otherwise nothing more is done on the 
basis of an attitude that when nothing has happened, things are probably as they 
should be and the employees must otherwise be attentive.  
3. Calculative management does what now must be done. It bases its safety on a 
system of auditing, procedures, statistics, etc. If all of this is in place and has been 
assessed by external professionals, then everything must be in order. 
4. Proactive management focuses on strategies and processes. It allocates resources 
for safety and involves all tiers of management and the employees with the 
intention of creating ownership of safety throughout the entire organisation. 
1  – NEGLECTFUL 
2  – REACTIVE 
3  – CALCULATIVE 
4  – PROACTIVE 
5  – GENERATIVE 
No safety 
programme 
No awareness  
Accidents are 
people’s own fault 
Safety is expensive 
Rules are 
problematic 
Programme according 
to instructions 
Create an APV 
according to At+s list 
Investigate accidents 
and subsequently 
correct 
Follow rules in order 
to avoid orders 
Satisfy requirements 
when they are 
stipulated 
Have an extended 
safety programme 
Ensure that everybody 
receives instruction and 
teaching  
Chart risks and create 
change 
Implement campaigns 
and initiate  
May have been 
certified 
Investigate accidents. 
and near misses 
See safety as an 
important part of the 
organisation’s political 
area 
Have a fully-
integrated intuitive 
understanding of 
safety at work 
All processes are 
considered in relation 
to this. 
All employees 
understand the 
organisation’s goals 
and strategy for 
safety and respect 
this and are an 
integral part in 
maintenance and 
future planning for a 
continued and 
sustained change and 
improvement process 
Five stages in organisations’ safety cultures 
Figure 15 
Safety takes place 
when an accident has 
occurred 
Rules are followed 
when the Danish 
Working Environment 
Authority orders this 
No programme or 
particular awareness 
unless external 
requirements are 
stipulated 
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5. Generative management is chronic in the indications relating to risk. New ideas 
are welcome and safety is considered to be a profit area with development 
potential. 
Even though great developments have been made in the knowledge about how accidents 
can be prevented, the statistics of reported accidents do show that there is still a long way 
to go before organisation will have succeeded in controlling risks and the causes of 
accidents (Cardieux et al 2006). 
One conclusion is that the current approach to safety initiatives within organisations is not 
adequate. The way that safety is measured and assessed in the organisations is also 
questioned. Therefore a large number of researchers indicate that measuring 
consequences, i.e. the number of accidents, is not an adequate measure of the level of 
safety. Even if no accidents are reported for a period of time, it cannot be concluded that 
the safety conditions are better than in some other period when accidents were reported. It 
is actually the case that when an organisation is able to reduce the probability of accidents 
occurring, it will no longer be possible to deduce the level of risk from the number of 
accidents, which will instead be an expression of coincidences.  
Also, when an organisation provides incentives to accident reduction and measures this, 
there will be a risk that the employees will instead be motivated not to report the 
accidents that occur rather than have the risk eliminated (Cardieux et al 2006). 
Alternatively, measuring a number of different factors directed towards a proactive 
prevention and safety culture should be considered. In their research, Cardiux et al (2006) 
propose the following nine areas: 
1. The organisational system – whether the safety system, its purpose, programme 
and results are considered to be just as important in the organisation as other 
factors of the organisation.  
2. Management commitment – the behaviour of the management within the 
organisation including proposals for improvements, allocation of resources, 
investment in and measurement of activities, respect for own rules. 
3. Employee responsibility – the behaviour of the employees towards procedures, 
including maintaining equipment, cleaning, training, involvement and compliance 
with agreements. 
4. Standards and behaviour – the standards of the employees that support or impede 
safe behaviour. 
5. Continuing improvement – implementation of the activities decided upon with the 
intention to improve and continually develop and evaluate this. 
6. Safety-related activities – the specific activities in the area of safety that have been 
established and implemented and continually updated. 
7. Organisational structure – the formal structure of safety issues, including the 
function of the safety organisation and the integration of safety into the 
management hierarchy. 
8. Communication – information and dissemination of all safety-related matters and 
the dialogue between employees and management that is required by continual 
awareness of safety. 
9. The work place‟s compliance with safety procedures/ rules – the extent to which 
the organisation actually succeeds in ensuring that each work place and work task 
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can be performed in accordance with both internal and external requirements and 
rules. 
2.3.5 Managerial orchestration 
Creating safety and preventing accidents is a difficult undertaking, principally because it 
is never known whether what has been done is sufficient and whether new situations have 
arisen for which no allowance was made. 
This is also the reason why the task is associated with both a managerial prioritisation and 
an employee involvement and engagement and it must also contain the eyes, ears and 
mental activities that through dialogue with the management can create awareness and 
communication of risks, dangerous situations and any need for adjustments, adaptation 
and continual development. 
We speak of the management that is needed as being multi-faceted and of there being a 
type of orchestration of initiatives, methods, processes, etc. 
1. The promotion of safety rather than accident prevention 
 The first thing to be established is that it is the promotion of safety rather than accident 
prevention that can lead to a high level of safety. The knowledge that is acquired within 
an organisation from its own accidents and near misses can primarily be used to monitor 
how things are going and if relevant identify which safety barriers are faulty and where 
there is need to invest further in training and situational awareness. The risks that may be 
encountered are those that are shown by major statistical analyses for the relevant types of 
jobs and those that can emerge from a job analysis and the observations from daily work 
situations that can be reported by employees. On the basis of this plans for safety barriers 
and message maps can be devised, which can be subsequently used for training and 
monitoring. 
2. Strategic, tactical and operational management 
The second argument for safety to be included in all tiers of management integrated into 
all other activities within the organisation. When discussing strategies, plans, activities 
and duties, the issue of safety must be included in a natural and integrated manner. The 
decision that are reached at the strategic and tactical levels are generally of vital 
importance to the matters that the work tasks at employee level become. In addition, the 
employees will generally perform the work that they believe is expected of them by the 
management, usually quickly.  
If the management wishes for something else, it must either ensure that it is credible and 
that the employees also understand that what is performed quickly is also safe. 
3. Transactional - transformational 
The third thing to be identified is the importance of involving the employees in taking 
responsibility for safety and that they are both motivated and inspired to contribute in a 
continual development of this. Here the management style is also decisive. If it is a purely 
top-down control in a transactional style, or if it is employee involving via a 
transformational style. 
4. Objectives and feedback 
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In establishing goals at the strategic level and transforming them at both a tactical and an 
operational level into a collaboration with the employees, the management is able to 
create a living culture and development in the area of safety. However, this must also be 
maintained through monitoring, measurement and feedback so that it is obvious that this 
is a priority area for the management as they monitor and react if the level is not 
maintained as a minimum or is instead continually improved and developed. 
5. Learning process, political process, symbolic process 
It is recommended that the change management concept is employed as a strategic choice 
for use in these management activities. This involves focusing both on creating a learning 
process, a political-organisational process and a symbolic process that can all interact and 
contribute to creating the change to the safety culture desired by the management. 
6. When safety degenerates 
It is not uncommon for the management to promote a dangerous practice, even though it 
is not in violation of the formal safety policy.(Nichols and Amstrong 1973).  
This is applicable, for example, if they exert pressure on the timely completion of tasks or 
if they give the order that tasks are to be completed despite the fact that the technical 
equipment is not in order or a training course has not been completed.  
In order to counter this and ensure the overall responsibility for safety, it is necessary to 
create a high level of safety awareness amongst those who are in a prominent position to 
consider safety in the overall agenda.  The managerial attitudes such as low fatalism, high 
safety prioritisation and high risk awareness have shown themselves to be of particular 
significance (Rundmo et al 2003) 
Rasmussen (1997) also puts forward the argument that safety will degenerate when 
nothing has happened for a while. There is therefore a gradual relaxation of rules and 
awareness, influenced by the desire to be more efficient and have less problems - when 
nothing has happened for some time and we feel that we have control over it. Rasmussen 
calls this “The drift to danger”, which is an effect that has over time been demonstrated in 
a large number of serious accidents. Figure 16 illustrates this “drift to danger” as an 
important argument for safety being something that must at all times be upheld and 
maintained. The work is never complete. 
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Figure 16 illustrates “The drift to danger” first formulated by Rasmussen in 1997. 
2.4 The small organisation and safety arrangements 
The research that has been conducted into the area of safety has largely been based on 
organisations with risks that could have disastrous consequences, the so-called “high-risk 
organisations”. At the same time this research is closely related to large organisations and 
not least to international groups. 
In Denmark in excess of 178,000 companies with employees and in excess of 121,000 
sole trading companies are registered. Among the companies with employees 85% have 
less than 20 employees, 10% between 20 and 50 employees, 3% between 50 and 100 
employees and only 2% have more than 100 employees (StatBank Denmark, trade and 
industry statistics for 2007).  
That is to say that safety activities in the more general areas in terms of risk should be 
targeted toward the small organisations. However, the question is whether the results that 
have been obtained from large organisations can be used in the small organisations. 
A limited number of research projects have been conducted that chart the health and 
safety problems of small organisations, including their organisational forms and 
management structures. (Hasle et al 2004) have conducted an extensive literature study of 
the work environment activities in small and medium-size organisations, which 
summarise the primary research results. The following, among other things, is 
demonstrated: 
- That the safety within small organisations is largely determined by the culture and 
understanding that the employer and the owner of the organisation has in relation to the 
aspect of safety. It is the owner who is the focal point for the tasks and duties of the 
organisation and who is responsible for the way in which safety is prioritised and 
implemented into daily work. At the same time, the owner has many different duties that 
must be attended to in his or her daily work and he or she will usually perceive systematic 
work environment initiatives as one of the more peripheral tasks (Hasle et al 2004). 
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-That systematic work environment initiatives in small organisations are usually limited, 
and that the same applies to all other types of systematic planning and management. The 
employer or the owner has a tendency to surrender responsibility for safety to the 
employees. The employer usually views safety as an individual problem and only the 
necessary safety equipment is provided. (Axelsson 2002, Hasle et al 2004). 
-That it is important to recognise that employers and employees in small organisations are 
witness to very few accidents and therefore have limited opportunities of gaining their 
own knowledge of the hazards that can lead to accidents. For this reason, among others, 
the understanding for safety being an important topic is similarly limited. (Hasle et al 
2004). 
-That over the last 5-10 years a number of different methods and tools have been 
developed, which have been trialled in small organisation, but the general experience is 
that it is difficult to disseminate and create interest in the results within small 
organisations. Small organisations need to realise that these results provide then with 
something they can use in their daily work. Something that can make the average day a bi 
easier and which is immediately understandable as regards why and how these should use 
these results. It is also known that the employers of small organisation are motivated by 
personal contact and when they are given the opportunity to exchange experiences with 
colleagues. (Hasle et al 2004).  
- That small organisations in the traditionally regulated market do not have the resources 
at their disposal that are required by the paperwork for a safety management system in a 
rule-based system. Employers of small organisations need to relay in their employees‟ 
abilities and the mutual more informal communication to a far greater extent. 
2.4.1 Challenges within the small organisation 
The formal framework within the small organisation is generally limited. It is still the 
employer who sets the agenda, i.e. decides which tasks are to be performed and under 
what circumstances.  
The employer often has a close, almost familial relationship with the employees, but in 
quite a few industries the employer needs the employees to be able to act independently.  
The informal framework, including planning and organisation, mean (among other things) 
that the communication paths are short. Immediate action is only taken when a decision is 
taken (Hasle and Limborg 2004). This means that when a demand for systematic 
management activities is made, for example systematic access to work environment 
management, the small organisations do not participate. This is too time-consuming and 
expensive and does not fit in with their way of working. (Antonsson and Smidt 2003).  
This means that the requirement for systematic strategic planning and organisation, which 
is prescribed in the methods to achieve the high level of safety, does not generally have an 
actual basis in the small organisation. On the other hand many of the elements that are 
included in safety management and safety culture will also be necessary in the small 
organisation. 
The challenge therefore lies in how to use the best from the large organisations adapted to 
a form that fits in with the everyday situation of the small organisation. Some of the facts 
that makes this difficult in the small organisations include the five following points: 
 The fact that the accident frequency is high, but the risk awareness is low 
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 The fact that culture and organisation are extremely different for different 
industries, professions and individual employers. 
 The fact that management resources are small, so must needs to be delegated to 
each employee. 
 The fact that the gains from a high level of safety are difficult to monitor. 
 The fact that resources for safety activities such as finances, time and knowledge 
are limited. 
High accident frequency, major underreporting – low awareness 
It has been shown in many other countries besides Denmark that the accident frequency is 
higher for small organisations than for large organisations (Vickers et al 2003, Walters 
and Lamm 2003, Eakin et al 1998). This has been partly shown in the EU by the countries 
that have adequate coverage of registered occupational accidents. Among these, Eurostat 
data for 1996 showed that organisations with less than 10 employees had an accidents 
frequency of 6.8 and organisations with between 10 and 49 employees had a frequency of 
6.3, whilst organisations with in excess of 250 employees had a frequency of 2.7 
(Eurostat 1996).  
The Danish recording of occupational accidents has an underreporting of around 50%, 
which is probably particularly due to the fact that the smaller organisation do not report 
their accidents. This is either because they do not know that these must be reported, do 
not have the energy to report, or are disinclined to report. 
On the other hand the individual small organisations experience accidents relatively 
seldom among their own employees and should an accident occur, it is often an accidental 
event that the employer feels he or she has no blame for. The vast majority of accidents 
are so-called “commonplace accidents” such as falls, collisions with objects or dislocation 
of muscles by heavy lifting.  
What is commonplace about these is that the events are simple and easy to explain, 
afterwards that is, but these accidents also have a strong element of human behaviour and 
actions at the same time the conditions that create the accidents are perceived as being 
everyday occurrences and not as something especially dangerous. This also involves a 
lack of competence in the small organisation in investigating and analysing accidents 
(Walters 2001). All in all this means that the awareness of dangers and their possible 
consequences is generally low. 
Culture and organisation for different industries, professions and employers 
Small organisations are not a homogeneous group that can be referred to. They represent 
an extremely inhomogeneous collection of organisations and people with individuals who 
may have become employers by accident. The large industry groups that are dominated 
by small organisation include agriculture, construction, commerce, knowledge services, 
which together constitute scarcely 50 % of all small organisations. However, only these 
four industries are characterised by very different cultures and ways of organising 
themselves. 
It can also be seen from the information provided by Statistics Denmark that a fairly large 
number of organisations close down every year and just as many new ones usually 
appear. Establishing yourself as a company in Denmark is very straightforward and you 
can start by acquiring a VAT number and then start work. The managerial skills in small 
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organisations in particular are associated with whether they are familiar with the tasks and 
therefore perform them by themselves and with the help of others. 
The organisations that survive are naturally those that perform well and which can are 
able to continue acquiring the tasks. However, this is also what is the most important. To 
be doing well and the relationship with the employees being important is shown in the 
majority of studies of small organisations, which also describes the familiar and often 
patriarchal relationship that exists between employees and employer (Vickers et al 2003, 
Hasle et al 2004). 
However, if the culture is that you have to be able to manage by yourself and each must 
be able to take responsibility for him or herself and own work, a large proportion of the 
employers will also perceive this as applying to issues of a safety-related nature (Hasle et 
al 2009). 
This is confirmed by the studies into the small organisations where the distinguishing 
mark is that accidents are caused by the employees themselves, especially if the employer 
has ensured that resources are made available (Vickers et al 2003, Eakin et al 1998). If 
accidents occur they are a surprise and are perceived as isolated events and they are 
therefore often interpreted as accidental accidents that are either due to personal 
“stupidity” or an almost inevitable destiny (Hasle and Limborg 2004, Hasle et al 2009) 
The management resources are small and the delegation of the work is a necessity  
The limitation of managerial resources in small organisation is generally pointed out in 
the literature that deals with small organisations. There may be no use for the large formal 
systems when the issues can just as well be discussed in the everyday situation. Therefore 
also the informal framework and an often ad hoc characterised arrangement of the work. 
(Hasle et al 2009, Walters and Lamm 2003, Eakin et al 1998) 
In addition, the work tasks in many small organisations are characterised by their needing 
to be performed outside of the organisation‟s premises or away from where the employer 
is based. This applies to, among others, the construction sector, within commerce, within 
agriculture, in the cleaning industry and within the transport industry, etc. 
The two industries that are included in the DanWorm project are the carpentry profession 
and the caretaking profession. For both of these two professional groups independence in 
the dealing with tasks is pronounced since the employer is not on site and therefore 
cannot monitor or in some other way verify whether the work has been performed safety. 
In particular the tasks of carpenters in small organisations bear the mark of work places, 
work tasks and work conditions changing on a daily basis and over the course of the day. 
This requires each carpenter to be able to take care of his or her own safety in very 
different situations, but of course the employer must also ensure that the carpenter has a 
basis on which to do so. 
As regards caretakers, in many cases their employers are  estate offices at other addresses 
and on a daily basis they are left alone to attend to various tasks in a specific property. 
These work tasks are to a certain extent fixed, but some are completely dependent on 
problems with residents, rain and poor weather, structural maintenance and waste 
management, etc. He or she is also often alone whilst working and must be able to operate 
in the situations that arise. Here his or her options are also conditional on the employer 
having created the basis to allow him or her to act safety, but whether or  not he or she 
does so in the situation if his or her choice. 
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The gains from a high level of safety are difficult to monitor. 
In many contexts it is postulated that safety can pay and that accidents are costly. If a 
serious accident affects a small organisation, this can also mean that the organisation will 
not be able to bear the cost and not at all if it affects the employer. 
However, as has been stated such accidents are rarely experienced in organisations and at 
the same time the accident is seen as something that is very random as regards where and 
how the accident strikes. It is for this reason, among others, that it is difficult for the small 
employer to relate to the argument that safety pays. 
He or she believes that time and money should be spent on obtaining equipment, drawing 
up instructions and work place specifications, etc. without the employees wanting to use 
these or put a price on their efforts. That is to say that he or she sees safety as something 
that is costly. (Brooks 2008). 
The challenge lies in making the employer see the costs of safety in relation to the risk 
rather than the actual accidents so that he or she is given an opportunity to assess the 
value of safety rather than spending money on something the effect of which he or she 
will not be able to see. 
Financial, time and knowledge of dangers and safety resources are generally limited 
It is also stated that the resources of the employer and business owner in a small 
organisation are limited in terms of finances and time and not least in terms of activities 
that are considered to be peripheral in relation to what the money is earned from (Brooks 
2008, Walters and Lamm 2003) 
It is also generally the case that the employer and owner of a small organisation primarily 
have a professional knowledge on what the organisation is based on and not special 
knowledge of safety and work environments. Nor is it the topics about which he initially 
begins to acquire knowledge: Economics and accounting, authority regulations, sales and 
customer contact come first. 
Nor will knowledge of safety immediately be at the top of the list when staff are being 
appointed. It is more about being able to make them perform the tasks for which there are 
customers. In small organisations there may be opposition to investing, in particular in 
equipment and tools (Vickers et al 2003). 
In small organisations there is not generally time to familiarise oneself with new technical 
areas, e.g. work environments and safety that are not immediately product-relevant 
(Walters and Lamm 2003) The employer therefore needs to be given a plan and method, 
which have been devised by others with the requisite knowledge, but which satisfy his or 
her criteria of having to be inexpensive, easy to use and maintain and adapted to his or her 
tasks and industrial requirements (Vassie and Cox 1998). 
On the other hand, customers from, for example, larger organisations may make demands 
on safety competences, which can have a positive effect on prioritisation in small 
organisations. This is therefore also one of the methods that is indicated as being the way 
forward in strengthening the awareness, prioritisation and competences of small 
organisations. (Vickers et al 2003) 
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2.4.2  Safety arrangements of the small organisation 
In relation to their operations, smaller organisations often have a great potential to act and 
a good ability to adapt to changes to everyday conditions (Hasle and Limborg 2004). This 
is also an advantage that means that they are able to demonstrate very good flexibility in 
the performance of their tasks, which justifies them in the labour market.  
The owner/manager is often also the founder and “father” of both the product and to the 
development of the organisation. It is therefore his or her perception of product quality, 
precision, pace, order and standards that is the basis for the safety culture within the 
organisation (Hasle and Limborg 2004) 
It is therefore still the case that safety begins with the manager and his or her decision that 
safety is to be an important parameter within the organisation irrespective of whether the 
organisation is large or small.  
Kogi (2006) has gathered experiences from a number of Asian countries of how 
participant-based safety initiatives in small organisations have been successful and which 
immediately appear to have a general nature. Other initiatives include the German 
“Employer Model” (Eichendorf 2001) and the Danish project concerning “controlling 
order and safety” (styr på orden og sikkerhed) (Hasle and Limborg 2004)) support Kogi‟s 
results. 
Kogi states two primary criteria:  
3) That improvements are best achieved if local knowledge of best practices is used 
and assistance is given in disseminating this knowledge via dialogue between 
local groups. In connection with this, the importance is highlighted of the 
objective for the small organisation being the use of good local practices, to be 
shown self-help actions at a low level of cost and to provide an experienced 
facilitator with support for a continuous process.  
4) That a starting point has been taken in the positive features of small organisations 
that include the informal style of management. Also the use of local people, as we 
communicate best with people that we already know. 
Kogi illustrates the step-by-step action programme for locally-established groups of 
employers from small organisations, as shown in Figure 17 
The first problem that is encountered in increasing safety in small organisations is 
therefore in creating understanding and insight in the employer in that he or she should 
give safety a high priority. As his or her own experience is that accidents do not happen 
and everything is fine. However, if and when the manager decides that safety is to be 
prioritised, he or she will need readily available information about the risks that need to 
be focused on and what needs to be done in this regard. He or she generally does not have 
the energy, knowledge or experience to look for knowledge in a multitude of different 
places nor the resources or people to manage a safety function within the framework of 
the organisation. 
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Figure 17 shows Kogi’s model for a step-by-step action programme targeted at small 
organisations’ participant-oriented introduction of safety programmes (Kogi 2006) 
At the same time he or she will need his or her employees to be able to act independently 
to a large degree, i.e. that through their basic training will have gained an insight into 
working safety and that they will know how to organise their work. Studies indicate that 
many employers in small organisations find it difficult to convince their employees that 
safety is important and that they must observe risks and act appropriately with regards to 
safety (Vickers et al 2003).  
The employer finds it too difficult to provide guidance as he or she cannot be present all 
the time where the employees are working. This applies in particular to the industries in 
which the work tasks are performed away from a home address, e.g. construction, 
transport, agriculture, etc. 
For both parties it may be helpful to acquire a tool that would enable them to see risks and 
observe safety barriers as well as being aware of the necessary measures and  provisions. 
This must be readily available as there are not many resources available in addition to 
what is needed to complete the work tasks. The goal must be to provide the employees 
with the skills that mean that the way in which they think that a task needs to be 
performed is fully integrated with performing the task in a safe manner. 
This requires a general understanding for tasks and jobs, especially in work that is 
performed outside of a “home organisation”, i.e. at different geographic locations to 
where the employer has his or her office. There will be special requirements here when 
the employees have to relate to new surroundings and new work conditions on a daily 
basis.  
It would not be physically possible for an employer to be present at all such work places 
and assess their safety. In these situations he or she must rely on the employee being able 
to do this at the same time as attending to a customer commitment. 
Independence and self-management in relation to safety at work therefore becomes 
especially necessary for employees in many small organisations. This places some 
particularly high demands on both employer and employee in relating to the safety 
requirements. The basis from the home organisation must be in order with regards to 
equipment, resources, instruction, time and work scheduling and the employee must be 
Learn local  good 
practices
Implement simple 
improvements
Check multiple areas 
jointly
Confirm benefits
1
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3
4
Good examples with 
eventually photo or video
Action checklist.     
List of low-cost ideas
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Figure 17
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made aware of how he or she should behave, what observations need to be made and how 
he or she must conduct him or herself generally.  
However, there are many indications that there is not an implementation problem in small 
organisations, but more of an awareness problem. Why – when there is no longer 
anything happening and how – except that it is too heavy in terms of costs and resources. 
The major problem of making safety an important topic in small organisations is a task 
that must and will be broadly resolved by means of authority arrangement, initiatives of 
the parties and training systems, etc.  
2.5 Summary 
This chapter contains the theoretical basis for the DanWorm project and describes the 
understanding of accidents and their prevention on which the DanWorm project is based. 
2.5.1 An understanding of the accident and its causes 
The concept of the “occupational accident” is defined as: 
” The occurrence of a sudden and unexpected event or series of events in 
connection with work that results in some injurious, cause injury to people, 
damage to material, processes, etc.” 
The phenomena of the “accident” can most easily be analysed with the benefit of 
hindsight, i.e. when the accident has occurred. This report illustrates how such an analysis 
can be conducted with the aim of identifying not only the immediate causes, but also the 
underlying and more fundamental causes of the accident. 
The review that is given in Chapter 2 shows, among other things, that accidents have 
many causes and it is the simultaneity of the causes that to a greater extent causes the 
accident rather than the presence of individual causes. However, given the fact that 
individual causes do not lead to an accident, this makes it difficult to single out the actual 
“culprits”. At the same time this means that it is difficult to perceive causes that in one 
situation do not have any significance but in another situation will be of significance to 
the occurrence of the accident. 
It may be easy for this reason to direct the searchlight on the actions and choices of 
individuals when explaining the accident and identifying “the cause”. This is why there 
has been great focus on human errors and mistakes. A distinction is made between 
conscious and unconscious mistakes and between faults in performance, faults in 
memory, incorrect choices of method and between misunderstandings and inadequate 
knowledge presented by, among others, Rasmussen (1987) and Reason (1977).  
This understanding of the different ways in which people make mistakes or act incorrectly 
is placed within a framework of explanations and conditions determined by the situation 
and context in which they find themselves. Reason (1997) states in his model how 
organisation, decisions and work conditions are of significance to which risks are present 
and the safety barriers that are necessary to prevent accidents occurring. 
This brings us over to looking at the understanding and perception of risks as important 
elements in people‟s ability to perceive risks, know which dangers these contain and the 
consequences of a potential accident. Basically this review leads us to the conclusion that 
people are not particularly good at or have the opportunity to assess risks. Some risks are 
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considered to be high and other low and this suggests that so many other factors in our 
lives and surroundings have significance to what we understand and perceive. This 
sometimes has the effect that we perceive a situation incorrectly or quite simply make a 
mistake, which can lead to an accident.  
We must instead look at the multitude of factors that are of significance to both the 
presence of risk and the causes of accidents occurring. An analysis of the different view 
of a number of researchers of this phenomena results in a taxonomy for the causes of 
accidents, in which the hierarchy of immediate causes, underlying causes and control-
related causes is described and is placed in relation to the decisions, values and actions of 
the people involved on the one hand and the possible control mechanisms and technical 
measures on the other. (Jørgensen 2002).  
This also points to the significance of all of the decision-making layers within an 
organisation and the organisational conditions for the way in which the safety 
arrangements operate and accidents are prevented. 
That is important to have an understanding of the paradox that an accident and its causes 
are not understood until after the accident has occurred, whilst it needs to be prevented 
before it occurs. Quite a lot of accidents preventing measures within organisations involve 
investigating the accidents that occur in order to initiate action against the specific cases 
demonstrated by an analysis. However, Krause (1995) shows that this type only has a 
limited effect. He instead suggests that a much better preventative initiative is achieved 
when the management decides to obtain a higher degree of safety and a more target effect 
of the safety initiatives. It would be even better if the management is able to create a 
culture within the organisation in which the employees contribute to continual safety-
related improvements. 
The knowledge of the risks and causes of accidents that is needed in such a process needs 
to be obtained from investigations and analyses of a large number of accidents, but in 
such a way as to obtain the generic fundamental causes of the accidents and the generic 
measures, i.e. safety barriers, which can prevent accidents. The use of generic knowledge 
is vital being able to achieve the desired results. 
The risks that are usually focused on are those that could result in very serious 
consequences if they were allowed to lead to an accident. „Spectacular risks‟ in particular, 
where a large number of people are exposed to the risk simultaneously, receive a lot of 
attention, obviously for very good reasons. However, the fact of the matter is also that the 
so-called „commonplace‟ and more common types of accidents have a very high 
occurrence and can have serious consequences to individuals. Many more people die as a 
result of such common risks than as a result of what are often termed „high-risk‟ areas, 
which are more of a challenge in relation to doing something with these common risks 
than relaxing the protection against the risks that are in focus. 
2.5.2 Instruments for proactive prevention 
Three types of instruments have been implemented to be used for proactive prevention.  
The first is assurance of the safety barriers, both technical and organisational, that will 
prevent accidents from occurring, the second is the situational awareness that must be 
instilled in people to enable them to take the correct action and the third is methods of 
gathering and disseminating knowledge of the relevant dangers, risks and their safety 
barriers by means of so-called „message maps‟. 
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For the safety barriers, a distinction can be made between the active and passive safety 
barriers, where the active barriers require active action from systems or people in order to 
function, whilst the passive barriers function by virtue of their presence alone. The safety 
barriers are also divided into preventative safety barriers, which protect against accidents 
occurring, protective safety barriers, which ensure that injuries do not occur even if an 
incident does occur and limiting safety barriers, which contribute to minimising damage. 
There are several ways to describe the different types of safety barriers. The description 
given in the ARAMIS report by Hale & Guldemund (2003) is very easy to understand. 
Here the safety barriers are divided into technical safety barriers and behaviour-affecting 
safety barriers and combinations of the two. This overview clearly indicates how 
important it is that the technical safety barriers are both provided but also installed, 
inspected and maintained for optimal operation. The behaviour-affecting safety barriers 
are connected to procedures, plans, rules, resources, competences, adaptation, obligations, 
coordination and communication. All in all, a large number of conditions that must be 
established by the organisation, including the way in which the work is organised. 
Situational awareness has been defined by Endsley (2000) as: 
”The perception of elements in the surroundings within a space of time and place, the 
understanding of their significance and prediction of their status in relation to what will 
occur in the near future.” 
Endsley (2000) lists a number of factors that are of significance to what a person has his 
or her attention drawn to. He states that goals determine perceptions and understandings 
and the direction of attention that Endsley therefore suggests, that if we do not understand 
what an individual‟s objectives are in a specific situation, the information in the 
environment will therefore have no meaning. In addition to this, prejudice and 
expectation will influence situational awareness. 
In reality, people need to act on the basis of more than that which contains the immediate 
information in the situation. They need to be able to combine information and imagine 
events that exceed what lies behind their experiences. They need to be proactive and not 
just reactive. They need to act on the basis of objective and be able to act with a certain 
degree of automatic and knowledge-based behaviour. 
A lot is therefore based on competences to be able to observe, know the significance of 
what is being observed and act correctly on the basis of this. Bellamy‟s (2008) 
competence steps can provide an overview of where an individual is or believes that he or 
she is. There is good reason, for example, to expect that this very unconscious 
incompetence is contributory to many accidents, not least among young people and new 
employees. 
A tool used to create an overview of safety barriers, risks and appropriate actions is the 
development of „message maps‟. These have been developed in order to create an 
overview of which users have a need for what information.  Their purpose is to make an 
individual able to take decisions and action that is directed at his or her own needs. Flin et 
al (2006) set up „message maps‟ as a means of creating situational awareness to be used 
in decision-making and communication and cooperation. It is also possible in this way to 
establish how managers can support this process. 
„Message maps‟ can be used in proactive accident prevention by specifying which 
consideration should be present in the person‟s head. That is to say a method to ensure 
that the situational awareness is correct and that appropriate action is taken by specifying 
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the observations, which need to be made and the safety barriers that need to be in place in 
order for everything to progress as it should, and the action that is required is the 
conditions are not in order. 
2.5.3 Managerial and control concepts 
Over time there have been many examples of organisations that have achieved a high 
degree of safety. Some of the characteristics possessed by these organisations are that the 
management has taken the issue of safety seriously and given this high priority in the 
organisation's strategy and organisation. 
It is also stated that safety should be integrated into the strategic, tactical and operational 
management of the organisation and that the line management is given responsibility.  
However, again it is quite inconsequential how this takes place. Flin and Yule (2004), 
among others, point to the difference between operating transactional management, which 
is characterised by a purely top-down style, and transformational management, which to a 
far greater extent is a participant-oriented and employee-motivating style. 
The top management, middle managers and general management each have their own 
functions and significance for how safety is operated within an organisation. The general 
management must be able to understand the art of supervising and communicating the 
priority of safety. For example, it has been shown that the more that safety is discussed 
and integrated into conversations about the performance of the general management, the 
greater will be awareness amongst the employees and also safety.  
Generally middle managers largely adopt the decision that are outlines in strategy and 
action plans and they are therefore of vital importance as to whether the general manager 
and the employees are given the opportunities, facilities and resources that are needed in 
order to perform their work tasks in a safe manner. However, everything begins and ends 
with the prioritisation and commitment that the strategic management establishes and 
exhibits in a continual dialogue and communication within the organisation. 
One of the managerial methods that has shown results in particular with regards to safety 
is the establishment of an objective, implementing it, monitoring and giving feedback on 
how it progressed in order to then set new objectives, etc. However, here it is also the 
case that involving the employees is important, i.e. that the initiatives are implemented in 
a transformational manner. Furthermore, it is vitally important that the plans are credible, 
realistic and based on mutual trust between management and employees. 
It is essentially a question of a management task for the majority of organisations that 
wish for an improved level of safety. The principles of change management can therefore, 
with advantage, also be used in the area of safety. Therefore initiatives must be 
implemented to create a learning process both for the managers and the employees, a 
political process that allocates responsibility and integrates safety both generally and in 
the day to day work and a symbolic process that contains stories, successes, visibility and 
clarification of the culture that is necessary in order to maintain a continuously high level 
of safety. 
What is most important is therefore the creation of a good safety culture, which as has 
been shown, can only take place by employing a number of different initiatives, methods, 
strategies and processes. The literature gives a number of different messages about what 
safety culture is and how it can be created. Awareness and involvement on the part of the 
management are two of the key words. In Westrum‟s five-stage scale there is an excellent 
model for the categorisation of organisations‟ levels of safety. Here a distinction is made 
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between the neglectful manager, the reactive manager, the calculative manager, the 
proactive manager and the developing manager.  
A number of methods have been developed to measure and categorise safety culture, but 
without a suitable method having thus far been identified. The fact of the matter is that the 
safety culture can vary in the people that an organisation consists of, the tasks that are 
performed, the conditions determined by the surroundings, the economic frameworks, etc. 
Furthermore, the level of safety has with this fallen over time according to Rasmussen if 
we are not continually aware of whether the limits for the level of safety moves. It is 
therefore important to have a long-term and constant focus on risk, even if accidents do 
not occur.  
2.5.4 The small organisation 
A characteristic of the management of the small organisation is that it is informal and 
largely determined by the manager‟s culture and understanding of the performance of the 
work and maintenance of safety. It is not uncommon for the employer in the small 
organisation to view safety as the responsibility of each employee when he or she only 
contributes to providing the equipment. In other situations the manager is not concerned 
with safety at all. It can be said that generally the majority of small organisations are at 
the low end of Westrum‟s five stage scale.  
The low awareness of the causes of accidents and consequences in small organisations is 
due in part to despite a higher accident frequency, they experience only a few incidents 
within their own organisations. This makes it difficult to achieve a prioritisation of risk 
awareness, situational awareness, safety competences and knowledge of safety barriers in 
the small organisation. 
At the same time small organisations are very different, partly due the tradition-bound 
cultures and standards of the industries and unions, partly due to an individual manager‟s 
own standards and values and finally due to the context in which the small organisation is 
to be active, e.g. independent of demands from large organisations or from local small 
customers, etc. 
One important aspect is that it is immediately difficult for the manager of the small 
organisation to see what gains can be achieved in using a lot of resources on safety, apart 
from taking his or her time and money, which is already limited. On the other hand the 
literature shows that if the manager of the small organisation already understands what he 
or she can do and what he or she can gain from this, the decision path is short and the 
potential for action is great.  
This therefore applies to developing methods and materials that can be targeted at the 
small organisation in a way that is easy to understand, easy to use, requires few resources 
and which can immediately be included in the usual work. An implementation of new 
methods must also involve local practices, illustrate the application of and gains from the 
methods principally within the industry or professional area of the small organisation and 
be very readily communicated from somebody that is already known by the small 
organisation. 
New methods and processes can also be implemented advantageously via technical 
training so that the employees are actually aware of risks, safety barriers, observations 
and options, for example, through their training and thereby impart this knowledge to the 
small organisation. 
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Whereas the orchestration of safety in the large organisation can be placed on strategic 
management and a large administrative apparatus, in the small organisation it must be 
incorporated into a social structure. We will now conclude with Lund and Aarø´s 
proposal for how to create an increased understanding of safety within a society, which is 
shown in Figure 18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 illustrates Lund and Aarø´s concept for influencing social attitudes and 
standards in relation to accidents (Lund and Aarø 2004). 
The thinking behind this model is that if we wish to achieve success in the area of safety, 
behaviour-modifying initiatives, attitude-creating initiatives and structural initiatives need 
to be implemented in a coordinated and targeted process. Each of theses initiatives by 
themselves have very little effect. (Lund and Aarø 2004) 
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3. The Dutch WORM project 
In 2003 a major Dutch project, WORM, was initiated by “the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment”. WORM stands for “Workgroup on the Occupational Risk Model" and 
its purpose is to develop a basis for calculating the risk of occupational accidents in any 
task at work. The background to the project was obtained from the work on “I-RISK – A 
quantified integrated technical and management risk control and monitoring 
methodology”, which is the result of a European research project concluded in 2000 
(European Commission 2000). 
The I-Risk method was devised to be used in the high-risk area and is based on the 
assessment of risks when using hazardous chemicals in processing plants. The aim is to 
be able to prevent major accidents and limit the consequences should such an accident 
occur. 
The WORM project has a similar aim for occupational accidents, namely to develop a 
method and an electronic program that could support a management in its decision-
making in its efforts to prevent occupational accidents. 
The WORM project is reported in two primary reports,  
 ” The Occupational Risk Model – Final report of the Workgroup on ORM”  
(Ben Ale 2006),  
 ” The Quantification of occupational risk – The development of a risk assessment 
model and software” (RIVM 2008).  
In order to understand the whole project and its scope and results, reference needs to be 
made to these two reports and to the technical reports that are available by sending an e-
mail to: cev@rivm.nl. These are the following: 
1.  Description of the project organisation 
2.  Overview of methodology, production steps and quality control 
3.  Occupational accidents in the Netherlands, Storybuilder & Storyfilter - The 36 
Storybuilders  
4.  ORM logical model and Bowtiebuilder  
5.  Probability Influencing Entities and the PIE questions 
6.  Centre Event Mission Data  
7.  Exposure surveys  
8.  Bow tie models and quantification 
9.  Measures, effectiveness and costs  
10. Activities, agents, jobs and bow tie links  
11. Storybuilder software user manual  
12. Bowtie builder software user manual  
13. ORM software user manual 
This section will only provide an overview of the structure and content of the WORM 
project and an insight into the product and results that emerged from the WORM project. 
Special emphasis has also been placed on the products that are used in the Danish project 
DANWORM.  
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3.1 Structure and content of the WORM project 
3.1.1 Bowtiebuilder and 64 critical events 
The basic model for the accident analyses in the WORM project is a “bowtie” model 
(bow tie model), which is a combined model of a fault tree analysis to the left and a 
cause-consequence analysis to the right, cf. Figure 19. The "bowtie” model is structured 
around a “centre event”, which we will in future called “the critical event” (den kritiske 
hændelse) in Danish.  
The choice of "critical events" is vital to the analysis of accidents since the analysis of 
both causes and consequences takes its starting point from here. In fact different types of 
undesirable events can be perceived as both causes and consequences completely 
independently of the location of “the critical event”. However, the fact of the matter is 
that as soon as “the critical event” has been established, the description of causes and 
consequences will solely concern the specific critical event.  
In principle a “bowtie” analysis exclusively consists of a description of the chains of 
events that lead to the critical event and the consequences that this critical event can have. 
By combining the analyses with a traditional fault tree analysis and cause-consequence 
analysis it is possible for each link in the chains of events to identify safety barriers that 
have been inadequate or have not functioned. The WORM project has used the 
understanding of the safety barrier concept that is described in Section 2.2.1 and Figure 
10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 illustrates the "bowtie” model and the structure of the WORM project accident 
analysis 
The prevention of accidents deals in principle with avoiding or minimising the 
consequences of critical events. In order to achieve this, the preventative actions must be 
directed towards ensuring that the safety barriers are in place and in order. That is to say 
that a management prioritisation has its starting point in the furthest right side of the 
model and its action space in the furthest left side.  
What the bow tie model does it to create the image and relationship between these 
furthest points. The philosophy of the WORM project is as soon as this relationship has 
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been created it is possible to calculated the risk and determine which preventative 
initiatives are most appropriate to implement in order to reduce the risk. 
Constructing an image of a bow tie for a specific critical event is a comprehensive 
process, which can be based on both a purely logical mindset and actual stories. In the 
WORM project a total of 36 bow ties have been developed, based on analyses of in 
excess of 9,000 accidents with either serious of fatal consequences. The analyses were 
conducted using a “storybuilder” method, which is described in Section 3.1.2. 
The bow tie model therefore provides a relationship between the existence of specific 
causes and the probability of specific consequences occurring. In the WORM project 
calculations have been performed with three types of consequences: 
1. Death,  
2. Invalidity and 
3. Serious but recoverable injuries 
The data that is used covers those occupational accidents that have resulted in 
hospitalisations. 
The right side of the bow tie analysis therefore covers the consequential process that the 
specific critical event has led to including the facts that can contribute to increasing or 
limiting the extent of the injury. The safety barriers that are found on the right side are the 
so-called „protective safety barriers‟ that prevent or minimise the injury in a specific 
critical event. 
The left side of the bow tie analysis covers all of the chains of events that have an 
influence on the occurrence of the critical event. The safety barriers that are found here 
are the preventative safety barriers that must be able to prevent the critical event from 
occurring.  
n WORM an understanding has developed for the existence of primary safety barriers 
(PSB) and supporting safety barriers (SSB). For example, the method when loading a 
truck could cover SSB (method, rules, training, knowledge about weights, etc.), which 
will be of significance to the PSBs that must ensure that the truck is loaded so that it has 
good stability (position, weight limits, loading aids) in order to prevent losing control 
over the vehicle. 
Information about whether they are the following can also be associated with all such 
safety barriers: (PUMM´s) 
 Provided  
 Used 
 Maintained 
 Measured 
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Figure 20 illustrates the performance system and barrier structure of the WORM project 
for safety barriers (RIVM 2008) 
Which can again be investigated for, whether through the management and organisation 
of the organisation they are connected to: 
 Procedures/rules 
 Equipment/aids 
 Design/furnishing 
 Accessibility 
 Competencies/training 
 Communication/knowledge 
 Motivation/engagement 
 Conflict resolution (for processes/functions) 
The relationships between PSBs, SSBs, PUMMs and the managerial performances are 
illustrated in Figure 20. 
An example of how a “bowtie” can appear is shown in Figure 21 "fall from roof", where 
the safety barriers relate to the strength and durability of the roof, the person's ability to 
move on the roof and the presence of railings or other protection against falling. If the 
person does fall in any case, the height that he or she falls from and the hardness of what 
he or she fall on will have a significance to the size of the injury and the subsequent 
treatment that can be provided. Within each of the boxes there is information on PUMMs 
and other managerial services. 
Figure 20 
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Figure 21 
Figure 21 shows the structure for the bowtie model for “fall from roof”. The details in 
each box are obtained from a story builder, where the context, causes and consequences 
are described (RIVM 2008). 
The “bowties” that are compiled in WORM represent 64 “critical events”, which can be 
understood as all of the events that can lead to a personal injury. Such a “critical event”, 
can also be understood or reformulated, such as “Hazard sources”.  The 64 critical events 
or hazard sources are shown in diagram 11. 
Diagram 11 
No Storybuilder- number and name No Bow tie Model – number and name 
1 1.1.1 Falls from heights – ladder and step 
 
1 1.1.1.1 Falls from heights – moveable ladder 
2 1.1.1.2 Falls from heights – permanent ladders 
3 1.1.1.3 Falls from heights – stepladders 
4 1.1.1.4 Falls from heights – rope ladders 
2 1.1.2 Falls from heights –Scaffolding 5 1.1.2.1 Falls from heights – mobile scaffolding 
6 1.1.2.2 Falls from heights – fixed scaffolding 
7 1.1.2.3 Falls from heights – erection/dismantling of scaffolding 
3 1.1.3 Falls from heights – Roof/ 
floor/platform 
8 1.1.3.1 Falls from heights – roof 
9 1.1.3.2 Falls from heights – floor 
10 1.1.3.3 Falls from heights – fixed platforms 
4 1.1.4 Falls from heights – hole in the 
floor/ground 
11 1.1.4 Falls from heights – hole in the ground/earth 
5 1.1.5.1 Falls from heights – mobile 
platform 
12 1.1.5.1 Falls from heights – mobile platform 
6 1.1.5.2 Falls from heights – stationary 
vehicle 
13 1.1.5.2 Falls from heights – stationary vehicle 
7 1.1.5.3 Falls from heights – other 14 1.1.5.3 Falls from heights – other 
8 1.2 Fall at the same level 15 1.2 Fall at the same level 
9 1.3 Fall on stairs and ramps 16 1.3 Fall on stairs and ramps 
10 2 Hit by moving vehicle 17 2. Hit by moving vehicle  
11 3.1 Contact with falling object - cranes 18 3.1 Contact with falling object –cranes and their loads  
12 3.2 Contact with falling object –from other 
than cranes 
 
19 3.2 Contact with falling object –mechanical lift  
20 3.3 Contact with falling object – from vehicle and their loads  
21 3.4 Contact with falling object –manual lift 
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No Storybuilder- number and name No Bow tie Model – number and name 
22 3.5 Contact with falling object -other 
13 4 Contact with flying object 23 4.1 Contact with flying object – from machines or hand tools  
24 4.2 Contact with flying object – from object under pressure   
25 4.3 Contact with flying object – that has blown with the wind  
14 5 Being struck by rolling/sliding objects or 
persons  
26 5 Being struck by rolling/sliding objects or persons 
15 6 Contact with object that is used  or 
carried  
27 6.1 Contact with object that is in use or carried – hand tool used by 
other than the injured 
28 6.2 Contact with object that is used or carried – that is not a hand 
tool 
16 7 Contact with hand tools used by the 
injured himself 
29 7 Contact with hand tools used by the injured himself 
17 8.1 Contact with moving parts of machines 30 8.1.1 Contact with moving parts of machines – under operation 
31 8.1.2 Contact with moving parts of machines – under maintenance 
32 8.1.3 Contact with moving parts of machines – under setup 
33 8.1.4 Contact with moving parts of machines – under cleaning 
18 8.2 Contact with hanging/swinging objects 34 8.2 Contact with hanging/swinging objects 
19 8.3 Mast/squeezed in between objects 35 8.3  Mast/squeezed in between objects 
20 9 Thrust against object 36 9 Thrust against object 
21 10 Buried under materials 37 10 Buried under materials 
22 11 Inside or on moving vehicle that lose 
control 
38 11 Inside or on moving vehicle that lose control 
23 12 Contact with electricity 
 
39 12.1 Contact with electricity – high voltage lines 
40 12.2 Contact with electricity – from hand tools and tools 
41 12.3 Contact with electricity – with electrical work 
24 13 Contact with warm or cold surfaces or 
naked flames 
42 13 Contact with warm or cold surfaces or naked flames 
25 14.1 Lost control of contents from open 
containers 
43 14.1 Lost control of contents from open containers 
26 14.2 Contact with hazardous chemicals 
without losing control 
44 14.2 Contact with hazardous chemicals without losing control 
27 15 Lost control of containers that are 
normally closed  
45 15.1 Lost control of containers that are normally closed – under the 
addition, removal of chemicals or opening of the container 
46 15.2 Lost control of containers that are normally closed – under 
transportation 
47 15.3 Lost control of containers that are normally closed – under 
closing of the container 
48 15.4 Lost control of containers that are normally closed – when 
working near them 
28 17 Fire 
 
49 17.1 Fire – warm work 
50 17.2 Fire – work near fire 
51 17.3 Fire – extinguishing fire 
29 20.1 Aggressive people 52 20.1 Aggressive people 
30 20.2 Aggressive animals 53 20.2 Aggressive animals 
31 22.1 Hazardous atmosphere in closed 
room 
54 22.1 Hazardous atmosphere in closed room 
32 22.2 Hazardous atmosphere through 
respirator  
55 22.2 Hazardous atmosphere through respirator  
33 23 Surrounded by fluid/water 56 23.1 Surrounded by fluid/water – work in or under water 
57 23.2 Surrounded by fluid/water – work nearby water 
 97 
No Storybuilder- number and name No Bow tie Model – number and name 
34 25 Straining of muscles and joints 58 25.1 Straining of muscles and joints – when handling objects, 
peoples 
59 25.2 Straining of muscles and joints – with movement around 
35 26 Too rapid pressure equalisation  - - 
36 27 Explosion 60 27.1 Physical explosion 
61 27.2.1 Chemical explosion – vapour or gas 
62 27.2.2 Chemical explosion - dust 
63 27.2.3 Chemical explosion – explosives 
64 27.2.4 Chemical explosion – exothermic reaction 
Diagram 11. Shows an overview of the 36 story builders and 64 “bowties” that are 
compiled in the WORM project. 
3.1.2 Storybuilder  
Each of these 64 logical “bowties” are based upon knowledge from a large number of 
actual accidents, in all over 9000 accidents, which in a period over 6 years have been 
investigated by the Dutch authorities. In all cases there is talk of accidents where the 
injured person either is deceased or has been admitted to hospital as a result of the 
accident. In the Netherlands, all such accidents must be investigated in detail. 
In order to gather information from all of these accidents, a so-called "story builder" was 
developed, which is a computer program where the critical event is identified and where 
both the right and left sides of the critical event are mapped for each concrete accident. In 
addition, there is information about safety barriers that have been lacking or that have 
failed, and a registration of the services in the management and organisation system that 
are associated with these deficiencies and errors, cf. figure 20. 
Figure 22 illustrates an example of a “story builder” that shows, how a larger number of 
accidents with the same type of critical event (the yellow box) spreads itself out on 
different consequences to the right, and causes and deficient safety barriers to the left. 
The red lines indicate each course of an accident and its path through the system (RIVM 
2008). 
The details that are included in the Storybuilder diagram are the following: 
 The work related situation 
o A – Activity at the time of the accident 
o ET – Type of aid  
 Error and causes:  
o DS – Error in output from the management system 
o T – Barrier error (PUMM´s) 
o BFM - Barrier error (PSB og SSB) 
o IF – Influencing condition or factors (PIE´s) 
o LCE – Loss of control / deviating event 
o REG – Observance of  legislation 
 CE - Centre event/ critical event 
 Effects: 
o DDF – Factor involving person causing the loss 
o INJP – The injured part of the body  
o INJT – Type of injury/diagnosis 
o HOSP – Scope of hospitalisation 
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 Consequences 
o FOD – Final consequence death 
o FOI – Final consequence likely recoverable injury 
o FOP – Final consequence likely to be permanent invalidity 
o ABS – Absence from work 
 
Classifications from ESAW have been used, for example, for registering the type of aid, 
body part and type of injury.  
 Figure 22 
Figure 22 shows “the story builder interface” with an example of one of the 36 
storybuilders.  
3.1.3 PIE´s – Probability Influencing Entity 
A significant element in the analyses in story builder and subsequent “bowties" is which 
safety barriers that have failed and have thus led to the accidents happening. In some 
cases the safety barriers are easy to assess, while in other cases they require more detailed 
information.  
One example is the safety barriers that shall ensure that the support of a scaffolding is in 
order (PSB). Here, the safety is dependent upon the surface’s condition, the support’s 
surface and placement, presence of a spacing support and its distance (SSB) etc.  
But, it is also necessary not only to identify that the safety barriers are in place but also 
their quality and which factors that have significance to this. 
The factors that have an influence on the quality of the safety barriers, and that by that 
means have an influence on the likelihood of an accident occurring, have been given the 
designation PIEs. It stands for “Probability Influencing Entity”, that is to say factors that 
can influence the likelihood.   
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The philosophy is that if all PIEs are in complete order, then the safety barriers are too 
and therefore the risk of an accident is low. If some of these PIEs are faulty, not in order 
or not in place, then the safety barrier is bad and the risk of an accident is high.  
For example, PIE questions for the base of a scaffold are the following: 
 Control of the foundations supporting ability 
 The foundation‟s strength in relation to weight and planeness 
 Control of whether the foundation remains sufficient 
 Use of wooden blocking to ensure stability 
 Strength of the construction that the scaffolding is attached to 
 Control of the construction‟s strength in relation to the scaffolding 
Connection between these PIEs and safety barriers, and their significance to calculation of 
the final risk is illustrated in figure 23.  
Figure 23 
Figure 23 illustrates the connection between PIEs and safety barriers and the 
significance for the risk level in this case exemplified for “fall from ladder”.  
The 7 designated conditions in “the working environment” are an expression for the 7 
safety barriers that are identified as most significant in the analysis of the hazard “fall 
from ladder” (RIVM 2008) 
Each of the safety barriers in all of the “bowties” have thus had a number of PIEs 
associated. It is, at the same time, the factors that are asked when the risk is assessed and 
calculated.  
3.1.4 Preventative activities, efficiency and costs 
The next step in expansion and use of the knowledge that is established through 
storybuilders, “bowties”, safety barriers and PIEs is to connect it to the activities that can 
ensure that PIEs are in order and to have evaluated what each of these activities costs. 
The goal is that when one registers that the safety barriers are not in order, and registers 
which PIEs that have significance to this, one can also show which measures can improve 
the conditions and which measures are the most effective and what these cost. For this 
purpose, the following knowledge card index has been built up in WORM: 
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 A library over activities that can change the value of PIEs, that is to say, improve 
these conditions 
 A detailed description of measures with reference to norms and standards 
 The costs of these measures through a general evaluation of how such 
improvements are normally carried out and combined in a generic form. 
 A list of the actions a measure requires, which form the connection between 
measures, PIEs and safety barriers. 
 An evaluation of the effectiveness of each measure with regard to its potential for 
influencing and reducing the risk 
This list of measures is in a mixture of generic, and for the individual “bowties” specific 
measures that strengthen the organisational, behavioural and technical safety barriers. The 
generic measures include, among others, training, inspection, physical safety barriers, 
control, signals and warnings, etc. 
The sources of these measures are taken from established checklists, safety manuals, 
procedures, training schedules, required training, as well as European and Dutch norms 
and standards.  
An example of the connection between “bowtie”, safety barriers, PIEs, PUMM‟s, 
exposure information and measures is shown in diagram 12. Specified in the example is 
one safety barrier and one PIE for the sake of the overview. 
Diagram 12 
Bow tie Falls from heights from a ladder 
One of the safety barriers Type and condition of the ladder 
One of the PIE´s Surface of the steps 
The question in the survey In what % of the time where you use a ladder, were the steps 
slippery because of the ladder type or the presence of e.g. 
paint, earth, snow, water, etc. on the ladder steps. 
PIE action Be sure that the steps on the ladder have a good foot grip 
Measure Use anti-slip treatment on the steps 
Ensure good maintenance and keep clean 
Carry out a visual inspection prior to use 
Periodic inspection and maintenance 
Diagram 12 shows an example of the connection from the Bowtie analysis with respect to 
Safety barriers, PIE and measures, where only one example is specified from each 
step.(RIVM 2008) 
An evaluation of the effectiveness of the measures and significance to the risk, 
concerning the measures effectiveness in relation to changing the PIE quality going from 
being unsuitable to being good. This assessment is difficult, and in the WORM project it 
is also recognised that neither in the literature, nor among the experts is there sufficient 
knowledge in the field. As an alternative, a qualified evaluation system for this 
effectiveness was developed. This system received two dimensions, each with 3 possible 
resulting values.  
The two dimensions are: 
1. The type of measure (source) 
2. What the measure influences (area of influence) 
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Figure 24 shoes the 2 dimensions and their respective 3 values. In addition, diagram 13 
shows the percentages that are used for the individual measures evaluated effectiveness 
for their areas of influence. 
Figure 24 illustrates the basis for an effectiveness system for measures based upon 2 
dimensions and these dimensions 3 values. (RIVM2008) 
Diagram 13 
 Area of influence  Physical 
conditions 
Organisational 
conditions 
Behavioural 
conditions 
Source  
Technical measures 80 % 70 % 50 % 
Procedural measures 60 % 60 % 50 % 
Behaviour regulating measures 50 % 50 % 40 % 
Diagram 13 shows the percentages used for evaluating the effectiveness of different types 
of measures effectiveness on different types of areas of influence ( RIVM 2008) 
It is also clear that each measure can influence more than one PIE, and that each PIE can 
be influenced by more than one measure. It is the quality of the PIEs that determines the 
quality of the safety barriers. Therefore, each measure has the ability to reduce an existing 
gap to the perfect. This is the goal for effectiveness.  
One example is, that if it is registered that a PIE is on a negative level 40% of the time 
and the effectiveness of a measure in achieving a gap of 0 is 75%, this means that the PIE 
level is reduced by (40% x 0.75) = 30%. Thus the new PIE value becomes (40% - 30 %) 
= 10 %.  
One example, where a PIE is "to detect hazardous substances in the atmosphere", and 
where a PIE level of 40% has been registered, i.e. that 40% of the time, people can be 
subjected to an exposure of hazardous substances in the atmosphere, because an 
observation system is not working.  
The gap that shall be reduced is therefore 40%, for which measures shall be found to 
reduce this. If the effectiveness of a measure in combination with the action “to detect 
hazardous substances in the atmosphere” is evaluated at 75% e.g. through a technical aid 
Source 
Technical measures 
Procedure measures 
Behavioural measures 
Application 
Technology 
Organisation 
Human 
Influences 
Figure 24 
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to measure the hazardous substances, then the gap will be reduced to 10%. A subsequent 
measure shall then be directed toward this 10% gap, which means that the gap can never 
achieve the value 0 (RIVM2008). 
The evaluation of the costs of carrying out the individual measures is also difficult to 
determine. The matter is, that the measures will have different cost levels within different 
sized companies and company strategies and therefore be almost impossible to set 
correctly in relation to the individual concrete company. Therefore, the WORM project‟s 
basis has solely been: 
 The most common implementations and the most common business characteristics 
within a certain industry are presented as standard 
 Only the most relevant and direct costs are taken into consideration 
The costs for a measure have a fixed share, which constitutes a first payment, and a 
variable share, which is based on an expected lifespan of the measure. Both parts can, in 
the developed software model, be adapted by a given user to an actual situation. All 
indirect costs, e.g. for production, wages and storage capacity, etc. are not included. 
In this exercise, the WORM project has taken many different means into use in order to 
obtain a good basis for the financial calculations. Including the actual prices for purchases 
but also a large number of expert assessments of the cost levels for carrying out specific 
measures (RIVM2008). 
3.1.5 Surveys on exposure data 
In order to be able to limit a risk, two sets of data are necessary: 
1. A likelihood that a critical event can occur with consequences resulting from this 
2. A knowledge of the exposure of the person to the given critical event and the 
working conditions in which these exposures are included. 
With regard to the first set of data, namely calculation of the likelihood of a given critical 
event occurring, there is the need for: 
1. A numerator, which corresponds to the number of observed cases of critical events 
and their consequences 
2. A denominator, which is the total number times persons are subjected to a 
situation, where the critical event can occur, i.e. the time with which the person is 
exposed for a given hazard. 
For example, the risk of falling down from a scaffold will be able to be calculated based 
upon details of a numerator, that indicated the total number of accidents with falls from 
scaffolding and a denominator, which indicates the total working hours, that have been 
spent working on a scaffolding. In addition this risk can be increased or reduced 
depending on the conditions under which the work is carried out. 
In order to be able to calculate the likelihoods, the WORM project carried out a 
comprehensive survey, which mapped out the exposure conditions in The Netherlands. 
This survey was carried out in 2 phases, where: 
 The first phase mapped out how many workers in The Netherlands were exposed 
to the 64 hazards,  
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 The second phase was comprised of separate surveys for each of the 64 hazards 
with regard to mapping out the working conditions and the presence/lack of PIEs.  
Figure 25 illustrates the structure of the two phases of this comprehensive survey that was 
based on an Internet survey among 30,000 workers in The Netherlands. The first phase of 
this survey was named “the mission survey”. Its purpose was to map out the number of 
hours, the Dutch workers were subjected to the different forms of hazards. An example of 
mapping of exposure for one type of hazard from the RIVM 2008 report is the following: 
Exposure for the hazard “being struck by a moving vehicle”. Here, the exposure will be 
the number of hours where a worker remains in areas in association with his work, where 
there are moving vehicles. This applies, among others, to activities in all industrial areas 
where there, at the same time, is carried out moving transport, in warehouses with mobile 
transport, along public roads e.g. in association with road works, rubbish collection, the 
delivery of goods, etc. Actual traffic activities, that involve traffic accidents are not 
included, as such accidents are not counted as workplace accidents in The Netherlands. 
In this survey, it was asked how many hours the individual was in the work situations 
subjected to each of the 64 hazards within the past week. Thereafter, these details were 
extrapolated to an annual exposure based upon 42 working weeks per year. In addition to 
these exposure details, basic data was also collected on industries, job, age and sex. This 
has formed the basis for descriptions of the risks the Dutch workers are subjected to in 
different jobs and industries. 
Figure 25 
Figure 25 illustrates the survey structure in the WORM project’s collection of exposure 
data for use in calculating the likelihoods (RIVM 2008) 
The second phase of the survey received the designation “bowtie specific survey” In this 
second phase, 64 specific surveys were carried out, one for each hazard. The purpose of 
this second part was to map out the working conditions that have significance to whether 
the risk is high or low, i.e. a mapping out of the presence of the specific PIEs linked to the 
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safety barriers. An example of the questions for one type of hazard and one type of safety 
barrier are the following (RIVM 2008): 
Three PIE questions are formulated for the hazard “Struck by a moving vehicle” where 
one of the safety barriers concerns “location and placement of the worker in relation to 
the moving vehicles”: 
1. The measures that separate pedestrians and the moving vehicles,  
2. The use of these measures,  
3. To what degree one passes close by, in front of or behind the vehicles. 
These specific surveys were carried out among the persons, who in the first survey 
responded that they were subjected to the concrete hazard during working hours, i.e. only 
persons were asked who were exposed. In each of these specific surveys, 400 people 
participated. 
 The question structure of the individual questions is illustrated by the following example 
(RIVM 2008): 
After a number of quality and validation checks a sort of average was calculated for each 
PIE weighted with the details for the exposure data from the first “mission” survey. This 
average was used to quantify the risk factor in the ORM software program. With respect 
to details of all questions and calculation methods refer to the WORM reports. 
3.1.6 ORM – The Occupational Risk Model 
The purpose of the WORM project was to develop a software program that companies 
can use to: 
1. calculate the company‟s risk for accidents  
2. calculate the financial costs that can decrease this risk. 
At the same time, with this, to be able to state which measures decrease the risk most in 
the most financially profitable manner. 
Question 1: 
When you in the last 12 months were a pedestrian during your work in places where 
vehicles were moving……..
In what percentage of the time were the vehicles  difficult to discern because they for 
example  didn’t have any lighting, didn’t use sound signals when driving backwards, didn’t 
use direction indicators 
Never Half the 
time
Always
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The components, which are included in the development of this quantified risk model, are 
collectively shown in figure 26 (RIVM 2008): 
ORM's logical model is the central part in the ORM software model and contains the 
analysis from “bowties”, including the connection between the safety barriers, PIEs and 
management services on the one hand and consequences on the other hand, which are 
gone over in sections 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3.. Linked to this are the denominator details 
from the two-phased surveys, which are described in section 3.1.5.  
Behind the model and the calculations lies a highly comprehensive statistical program, 
which is carried out by NCSR Demokritos, Greece. 
Figure 26 
Figure 26 illustrates the overriding model for the data included in the ORM software 
model (RIVM 2008) 
The developed software program is designed in such a way that if a company, workplace 
or trade group goes in and describes: 
1. What they or the employee does and how long time (exposure times per “bowtie”)  
2. Under which conditions this work is carried out (occurrence of PIEs) 
so they can obtain a calculation of their risk of accidents that lead to either death, 
invalidity or recoverable with severe injuries. 
The program can also conduct an optimisation (the optimiser), where it goes through the 
answers that are given about the working conditions and relates these answers to possible 
measures that can change the risk. At the same time this optimisation puts the measures 
into a financial evaluation of the costs of carrying out the measure. 
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An end product would be a picture, as shown in figure 27, where the 3 curves show 
respectively the risks for death, invalidity and reversible injuries. The curve‟s start point 
on the X axis states the risk that is present based upon the given details.  
The X axis states the risk, while the Y axis states the financial costs of carrying out the 
stated measures. To the right of the image are specified the measures that "the optimiser” 
has found to be relevant based upon the information given about the actual exposures and 
working conditions.  
By going into the individual points on the curves, one will be told which combination of 
measures must be carried out before one can reach this new risk level, and what the costs 
will be to carry them out. 
Figure 27 
Figure 27 illustrates the ORM software end product with a statement of the risk for 
respectively death, invalidity and recoverable serious injuries after accidents, as well as 
which measures can decrease this risk and the costs of this. 
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With this, a good basis should be created for a company to decide which initiatives they 
want to carry out and what they can expect to get out of it. 
The matter is, however, that quite a lot of data must be entered into ORM in order for 
these calculations to be carried out and the end product received.  
All employees are subjected to risks in their work to differing degrees. These risks also 
include, as a rule, a number of different hazards / critical events. In the ORM program 
there is the potential for a company to specify a number of different jobs and also the 
number of employees that perform them.  
For each job or task, one must also state which activities are carried out in relation to 
different types of exposures. E.g. if one is a carpenter then one must state how much time 
one spends going on ladders, on scaffolding, on roofs, in areas where vehicles are driven, 
etc. These details correspond completely to the questions that were asked in the 1st phase 
of the mission survey. 
The next step in the software program is to inform about the conditions, under which each 
individual activity is performed, i.e. at which level the different  
PIEs are present in the use, maintenance and control, etc. In the program, the “Dutch 
National Average” is inserted, so that you can either chose to “do as the average”, or 
chose to “specify/change all of parts of the stated PIEs”.  
Figure 28 
Figure 28 illustrates the structure of the details a company needs to provide in order to 
receive a calculation of the total risk. 
Figure 29 then illustrates how the question about the individual PIEs is included, and 
where in the model the optimisation goes in and calculates where risk-reducing measures 
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can occur cf. section 3.1.3. 
Figure 29 
Figure 29 illustrates how changes of PIEs affect the risk calculation. 
The Dutch ORM program has undergone a number of development steps and is now 
made publicly available in 2010, both in a stand-alone application and in a light web 
version cf. http://weborca.nl 
3.1.7 Sensitivity analysis 
Instead of using “The optimiser” to calculate concrete results of particular measures, that 
lead to results as shown in Fig. 27, one can also see what effect a change in safety barriers 
or PIEs has on the accident risk. To that a systematic analysis has been conducted where 
each safety barrier and each PIE are changed from the Dutch average (DNA) to the 
maximum (most optimal) value and its minimal value. Under the assumption that the 
other safety barriers or PIEs do not change, one can calculate how great a significance the 
individual barriers and PIE have on the risk. This is also a way of identifying which 
factors have the greatest influence, i.e. which factors one shall, with advantage, focus on 
in order to have the most security for the effort.  
The analysis has looked at the primary and secondary safety barriers and at PIEs. The 
analysis has led to three parameters for each variable (safety barriers or PIE). The first 
two parameters (“Risk Reduction Index” and “Risk Increase Index”) are the percentage 
change in the risk (per exposed hour) if the safety barrier or PIE shifts from the Dutch 
average (DNA) to respectively, the maximum positive value (for “Risk Reduction Index”: 
the barrier is always in a good state or the PIE is 100% of the time in the positive state) or 
to the maximum negative value (for “Risk Increase Index”: the barrier is absent or PIE is 
100% of the time in the negative state).  
It is clear that these two parameters depend both on the effect of the safety barrier or PIE 
at risk, but also which improvement possibilities there are, in other words how the Dutch 
average is in relation to the optimum state.  
 The third parameter is the relative change of risk as a result of a change in safety barriers 
or PIE state. It gives a sort of “sensitivity” of the risk of changes in the safety barriers or 
PIE quality, which is not quite so dependent on whether the starting situation corresponds 
to DNA.  That is to say, that this sensitivity can also be used as an aid for prioritising, 
when the relevant PIE does not correspond to the DNA. This sensitivity can be defined 
as:  Changes in the bowtie risk/Changes in PIE. 
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 The following figures show examples of these sensitivities.  
Figure 30 shows an example of the “Risk Increase Index” and “Risk Reduction Index” for 
safety barriers in the “bowtie” “Struck by moving parts of machinery during operation". 
The three consequences are differentiated, namely severe but recoverable injuries, 
permanent injury/invalidity and death.  
 
Figure 30 shows an example of the “Risk Increase Index” and “Risk Reduction Index” 
for safety barriers in the “bowtie” “Struck by moving machine parts during operation".  
Stated for each of these 3 consequences are the potential, percentual change in the risk, 
when the likelihood for failure of one of the six safety barriers changes from what, in 
WORM project, is the Dutch national average (DNA). The changes can go from 100% 
failure (“risk growth”) to 0% failure (“risk reduction”).  
This figure shows, among others, that the sensitivity can be dependent upon the 
consequences, for example, the safety barrier “Emergency stop” on a manned machine is 
far more important to the death risk than to minor injuries. It can also be sees that the 
basis presupposes most of the safety barriers are "on the correct side" which means that 
potentiality for improvement is relatively modest for multiple safety barriers, while 
missing safety barriers can worsen the risk dramatically.  
Figure 31 shows the sensitivity for the same hazard as figure 30. The trend is in 
agreement with figure 30, however, the potential for improvement or worsening cannot be 
seen here. The figure illustrates instead how the risk of "struck by moving machine parts 
during operation" changes when the likelihood of failure of one of the hazard's six safety 
barriers changes. It is noted that the calculations presuppose that all other safety barriers 
have a failure likelihood in agreement with DNA. 
 
Figure 31 
 
 
Figure 30 shows an example of the “Risk Increase Index” and “Risk Reduction Index” 
for safety barriers in the “bowtie” “Struck by moving machine parts during operation". 
Stated for each of these 3 consequences are the potential, percentual change in the risk, 
when the likelihood for failure of one of the six safety barriers changes from what, in 
WORM project, is the Dutch national average (DNA). The changes can go from 100% 
failure (“risk growth”) to 0% failure (“risk reduction”). 
This figure shows, among others, that the sensitivity can be dependent upon the 
consequences, for example, the safety barrier “Emergency stop” on a manned machine is 
far more important to the death risk than to minor injuries. It can also be sees that the 
basis presupposes most of the safety barriers are "on the correct side" which means that 
the potential for improvement is fairly modest for several safety barriers, while the lack of 
a safety barrier can worsen the risk dramatically. 
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Figure 31 shows the sensitivity for the same hazard as figure 30. The trend is in 
agreement with figure 30, but the potential for improvement or worsening cannot be seen 
here. The figure illustrates instead, how the risk of “being struck by moving parts of 
machinery during operation” changes when the likelihood of failure of one of the hazard‟s 
six safety barriers changes. It is noted that the calculations presuppose that all the other 
safety barriers have a failure likelihood in agreement with DNA. 
 
Figure 31 
 
Figure 31 shows how the risk for “being struck by moving parts of machinery during 
operation” changes when the likelihood of failure of one of the "bowties" six safety 
barriers changes.  
 Figure 32 shows the sensitivity of the risk as a result of the changes in PIEs for the given 
hazard.  
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Figure 32 shoes sensitivity of risk as a result of changes in PIEs.  
The figure shows the intervals for risks, when the PIE concerned is changed from the 
most positive to the most negative state in relation to DNA. Additional PIEs that 
influence a barrier and thereby the risk intervals are also shown. 
3.2 General results from WORM 
In addition to the developed software for use in the risk calculation and risk optimisation, 
there is comprehensive data material in the entire WORM project that can be used in 
general. Also drawn up is a large number of analyses and reports over the data that the 
material contains, and an actual data warehouse with the possibility of pulling data out in 
all directions. 
Here is five examples of the analyses, the material gives the opportunity for: 
1. An overview of the relative risk for the 3 types of consequences for the 64 
“bowties”. 
1.E - 12 1.E - 11 1.E - 10 1.E - 09 1.E - 08 1.E - 07 1.E - 06 
Physical screening (barriers) 
Physical screening insufficient? 
Physical screening removed or placed out of function? 
Physical screening defective? 
Physical screening avoided? 
Physical screening not procured? 
Danger zone (barriers) 
(Awareness of) Body part in the danger zone (barriers) 
Danger zone not clearly marked? 
The machine doesn’t stop momentarily? 
The danger zone moves? 
Danger zone within reach? 
Workplace not in order? 
The person has a poor physical condition? 
Affects the concentration negatively? 
Ability (barriers) 
Machine’s state (barrier) 
CE marking lacking? 
Machines with modifications within risk identification? 
Machine in damaged or poor condition? 
Emergency stop (barriers) 
Age (barriers) 
Risk of accident per hour 
8.1.1 Being struck by moving parts of machinery - operating 
Death Recoverable injuries Permanent injury 
The person is wearing loose clothing, long hair, gloves, etc.? 
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2. An example of the meaning of Barrier error in association with the risk of fall 
from roof 
3. An example of the 10 most important Barrier errors that shall be checked when 
building, and which underlying errors and managerial errors that are associated 
with this. 
4. An overview over the distribution of errors in the managerial output for all 
“bowties”. 
5. Examples of different analyses of exposure data from the surveys carried out 
3.2.1  The relative risk for 64 “bowties” 
The number of accidents per year per 100,000 employees gives a value that is an 
expression for the national average risk per year in The Netherlands. The following 3 
figures show this relative risk for, respectively, death, invalidity and  recoverable severe 
injuries with a rank order of the 64 hazards according to the risk value‟s size. (RIVM 
2008) 
Figure 33 shows a rank order of the 64 hazards based upon the likelihood of a fatal 
accident per year, with an average exposure evaluated on the basis of the Dutch national 
average (DNA). Thus “Fall from roof” contains the greatest likelihood of leading to a 
fatality, etc. 
Figure 34 shows a corresponding rank order of the 64 hazards based upon the likelihood 
of an accident involving invalidity per year, with an average exposure evaluated on the 
basis of the Dutch national average (DNA). The hazard with the highest likelihood per 
year is “contact with moving machine part during cleaning”, just as it is the hazard with 
the highest likelihood per exposed hour, while the hazard with the highest number of 
accidents that has led to invalidity is “contact with moving machine part while working 
with the machine. 
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Figure 33 shows the 64 hazards ranked after which contains the greatest risk of fatality by accidents per year.  
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Figure 34 shows the 64 hazards ranked after which contains the greatest risk of invalidity by accidents per year.  
 
PERMANENT INJURY RISK RANKING PERMAMNENT-INJURY RISK RANKING
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Figure 35 shows the 64 hazards ranked after which contains the greatest risk of accidents per year that leads to severe but recoverable 
injuries  
RECOVERABLE-INJURY RISK RANKING
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3.2.2 Barrier faults in connection with the risk of falling from roofs 
In order to gain an impression of what details that can, for example, be retrieved for specific risks, 
the following 2 diagrams are shown. Diagram 14 illustrates which safety barriers that have failed in 
association with accidents involving “fall from roof”, and in what scope these safety barriers have 
failed with all inspected accidents of this type. 
Diagram 14 illustrates an example of failure in the safety barriers, which are the most important 
causes of accidents involving a fall from roof (RIVM 2008) 
Diagram 15 follows up on the results in diagram 14 and shows the most common fault in PUMM‟s 
i.e. the conditions that shall ensure that the safety barriers are in order and the faults that are found 
in the managerial measures that shall ensure that the conditions are in order.  Diagram 15 solely 
concerns, just as diagram 14, the accidents that are linked to the hazard “fall from roof”.  
Diagram 15 illustrates an example of the errors in safety conditions and managerial measures that 
would have ensured that the safety barriers were in order, but that have involved accidents by fall 
from roof. (RIVM 2008) 
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3.2.3 The 10 most important barrier faults when building 
By an analysis on industry level of all accidents within building, one can find those errors in safety 
barriers that have the greatest significance to the risk in this industry. Listed in diagram 16 are the 
10 types of safety barriers, which there especially should occur a safeguard of: 
Diagram 16 
The safety barriers are underlined under each of the following points: 
▪ Presence of correct railings along the roof, ground and platform. 
▪ Placement of ladders – if the conditions are suited to placement of a ladder, if the ladder has a 
sufficient length, is placed on stable and firm foundation with a safe angle, and secured against 
movement. 
▪ Procure and use personal fall protection, when working at heights without railings. 
▪ Attention to the building parts being properly secured. 
▪ To keep people outside of danger zones where loads are hanging or where there is the danger that 
objects can fall down from heights,  like under object that are being mounted. 
▪ Safe cutting of loads. 
▪ The presence of proper railings on scaffolding and monitoring of control measures, which ensure that 
the railings remain in good order. 
▪ Proper construction of the scaffolding (especially support and anchoring) and state of the scaffolding 
floors (e.g. fixing to the building). 
▪ Presence of reliable machine guards and sufficient user ability to operate the machines in a safe 
manner. 
▪ Check that current-carrying parts are not live when working with them, including measures to 
ensure that they remain so during the entire work (lock-out). 
 Diagram 16 shoes the top 10 themes for use in safety checks within building (RIVM 2008) 
Also linked to these faults in the safety barrier is knowledge of the scope of errors in the underlying 
causes (PUMM‟s) and errors in the management‟s measures. Diagram 17 shows in which scope 
these conditions have had significance to errors in the safety barriers for the building sector in total. 
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Diagram 17 
Also linked to the safety barrier errors specified in diagram 16, is a broad significance of the 
underlying causes (PUMM‟s) and errors in the management‟s measures. Stated below is the 
significance of the underlying causes for the safety barriers in the building and installation sector: 
(1) Error in the task related safety barriers (PUMM’s = the Provide, Use, Maintain, Monitor tasks) 
cf. figure 20 
  Barrier not procured: 47% 
  Barrier not used or not used correctly: 39% 
  Barrier not maintained in a good state or not secured so it remains in its place.: 8% 
  No monitoring of whether the barrier is in place: 6%  
 
(2) Error in the services, which the management system shall offer in order to secure the task 
related safety barriers  
(the underlined words refer to designations in the management system, as stated in figure 20) 
 Insufficient motivation and attention from management: 30% 
 Insufficient plans and procedures:16% 
  Insufficient or unsuitable equipment: 15% 
  Insufficient staff competencies: 11% 
  Insufficient communication:10% 
  Insufficient solutions surrounding conflict between task and safety: 10% 
  Poor ergonomic furnishing and design in the work: 6% 
  Insufficient access to the appropriate staff: 2% 
Diagram 17 illustrates the significance of errors in the underlying causes of accidents in the 
building sector (RIVM 2008) 
3.2.4 Distribution of errors in the managerial measures  
It is also interesting highlight what the significance of the individual elements in errors of 
managerial measures are to the risk of accidents. Here it shows that there actually is a difference in 
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the different types of risks but that there are also some measures that are more important than others 
to place focus on. 
Figure 36 shows the general division of the errors in measures, which are registered for all the 
analysed accidents. The curves also illustrate how this distribution looks for 5 different specific 
hazards. For example, the ergonomic design of hand tools is a significant defect for accidents using 
hand tools, while the explosion risk has defects on the delivery of the correct technical equipment. 
On the general level comes management‟s lack of ability to motivate safe behaviour in at a clear 
first place. 
Figure 36 
Figure illustrates faults in the management services both generally and for 5 specific risks (RIVM 
2008) 
3.2.5 Examples of analyses of exposure data  
This Dutch survey of exposures to accident risk is unique and gives, for the first time, the 
opportunity to set a number of accidents in relation to the scope of exposure, which occurs in the 
ORM software model. But in addition to this, the collected data also provides the opportunity to 
describe not only what risks people are subjected to but also precisely the scope of the exposure in 
different industries, jobs, task types, and under which conditions these risks occur.  
In the Dutch report (RIVM 2008) the following examples are given for what this data can show. 
The DanWorm project has, to a certain extent, taken a point of departure in that the difference 
between the Dutch and Danish workplaces do not differ significantly from each other. 
The first example of the use of exposure data is figure 37, where it is shown how many employees 
are subjected to being struck by a vehicle. The figure shows the number of employees distributed by 
the number of hours per year they are subjected to this exposure. As one can see, very many 
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employees are subjected to the danger in shorter periods, while a smaller number are subjected for a 
longer period of time. This type of distribution is quite typical for most of the types of hazards.  
Figure 37 
Figure 37 shows the number of employees who are exposed to the hazard "being struck by a 
vehicle” and the number of hours they are exposed. (RIVM 2008) 
The second example is shown in figure 38 and is the result of an analysis of the 10 types of hazards 
that the Dutch employees are most exposed to measured in the number of hours per year. 
Figure 38 
Figure 38 shows the 10 types of hazards, which Dutch employees are most subjected to measured in 
hours per year (RIVM 2008) 
It is not surprising that the danger of falling on the same level, which concerns all forms of 
activities on the floor and in areas without a difference in heights is comprehensive, but there is also 
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Figure 1. Distribution of the total number of hours per year workers in t e Netherlands are at risk of 
being struck by a moving vehicle. 
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many that are subjected to this hazard in a large part of their working hours. This means that the 
calculated risk, i.e. the number of accidents per number of subjected hours, remains small. 
The third example is shown in figure 39, where the exposure to the hazard “struck by a vehicle” is 
divided into industries.  Be aware that the traffic risk on public roads is not included in the Dutch 
data.  The industry sector and the trade sector are the industries, where the employees are most 
exposed to this hazard. 
Figure 39 
Figure 39 shows the industry division for the employees who are exposed to the hazard “being 
struck by a moving vehicle”. 
3.3 Summary 
The Dutch project has contributed with a comprehensive analysis of accidents, their causes and 
safety barriers, which together with a mapping of the exposure conditions in The Netherlands, have 
given a basis for being able to calculate the actual risk of accidents with severe consequences in the 
form of death, permanent invalidity or other severe but recoverable injuries. 
The results are given in an overview of 64 hazards, which an analysis of some 9,000 severe 
accidents have identified. 
Identified for these 64 hazards are the safety barriers (PSB, SSB) that for each individual hazard, 
have failed in the accidents, and there are identified the conditions that determine the safety 
barrier‟s quality (PIEs).  
A registration has occurred of in how high a degree the respective safety barriers are: 
 Provided 
Exposure to hazard of BT2 "Struck by moving vehicle" per sector in NL
31%
20%14%
11%
7%
6%
4% 4%
2%1%
0%
Industry
Trade
Transport and communication
Construction
Other organisations
Governmental services
Health and social care
Commercial services
Other services
Education
Financial services
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 Used 
 Maintained 
 Measured 
And whether the managerial initiatives have functioned in the form of: 
 Procedures/rules 
 Equipment/aids 
 Design/furnishing 
 Accessibility 
 Competencies/training 
 Communication/knowledge 
 Motivation/engagement 
 Conflict resolution (process/function) 
To be able to calculate the actual risk, a comprehensive survey has been carried out among 30,000 
employees in The Netherlands, where the exposure conditions to the 64 hazards and their safety 
barriers have been mapped.  
This also gives valuable knowledge of trade groups and employees in the industries‟ subjection to 
the 64 hazards. 
The Dutch project has also developed an electronic calculation tool, which makes it possible to 
calculate the risks for, respectively, death, invalidity and severe injuries, if one states what one does, 
what hazards one is subjected to and under what conditions this occurs. The calculation system can 
also tell, which preventive measures can bring down the risk, what it costs, and give an optimisation 
of which preventive measures can best pay to carry out for a given investment. 
Of the results derived from the Dutch project a large number of basic data and statistics are, in the 
form of exposures divided into industry and trade group. 
The Dutch project has been the basis for the Danish project and there has been throughout the entire 
project period, a close co-operation between the 2 projects.  
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4. Data collection for the DanWorm project 
The name DanWorm is an expression for “Danish Working group for Occupational Risk Model”. 
The original purpose of the DanWorm project was the following: 
 To transfer the Worm results to a Danish version and simplify the program, so that small 
companies can, in an easy way, form an impression of the actual risk level for accidents in 
their own company. 
 To develop a targeted auditing system, which builds on the accident scenarios that the 
WORM project has found, and that with limited resources can be used in small businesses. 
 To try to establish the quantification of the risk with the safety barriers‟ effectiveness on the 
background of results from inspections based upon data from a limited number of small 
businesses. 
 To draw up auditing forms as a type of self evaluation that makes it possible for a business 
to establish the effectiveness of own safety barriers. 
The goal of having focus on the small businesses is based upon the Dutch project especially having 
focus on larger businesses, at the same time as the developed software is complicated to use. 
Therefore, the Danish project views it as a particular task to develop a simplified version, which is 
less complicated to use.  
These objectives were designed at a time where the ORM program was under development.  The 
Dutch progress was delayed especially because of the development of the software and the 
completion of the “bowtie” analyses. It created a delay of the Danish project, which was dependent 
upon these results. 
However, the work with the Dutch “bowtie” analyses gave a good insight into the Dutch process 
and results in relation to identifying the safety barriers and PIEs.  
Also, from the Dutch side there came a need for making the developed material more accessible and 
“popular” in the use. This led to significant co-operation across the projects. Especially the use of 
the many data to create “exposure profiles” of e.g. industry levels are a result of this co-operation. 
Finally, part of the methodology work in the Danish project has led to a simplification and 
adaptation of the Dutch software. The Danish work has, in addition to this, been to make a Danish 
version and make the software available for Danish users. This is described in section 5.4. 
4.1 Tasks of the DanWorm project 
n order for companies to use the developed software and form an impression of their actual risk 
levels, the following are required: 
 That one makes a highly detailed account of which tasks are performed and in how long a 
time converted into a whole year. 
 That one makes a highly detailed account of under what safety related condition these tasks 
are performed. 
124 
As the software was in the beginning and the DanWorm project period, it was clear that it required 
collection and entry of a comprehensive amount of data material for companies who want a 
calculation of the risk in their own company. 
The DanWorm project quickly arrived at the fact that a small company would do this or have it 
done. The task then became to find a method whereby this could be done for the little company. The 
result of this is described in section 5.3. 
In order to test the developed method and to show its usability a data collection was carried out for 
2 industries to see, if one could create a risk profile for jobs in small businesses. The 2-
industries/trade groups that were chosen are carpenters and caretakers. The results of the DanWorm 
project‟s observations are described below and the risk profiles are shown in section 5.5. 
Finally, the observation showed that there is a need, especially in the small companies, for gaining 
targeted and concrete information about what risks they shall especially be aware of and which 
safety barriers, in that connection shall be instructed on or paid particular attention to.  For this 
purpose, the DanWorm project has drawn up a number of INFO cards for the most important 
hazards. The results of the INFO cards are shown in Appendix A. 
4.1.1 Data model 
The data, which shall be collected is exposure data for work tasks within the 2 industry areas. The 
type of exposure data is given by the analysed 64 hazards. Thus data shall be collected on all 
activities and on their relation to the 64 hazards, including data on safety barriers when performing 
the individual activities. Finally looked at are the managerial conditions that shall support the 
safety. 
In order to be able to register as precisely as the Dutch software system requires, the following 
structure was drafted for a data collection where 
 Job corresponds to either carpenters or Caretakers. 
 Task corresponds to e.g. new building or repair work for carpenters and e.g. operation of 
group heating station or care of outdoor areas for Caretakers. 
 Activities correspond to e.g. work on ladders, work on roofs, work with chemicals, etc.  
 Safety barriers correspond to e.g. railings on scaffolding or support of the scaffolding. 
The data model for collection of the exposure data is illustrated in figure 40. 
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Figure 40 illustrates the data model used for collection of the Danish exposure data. 
The model illustrates that the individual jobs are divided upon into a row for the job‟s 
characteristic tasks preferably 5-10 items. There shall be talk of tasks with a great difference in 
content, e.g. for caretaker there can be building repairs, garden work, office work, attending to 
heating system, etc. For carpenters there can be carcase construction, laying floors, windows 
and doors, small repairs, purchasing, transport, handling of materials, etc. 
The list of the tasks which respectively caretakers and carpenters are divided up in, is shown in 
diagram 18. 
Diagram 18 
Carpenters Caretakers 
1. New building, external tasks, such as construction, 
facades, roof, windows, doors 
1. Care and maintenance of outdoor areas (gardener) 
2. New building, internal tasks, such as floors, walls, 
doors, stairs, etc. 
2. Building maintenance (bricklayer, joiner, carpenter, 
plumber, painter) and any cleaning 
3. Repairs, renovations, additions, external tasks 3. Operation of heating system (boilerman) 
4. Repairs, renovations, additions, internal tasks 4. Ventilation and heating (technician) 
5. Demolition 5. Waste management and environmentally hazardous 
waste (environmental technician) 
6. Workshop work 6. Computer/IT (daily administration, maintenance and 
archiving)  
7. Driving, purchasing, waste, transport 7. Maintenance of tools and machines (all-round 
technician) 
8. Administration, customer contact 8. Resident service, resident democracy and practical 
(guidance, service and support) and guard duty 
Diagram 18 shows the division of tasks that are used in data collection for respectively carpenters 
and caretakers 
4.1.2 Data collection method 
Fundamentally, the data collection is a time record of the individual activities within the concrete 
tasks that have been carried out, and a record of any shortages of the necessary safety barriers.  
In diagram 19, there is an example shown of the connection between an activity and the respective 
safety barriers and quality parameters (PIEs). 
Diagram 19 
Activity and 
hazard 
Primary 
Safety 
Barriers 
Support Safety 
Barriers 
Evaluation criteria 
Work on ladders 
with the risk of 
falling 
1. Ladder‟s 
strength 
2. Ladder‟s 
stability 
3. User‟s 
1. Type of ladder and 
strength 
Ladder‟s and step‟s type 
Inspection of the ladder‟s capacity and length 
Maintenance and storage 
Cleaning 
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ability 2. Placement of the 
ladder and its 
protection 
Placement of the ladder foot 
Placement at the top (ladder angle) 
Protection against traffic that can bump into the ladder 
3. User‟s ability to 
work on the ladder 
User‟s position on the ladder 
User‟s condition 
Use of both hands to hold onto the ladder 
Influence of external forces 
Appropriate movements 
Diagram 19 illustrates an example of the connection between an activity and the associated safety 
barriers and quality parameters, here exemplified by work on a ladder with the risk of fall. 
As several activities can be done at the same time e.g. the carpenter both stands on a ladder and 
works with a hand tool, the data collection is adapted to be able to register up to 3 activities at the 
same time. 
The described details are collected by following a person at work for 3 days and recording the 
details electronically. In all 20 persons have been followed for the DanWorm project, each for 3 
days from morning to night for each of the 2 industry areas. It is sought to cover different types of 
jobs within the 2 industries small businesses. The 60 observation days per job were used for an 
average exposure evaluation and a risk profile. 
In order to gain details of the individual tasks spread over the year, and the managerial factors, 
interviews have been carried out with both managers and employees in the business. In these 
interviews, questions are asked about:  
 The practical and safety management conditions for each task 
 How often the individual tasks are carried out annually 
 To what degree the observed risk actions for the individual tasks are expressions for the 
general on an annual level 
 To what degree the observed safety barriers, their quality and presence are expressions for 
the general on an annual level. 
4.2 Data collection from two sectors 
The companies were found via contact with the respective industry safety council, based upon 
details on Krak and from own contacts. One can discuss the representativeness of the companies 
that are included in the data collection as there is talk of 5-7 businesses per industry who have been 
positive in relation to participating in a project about safety, and who are also located in the 
Copenhagen area with regard to minimising travel. 
The collected data can, therefore, draw a too positive image of the safety level without it being 
studied closer. The process that is followed in the business contact has been the following: 
1. The first meeting with the business is a dialogue with management and possibly with 
employees about the purpose of the study what they can expect to get out of it. It is also 
agreed here, which of the employees will be followed and when. At the meeting it is also 
sought to have created an overview of the job‟s typical tasks over the year in the company, 
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and when the individual tasks are performed. It is important to have the individual persons 
followed when they perform the different tasks.  
2. In the course of the agreed periods, the selected persons are followed and the details 
recorded in the electronic data collection. 
3. After carrying out the data collection an interview is carried out with management and 
employees about, partly the managerial details, partly an evaluation of the task frequence 
and presence of the safety barriers and quality. 
4. On the basis of the registered details, a little report is drafted to the company for use by the 
company‟s APV. This report is given to the company as a thanks for their help.  
In preparation for the data collection, tables were drawn up from the WORM material that could 
illustrate the industry‟s most frequently occurring accidents.  As the WORM project has 
integrated Danish data in its system over the occurrence of accidents, the prepared overviews 
are based upon Danish data from 5 years registration in the Danish Factories Inspectorate. 
Figures 41 and 42 show, therefore, the 64 hazards for respectively carpenters and caretakers 
listed out from the frequency of accidents registered in Denmark over 5 years. 
Figure 41 
Figure 41 shows the frequency of accidents for caretakers in Denmark over a 5-year period. 
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Figure 42 
Figure 42 shows the frequency of accidents for carpenters in Denmark in a 5 year period. 
4.2.1 Carpentry and its risks 
Data collection was performed at a total of 5 carpentry companies all placed within the Greater 
Copenhagen area but divided by both city and country. The company‟s size varied from 3 
employees to 40 employees. Here follows a description of the risks and hazards, which were 
observed in the companies. 
Working at heights 
As expected, much work was carried out at heights, that is to say, on ladders and scaffolding and 
common to the 5 companies is that they have a good consciousness and attention to ladders and 
scaffolding being in order. Generally they work in a calm and attentive manner in relation to clear 
risks of falls, which compensates for work on e.g. ladders often is carried out with both hands i.e. 
without one holding onto the ladder.  Often brought along are rolling scaffolding and ladders that 
can ensure a good working height. Yet, sometimes compromises are made which coincides with the 
nature of the task and the great degree of flexibility and ad hoc character. This applies, among 
others, to the scope of railings and securing of ladders. 
Work and activities in level 
Work and activities are carried out in levels at many different types of areas, where there can be 
demolished building materials, earthwork, new building materials, lines, etc. This is difficult to 
change, as the company isn‟t solely responsible for the site, but to a great extent depends just as 
much on customers, other trade groups and the nature of the task.  There is attention to clearing up, 
yet work is often carried out in areas where there are materials and cabling that does not necessarily 
need to lie where one walks.  Often during renovations, digs can occur in the area. Here, it should 
be thought over where carpenters and others walk most so the access roads in the least are even, 
without holes or obstacles. There is a general need in the industry for a more consequent clearing up 
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of work areas, so one can walk unhindered. Observations were not carried out during the winter 
period, but experience shows snow and ice can be a problem. Securing of access conditions and 
outdoor workplaces in the winter should occur with regard to this. 
Surroundings 
The surroundings can contain risks, like bumping into things, being struck by something and getting 
something down over oneself, falling objects, slipping of materials, etc. For demolition tasks it is 
important to have focus on the materials one takes down, for example, old glass wool or other and 
whether one can get it in the eyes.  In such a case dust masks and gloves should always be used. 
It varies greatly whether employees are alone or together while working. If one works together two 
and two it most often means that one goes round each other on the same site where materials, 
planks, etc. are handled.  Thus there is a risk of one bumping into each other or one can hit each 
other while handling materials.  On the other side it also gives the opportunity for one to help each 
other and e.g. be 2 during heavier lifting.  When materials are delivered one must be aware of 
situations where the materials are lifted into place by a crane or similar. One must either keep at a 
distance or, if necessary, be close by and protect oneself e.g. with a helmet. 
Again the employees‟ calmness, overview and mutual consideration for each other plays a great 
role to safety.  The general impression is that there is a great mutual consideration and mutual 
helpfulness between craftsmen in the small companies.  
Hand tools 
Hand tools are predominantly used – both manual and mechanical. A constant interaction occurs in 
the use of the most common tools that are associated with the carpenter trade. They are generally 
handled very professionally. A comprehensive part of the work, is carried out using hand tools on a 
ladder or scaffolding, where one necessarily must use both hands to work. Balance and good 
physical condition are, therefore, a necessity.  Similarly that there are good tools and that ladders 
and scaffoldings are in order and have a proper foot support. These things are, for the most part, in 
order in the companies.  Both in the form of maintenance from the company‟s side and employees 
own attention to things needing to be in order.  However, it is an behaviour to lay hand tools where 
one walks and stands because one will use them again in a little whole. There is e.g. observed, that 
tools at times are placed on rafters or collar beams, where people walk below. There is a need for 
more fixed procedures, where tools are placed during work, in the periods where they are not in use.  
E.g. in a bucket or on a rack.  
Use of vehicles 
Employees normally have a car at their disposal, because they drive from task to task and to collect 
materials.  Therefore, there is a certain risk of accidents in traffic. There is also talk of the use of 
handheld mobile telephones while driving, even if some have handsfree sets at their disposal, they 
are not used.  There shall therefore, possibly, be thought about telephones that have a better and 
simpler potential for use while driving.  Beyond the risk of driving the wrong way, one also 
breaches the Road Traffic Act.  
Cars are used both for normal transport and for the storage of tools, working machines, etc. 
Therefore order and maintenance of the tool storage area and transport in the cars is a task. The cars 
and the tools are gone through and maintained every half year. The master keeps an eye on 
employees who are “known” for loading too much or having a mess in their car. 
 
 
Machines 
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Work is primarily done using smaller machines, which can be carried from place to place.  Some of 
these machines have legs mounted, so they can be used at a normal working height, while others are 
used, where it is now possible, either at an accessibility table or on the ground/floor. There is talk of 
saws, crosscut machines, etc.  They are generally equipped with the necessary safety equipment, 
however sometimes lack a cover or a gap knife. Carpenters sometimes also use machines at the 
workshop itself and individual machines are observed without the correct safety equipment. It is 
recommended that all stationary machines are gone over and equipped with the necessary 
equipment and that maintenance, cleaning and inspection of the technical equipment is an important 
safety task. 
Electricity 
Electrical tools are worked with.  Therefore, there is often cabling up to the workstation. Here, there 
is, however, more a question of the cabling giving a risk of fall before a risk of electric contact. That 
is to say, there is a need for securing good cabling, where work is carried out.  There are also tasks 
such as e.g. demolition, where there can be defective cabling. In such cases an electrician is called 
to handle the task.  
Heat, Cold 
Sometimes work involving asphalt paper and heat of the roof, where there can be a risk of fire and 
combustion. Again, being careful, calm and maintaining an overview are necessities. 
Chemistry 
Immediately, there is only in a small scale work with hazardous chemicals and there was observed a 
general attitude toward using water-based solutions.  However, there are cases where lime etc. is 
used, which is hazard marked.  It is therefore recommended that some simple instructions are made 
for safety requirements for use of these are materials, which can be given out together with the 
materials. The requirements are stated in the usage instructions and can be retrieved from the 
following website www.styrpaastofferne.dk 
It is also observed that wood protector and paint were used without labelling on the container.  Also 
that one investigates the content in the unmarked containers by smelling them.  It is recommended 
that all chemicals are stored in correctly marked containers specified with a code number, and that 
there is a simple brief usage instruction of the chemicals that are marked with code numbers  
2 and 3. 
Loads 
A number of building materials and tools are lifted and handled.  This normally occurs over shorter 
periods of time.  In cases of larger tasks there are more people working on the task. The 
combination with heavy loads and cold is, however, something that one must be aware of.  
For larger deliveries of building materials the supplier drives the materials out with the possibility 
that the materials can be lifted into place, so further lifting is reduced.  When working on 
scaffolding one is generally aware and lifts materials up with a bucket and line.  There could be the 
need for having a simple aid that can be mounted on the scaffolding that can contribute in the lifting 
of materials up and down.  
Building materials are predominantly of wood and plaster, but a number are also of glass or metal 
which mean there is a possibility of cutting oneself. Generally, there are always gloves available but 
there is a slight difference as to whether they are used.  
Renovation of doors and windows hold a particular risk for broken panes.  There should be a clear 
instruction as to how these tasks shall be performed.  
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Due to the large number of lifting and handling of materials, both light and heavy, in many different 
situations and surroundings, it may be appropriate for all to be trained in correct lifting techniques. 
Also, a good physical condition is essential. 
Other accident risks 
Other risks include fire, explosion, drowning, suffocation, etc. These are not risks that are not 
normally included in the tasks that are carried out by the carpentry company.  There can, however, 
be tasks where there is the need for particular attention, such as if work is carried out near areas 
with water or where there are other trade groups in the area, where such risks are included.  
Due to the nature of the tasks, which are to repair damage to buildings of very different characters, 
there can be situations where lines with electricity, gas, etc. are damaged.  It is important that 
carpenters are instructed carefully about how they can observe such risks and how they should act 
in such cases. 
Other health risks 
Electrical tools are worked with frequently.  Especially saws and drills are noisy. Hammer drills not 
least.  Hearing protectors are always available and it is recommended that they are used.  
Renovation tasks can also involve the presence of dust, for which there should be protection 
against. Dust masks are generally available with the recommendation that they are used in the 
necessary scope for particularly dusty work, but it is up to the individual carpenter to put them into 
use. 
4.2.2 Risks and hazards to caretakers 
A caretaker has the task of taking care of the daily running of a property company‟s property. The 
caretaker is associated with a property office with from 1 to approx.  20 employees.  
The individual property office can contain all of the employees in the relevant property company, 
but the property company can also own or administer a number of properties, and thus comprise a 
number of property offices attached to a central management.  Finally, the caretakers at the relevant 
property office can be employed by the property company but be managed by a different company 
who, at the same time, is responsible for the administrative operation of the property.  However, it 
is often so that the individual property office is quite self-governing.  
A data collection has been performed at a total of 7 properties, all located within the greater 
Copenhagen area, but divided both within Copenhagen itself, as in the outer areas. 
Work at heights and on a level  
In the caretakers work, a large part of the time is spent in outdoor areas, roads, paths, pavements 
and grass, as well as indoors in cellarways and up and down stairs.  When driving tractors he must 
get in and out of the tractor.  The other caretakers can stand on the vehicle while driving and shall 
also climb up and down, finally the loading and unloading of trailers means that one goes up and 
down off the trailer.  Due to this there is the risk of injury from falling on a level, falling from trailer 
and tractor and falling on stairs.  The work is carried out at a slow pace.  
Caretakers seldom work at heights but the use of ladders (normally under 2 metres) occurs often, 
among others, when replacing light bulbs in staircases and when repairing gutters (plumbing and 
heating man), cutting of trees from ladders can also occur.  In special cases, however, they may 
work on roofs of help workmen who e.g. repair a roof.  
Transport 
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Transport with motor vehicles, among others, for collection of bulky refuse and for lawn mowing 
occurs both on even roads, over kerbstones and on uneven grassy areas.  Driving primarily occurs in 
areas with no traffic (opposing traffic) or very limited traffic.  Transport in motor vehicles can give 
the risk of hitting something in the driver cabin in the event of a bump, with overturning, or if 
something is driven into, or into other motorists.  Under transport, the other caretakers can sit or 
stand on the vehicle.  They can, in a similar manner, injure themselves by falling and by driving 
into the tractor‟s parts.  
Loads 
During the work quite a bit of rubbish and bulky rubbish is lifted up and down cellar stairs and up 
and down from trailers and into containers, among these, old tables to gas jets and white goods.  
Handling of waste containers and the use of some of the machines that are pushed or pulled around 
can have the character of heavy work, among others, the use of leaf vacuums.  This gives a great 
deal of lifting and pushing work, where part is heavy work that causes the risk of injuries to the 
back, arms and shoulders.  
With plumbing and sanitation work there is the risk of injuries in the form of twisting etc. from poor 
working positions when repairing taps and rinsing drains, etc. There is the risk of bumping the head, 
hands and other body parts against the walls and other objects because it is difficult to reach. 
Hand tools and machines 
Hand tools such as a sack truck, Stanley knife and a “tricker” for rubbish; broom, shovel and 
wheelbarrow when sweeping and weeding hoe when weeding; lopping shears and saw when 
cutting.  This gives the risk of injuries such as pricking, clipping and cutting oneself on a knife.  
Machines are used for waste handling such as tractors and tractors with lifting equipment to empty 
containers, tractors with cranes, motor saws for cutting, “whisks” for removal of weeds, grass 
clippers (hand truck, little tractor for grass clipping and large tractor), equipment for chipping of 
bush/ tree remnants, stub miller for removal of stubs, band saw.  Machines are filled with fuel, etc., 
connected together, handled, and repaired also by the caretakers.  Work with the machines gives, 
therefore, the risk of severe cutting injuries on e.g. arms and legs, if one comes near the cutting 
parts.  There is also the risk of injuries such as squeezing, poking, clipping and cutting when 
handling and repairing machines.  Generally used are the required personal safeguards when using 
the machines. 
Surroundings  
Work outdoors for many hours during summer and winter gives the risk of heat/cold effects, which 
can lead to an increased risk of infectious diseases.  Work collecting and handling waste and 
handling waste from dirt and plants, among others, leaves can involve subjection to hazardous 
microorganisms with the increased risk of infectious disease as a result.  Work with waste can 
involve subjection to hazardous microorganisms with the increased risk of infectious disease as a 
result.  
Part of the sweeping occurs out on a closed road with a certain amount of traffic.  There is therefore 
a certain risk of being injured by being driven into. 
The work outdoors can also involve the risk of getting something on one‟s head – when handling 
waste from waste, which galls down when, among others, emptying containers and from branches 
when cutting bushes and trees.  
A number of the machines give the risk of being struck by thrown out parts when working and 
“hitting stones or the ground”. This gives the risk of being hit on the body and in the eyes, both by 
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the person who operates the machine and, in part, colleagues close by or persons who pass the work 
place.   
Corrosion and fire/explosion etc. can occur when handling chemicals. Chemicals are handled only 
in a very limited scope, among others, when filling petrol/fuel for use in machines, when filling 
cleaning agents in the laundry rooms and during cleaning and repair work. Cleaning staff are most 
subjected, but also plumbing and sanitation tasks can mean the use of cleaning agents, solvents, etc. 
Risk of Burning  
Burners are used for the removal of weeds, which gives the risk of burns. 
Electricity 
Power tools are found in a very limited scope, among others, in the form of drills (battery) and 
coffee makers.  There is an agreement for an annual check of power tools.  One task is also 
replacing defective light bulbs and light tubes in cellars.  It looks as though light bulbs and light 
tubes occurs while there still is current.  This gives the risk of contact with the live parts and thus 
for electric shock. 
Human aggression  
The caretaker can be subjected to human aggression from residents and others when the person 
enters into confrontations, e.g. when rules shall be stressed or when disagreements occur e.g. when 
inspecting flats during moves in or out.  This can lead to physical or mental overload.  
4.3 Recommendations to the companies  
It became very clear during the observations that the employees‟ independence in the work is 
distinct and that they, in the least in these two industries, work away from the home company, i.e. 
outside of the employer‟s possibility to follow along with, instruct in or inspect the work.  It is also 
clear that the tasks are very varied often from day to day and shall be carried out under terms, which 
the employer or employee does not have the full influence on.  These two significant conditions for 
management work and for safety work have set their stamp on the recommendations, which are 
given to the companies and to the recommendations that this report leads to. 
4.3.1 Carpenter companies 
The experience from the carpenter companies is the following: 
1. The employer in the small company will generally usually create good safety conditions for 
his employees, but he does not have the large resources to search for knowledge or methods.  
This knowledge shall be easily accessible and targeted.  
2. The employer in the small company shall perform the daily administration and job 
allocation, agreements with customers, procurement of materials, etc.  In this course one 
goes in between compromise with the rules, partly to get jobs in house and partly in order to 
get logistics to run.  Methods and materials are used, when they are easiest to use and where 
there is a general understanding of one only does this when one is a professional. 
3. Most carpenters‟ assistants work independently with responsibility for an apprentice or 
junior assistant.  He often orders his own materials and he must ensure that his car and tools 
are in order.  
4. In many tasks, the carpenter‟s assistant is the only person who has the possibility to evaluate 
working conditions and evaluate the risks that are on site.  
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5. It is the general perception of what is dangerous, which will apply, i.e. what is taught, what 
is the rule for, or what is informed of by organisations. 
Based upon this, the recommendations for the small carpenter businesses are divided up into two 
parts, namely a plan for the employee and one for the carpenter‟s assistant who has the 
responsibility for a concrete task.   
10- point plan for the employer 
Employers in the small carpentry business were given a 10-point plan, which includes the  
following: 
1. Plan for safety and daily attention 
The goal for safety and health in your company can be: 
”that it is strived for to as high a degree as possible for all tasks to be performed under consideration for the 
employee’s safety. This applies both to where one walks, stands on a ladder, scaffolding and roofs, as what one works 
with”. 
 
As the tasks are highly varied and change from day to day at highly different workplaces, there will always be the need 
for evaluating safety in the task from place to place and from job to job. 
One way of doing this, without it becoming all too troublesome, is for the carpenter‟s assistants to think through the 10 
points for safety evaluation before a job begins.  This requires, however, that the employer has given instruction and 
training herein, so that the carpenters can do it by heart. In the beginning it may also require there being joint morning 
meetings.  When first the carpenters know the 10 points by heart, no greater initiative is required than that, which is to 
perform the tasks in a safe manner.  
2. Focus on safety in all directions 
Safety is increased by increased focus – and this shall apply in all directions.  This means that out in the individual site 
there shall be focus on the daily safety.  All employees shall know the safe way of working and there shall be focus on 
safety equipment being used at work. 
If the clerk of works does not have the possibility for keeping focus on safety onsite, because he drives around one, each 
site shall be designated to ensure that there is focus on safety, that morning meetings are held with safety on the 
programme, and that it is cleaned up regularly. 
3. Cleaning up on work areas and scaffoldings 
A fixed procedure for cleaning up of those locations are where work is performed and gone about during the work, so 
that one doesn‟t always have to look where one sets one‟s feet, when the focus is on the task. E.g. that cleaning up is not 
only done at closing time but also before lunch. 
4. Laying cables in work areas 
There should be a set procedure for laying cables in the work area.  Cables should, as far as possible, be laid where one 
is not walking or in the best case be hung up. 
5. Placement of hand tools during use 
There should be a fixed procedure for the placement of hand tools, when they are not immediately in use, but will be 
used with a short space between. The tool can, e.g. be placed in a bucket. 
6. Accessibility of equipment, safety related aids in cars 
A fixed procedure for tidying up is the care and ensuring that the necessary safety equipment is always available. 
Equipment is e.g. gloves, dust masks, hearing protection, tape, first aid box, etc. Clerks of works shall be aware as to 
whether the equipment is used. 
7. Maintenance of tools 
Maintenance and cleaning of all tools and machines is important.  Look after everyone by taking defective tools back 
for repairs and not using them.  
8. Use of machines, procedures and safety equipment 
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Ensure that machines have the necessary safety equipment.  A good practice shall also be created when working with 
machines without this equipment – a sound respect and working form. 
9. Correct lifting techniques 
One fixed procedure for all forms of lifting. A potential collective training session in correct lifting techniques is given 
by a physiotherapist one Friday afternoon. Also, a membership to a fitness centre can be given out. 
10. Use of mobile telephones while driving 
Installation of holders for mobile telephones in all cars and equipment so that one can speak on the phone without using 
one‟s hands.     
 
 
10 points for carpenter’s assistants 
 As a supplement to the plan for the employer, 10 points were given to the carpenter‟s assistants that 
they can have e.g. in their car, and that can be a form of reminder they can use to evaluate the risk 
in a given job and for assessment of which measures they should take before commencing the job. 
The 10 points include the following: 
1. Safety on scaffolding 
Check railings, foundations, access, tidiness, distance between scaffolding and wall, close the 
access hole during work, well-being 
2. Safety when working on ladders 
Check maintenance, stability, ladder strength, ladder length, protection against skidding  
3. Safety while working at heights, on roofs and similar 
Check shielding, cage-arresting device, well-being 
4. Tools and machines 
Check maintenance, safety equipment, storage, cabling 
5. Protective equipment 
Check that the necessary equipment is always available, that it is replenished, that you can offer 
first aid 
6. Lifting of loads and working height 
Check that you are two for heavy lifting, that there are aids, e.g. for up and down hoisting of 
scaffolding, correct lifting technique, use of work platforms, stepladder, etc 
7. Work and traffic area 
Check cleanliness, cleaning, lighting, cabling, gravelling when there is ice/snow unevenness  
8. Waste management 
Check waste management in working areas, storage, removal, use of gloves 
9. Transport 
Check driving behaviour, and the car‟s maintenance and cleanliness 
10. Consciousness of risks in tasks that include: 
 Sharp objects 
 Pricking objects 
 Squeezing 
 Bumping into 
 Risk of fire 
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 Chemical risk 
 Dust  
 Explosion 
 Slipping  
 Falling objects 
 Slippery, uneven surfaces 
 The potential for falling 
 Other motorists 
4.3.2 Caretakers 
n the following there are given a number of recommendations, which have come to light based upon 
the observations carried out. 
1. Attention to hazards  
Caretakers generally feel that their risk of being subjected to workplace accidents is small and the 
consequences of any such accidents are limited. This is because they have not experienced any or 
few accidents at work and they feel that the relevant accidents are self-caused. It is therefore 
important to find methods of making the hazards for workplace accidents visible and relevant.  
2. Self-management 
Caretakers generally have a great influence on organizing their own work, which generally is 
performed in areas a bit away from the property office and without management directly monitoring 
the work.  This means that the individual caretaker or group of caretakers, to a great extent, must 
take care of their own safety/the group‟s safety.  The individual employee shall, therefore, be in a 
position to evaluate their own and the group‟s danger and need for safety measures. Management 
must be clear in its role to secure that the individual employee can perform his tasks safely, to 
secure that machines, etc. are in order and to provide safety equipment. Management must also 
clearly state their expectations in the safety area and in a sufficient degree monitor the work, advise 
and step in if the work is not performed in a satisfactory manner. 
3. Unskilled employees 
As employees are, as a starting point, unskilled in relation to the work as caretakers it would be a 
good idea if the employees were trained so that they, in the best possible manner, can attend to 
safety when working with the dangerous machines (e.g. motor saw), they handle and in working 
positions and with good lifting techniques in the highly manual work that they have.  Finally, they 
should also be trained in work with waste including sorting. Courses are offered in this field.  
4. Highly manual work 
Work that the caretakers perform is to a high degree manual tasks that occur outdoors. Even though 
there is a lot of heavy work and quite a bit of one-sided repetitive work it does not seem to be very 
strenuous, perhaps with the exception of handling hard white goods and bulky rubbish. One can 
therefore dream about the caretaker‟s job as being, sound work, and strive after tasks that 
collectively give a sound body. 
Caretakers could, due to the risk of long-term exposure, regularly receive instruction in and checks 
of their positions. It may also be an idea to ensure that employees' physique is kept in good form 
e.g. but supporting access to a fitness centre/gym. In order to ensure a sound body this could be 
supplemented with a better awareness of healthy eating habits.  As it seems many caretakers eat 
wrong and too little.  
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Finally, there should be a prevention of injuries from outdoor work e.g. in the form of use of cream 
against sunburn and sunglasses against sharp light and the use of head coverings such as a 
sunhat/cap.  
5. Furnishing of workshops 
Many of the caretakers are trained workmen, who therefore have the professional background to 
carry out a number of repair and maintenance work.  But as this is not the caretaker‟s primary task, 
there is a tendency of equipment and interiors not in all cases corresponding to a professional 
standard.  This especially applies to the furnishing of workshops.  
Management should therefore, in relation to repair and maintenance work, make agreements as to 
which tasks can be performed and then ensure that furnishing the workplace, tools and machines, 
equipment and personal protective devices are in order in relation to the tasks. 
6. Plumbing and sanitation work and waste management/washing 
Work with plumbing and sanitation work and shafting results in many poor positions, this is due to 
the furnishing of facilities for waste management, furnishing of the kitchen and bathrooms, and 
furnishing of laundry rooms have not, in a sufficient scope, had regard paid to safeguarding repair 
and maintenance work. Property companies stand for building and furnishing of flats and joint 
facilities.  Therefore they have a very good potential for creating better working conditions for 
caretakers.  
7-point plan for the employer 
1. Training 
Ensure that employees have sufficient knowledge about carrying out their jobs safely. 
Possibly ensure employees are trained particularly within  
- work with hazardous machines among others motor saw 
- ergonomics – good working positions and lifting techniques 
- work with sorting waste 
2. User ability – much manual work 
Motivate employees to a sound way of living/promote health Provide access to a gym, healthy food and possibly 
massage.  
3. Furnishing of workshops: 
- Evaluate which tasks you want your employees to perform.  
- Furnish workshops professionally in relation to this, among others, with good working tables, sufficient ventilation 
and point extraction, in heated, tidy workshop locales with sufficient ceiling height. 
- Instruct employees in which tasks they can perform themselves. 
- Instruct employees as to which tasks shall be performed by external workmen. 
- Instruct employees about what you want them to do if the workshop and machines are defective.  
4. Furnishing of workplaces: 
- Observe and evaluate work processes, access and space for the tasks the employees perform especially for waste 
management including shafting, with cleaning and repairs of laundry machines and with plumbing and sanitation work. 
- Ensure that the workplaces are furnished appropriately in relation to the tasks. 
- Instruct employees in safe performance of the work. 
5. Equipment and behaviour in order: 
- Motivate and instruct employees about how you want their behaviour to be so that work is performed safely and they 
avoid accidents. 
- Ensure that hand tools, ladders and machines are available and in order. 
- Ensure that the necessary personal protective devices are available and in order  
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- Ensure for cleaning, repairs and maintenance of technical aids, personal safety aids and working areas. 
6. User ability – much manual work 
Observe and evaluate whether the employee: 
- is in a position to carry out his tasks safely,  
- has the ability and knowledge about safe use of the tools and machines he shall use,  
- is in good condition in relation to the work he shall perform,  
- is aware in relation to hazards and has good safety related behaviour. 
7. Ensure for 
- clear instructions/agreements 
- good division of responsibility and tasks 
- positive motivation to safe behaviour 
- to state how you want them to act if they observe faults and deficiencies 
- a consequent attitude for violations 
6 points for caretakers 
1. Training 
Participate in the necessary courses for your job, among others, courses in 
- work with hazardous machines, among others, motor saw 
- ergonomics – good working positions and lifting techniques 
- work with sorting waste 
2. User ability – much manual work 
Be aware that the highly manual labour demands a healthy body. Participate in activities about a 
healthy way of living/ promoting health. Use the opportunity for access to a gym, healthy food and 
possibly massage.  
3. Furnishing of workshops 
- Follow instructions on which tasks that must be performed by you and your colleagues 
- Use the furnished workshops including point extraction and personal safety aids 
- Report faults and defects to the manager  
4. Furnishing of workplaces 
- Follow instructions on the safe performance of the work  
- Report faults and defects to the manager  
5. Safe behaviour 
- Observe and evaluate whether hand tools, ladders and machines are available and in order. 
- Observe and evaluate whether the necessary personal protective devices are available and in order  
- Follow instructions for safe use of equipment 
- Ensure there is good safety related behaviour during work and good order and cleanliness during 
and after  
6. User ability  
- Follow agreements and instructions 
- Evaluate whether you are in a position to carry out your tasks safely,  
- Evaluate whether you have the ability and knowledge about safe use of the tools and machines 
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you shall use,  
- Evaluate whether you are in good condition in relation to the work you shall perform,  
- Be aware in relation to the hazards your job tasks involve. 
- Report faults and defects to the manager 
4.4 Summary 
In that connection, a little electronic registration tool was developed, which gave an observer the 
possibility to collect and time register tasks, activities and safety barriers, for the person who 
performed the work.  
This tool has functioned very satisfactorily and absolutely fulfilled its purpose.  By following 
persons and recording their activities, very precise details are obtained and many specific details 
that otherwise would be difficult to ask about or be informed of in a different way. 
However, the method is time consuming and requires a comprehensive data collection in order to be 
able to create a representative foundation. The time consuming element shall, therefore, be weighed 
up against the use of a questionnaire, if one wishes to repeat a mapping of the concrete exposure 
conditions in an industry or in a company. 
On the other hand, following a number of persons so closely over 3 days has given good insight into 
both the daily tasks and the problems that the individual employees come out to solve, and at the 
same time gives an insight into the culture the individual uses as the basis for his work. This 
knowledge has subsequently given inspiration to both feedback to the company and what should be 
included in their APV. 
Insight into the small company's way of working and the conditions it functions under has given the 
background for evaluating what one can anticipate and what one can instruct the employer in the 
small company to do for safety in the company. But also what one can and should expect from the 
individual employee in relation to himself being able to perform an ongoing evaluation of his own 
risk.  
However, such a division of responsibility and duty places a clear demand that the employee is 
instructed and guided and that there has created an opportunity for the employee knowing how he 
shall risk assess, and that the employee has the materials, tools and time available to create safety in 
the task. Finally, it is essential that the employer motivates the employees to risk assess tasks and 
act safely. 
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5. DanWorm project’s results 
The project results are presented in 4 parts:  
1. Comprises a systematic access to the Dutch hazards and methods for making this 
information usable to smaller businesses. 
2. Comprises the work with a Danish version of the Dutch data, and assistance in 
developing and simplifying the software for the risk calculation through a “light” 
Danish version of the calculation program Orca (Occupational Risk Calculator 
Assessment). 
3. Comprises a method of collecting the data, which is necessary for the risk calculation 
in ORCA. 
4. Comprises the results of the data collection for 2 trade groups, carpenters and 
caretakers, including the 2 trade group‟s risk profiles.  
5.1 Hazards, safety barriers and INFO card 
5.1.1 Hazards and risk situations 
In the Dutch WORM project 64 hazards in total were identified, cf. Diagram 11. Each of these 
hazards can be connected with an activity or a situation where there is a risk for a certain accident 
event, e.g. “activities in areas where there is moving traffic" involves a risk of "being struck by a 
moving vehicle”. 
The DanWorm project has sought to make it easier to work with the 64 hazards and the associated 
risk situations.  This is done through a 3-divided grouping of the hazards in respectively: 
4-17-64 
The 4 risk situations, which make up the first stage of hazards grouping is characterised by the 
following: 
A. The foundation where it is walked or worked on, with the risk of fall; 
B. The surroundings that are walked on or worked in with the risk of bumping 
into something, being struck by something, getting something over oneself, 
etc. 
C. What is worked with or by, with the risk of being squeezed, poked, cut, etc; 
D. Surroundings of a particularly hazardous character, with the risk of 
explosion, fire, etc. 
 
The 17 risk situations, which make up the second stage of hazards grouping are the following: 
A 1. Working at height 
141 
2. Working at the same level 
B 3. Working where objects can fall  
4. Working where objects can fly around 
5. Work where you can be struck by objects, collide with something or be squeezed 
6. Work where you can become buried 
7. Work with people and/or animals 
C 8. Machines and tools 
9. Vehicles  
10. Electricity 
11. Heat and/or cold 
12. Chemicals  
13. Heavy lifting 
D 14. High voltage 
15. Fire hazard 
16. Suffocation/choking 
17. Explosions 
 
The connection between this 4-17-64 grouping is shown in the following overview diagram, 
diagram 21.  
Diagram 21 
Characteristics Activity Risk Hazards 
A. 
The surface 
which is 
walked on or 
worked at; 
1. Work at 
height  
Fall from height 1.Fall from height – movable ladder 
2 Fall from height – fixed ladder 
3 Fall from height – step ladder 
4 Fall from height – rope ladder 
5 Fall from height – mobile scaffolding 
6. Fall from height – fixed scaffolding 
7. Fall from height – putting up/taking down scaffolding 
8. Fall from height – roof 
9. Fall from height – areas, floor with large level difference 
10. Fall from height – fixed platform 
11. Fall from height down in hole (e.g. in earth, floor) 
12. Fall from height – mobile platform 
13. Fall from height – holding vehicle 
14. Fall from height – work at heights without protection 
 
2. Work at a 
level 
Fall in the same 
level 
15. Risk for tripping up or slipping on the same level 
16Fall from stairs or slanted surfaces 
 
B. 
The 
surroundings 
3. Falling 
object 
Struck by falling 
object 
17 Struck by falling object – crane or lift 
18. Struck by falling object – mechanical lift (excl. crane) 
19. Struck by falling object – from vehicle or conveyor 
142 
Characteristics Activity Risk Hazards 
which is 
walked on or 
worked at; 
20. Struck by falling object – from manual lift 
21. Struck by falling object – other objects at height 
 
4. Frag-objects Being struck by 
frag-objects 
22. Struck by falling object – from machines or hand tools 
23. Being struck by fragments – from objects under pressure/stress 
24. Being struck by fragments – that are blown by the wind 
 
5. Colliding 
against, in 
between, being 
struck by 
Being struck by 
moving objects, 
squeezing, being 
mast. 
25. Collision with vehicle 
26. Being struck by rolling/sliding objects 
27. Being struck by hand tools held by another person 
28. Being struck by hand tools held by another person 
29. Being struck by swinging objects 
30. Becoming caught/jammed between objects 
31. Colliding against/with objects 
 
6. Sliding of 
materials 
Being buried 32. Buried under loos material 
 
7. Aggression Violence 33. Exposure to aggressive people (violence) 
34. Exposure to the behaviour of animals (falls, bites, stings, kicks) 
 
C.  
What is 
worked on or 
with; 
8. Technical 
aids 
Being struck 
by moving 
objects, 
becoming 
caught 
up/jammed, 
cutting 
35. Being struck by own hand tools 
36. Being struck by moving parts of machinery - operating 
37. Being struck by moving parts of machinery - maintenance 
38. Being struck by moving parts of machinery - preparing 
39. Being struck by moving parts of machinery - cleaning 
 
9. Vehicles Collisions 40. Loss of control over vehicle 
 
10.Electricity Electric shock 41. Contact with electricity – electrical equipment 
42. Contact with electricity – when installing/repairing 
 
11. Heat or 
cold 
Burning 43 Burning - freezing/burning with cold/warm surfaces or  
open fire 
44. Fires – combustion from “hot” work 
 
12. Chemical Poisoning, 
etching  
45. Discharge of dangerous chemicals from open containers 
46. Contact with uncovered hazardous chemicals (without discharge) 
47. Release of chemical risk from closed containers - 
work/filling/draining 
48. Release of chemical risk from closed containers - without 
49. Release of chemical risk from closed containers – when closing 
 
13. Lifting, 
heavy loads 
Strain injuries 51. Extreme exertions – heavy lifting 
52. Extreme exertions – inappropriate movements 
 
D. 
Surroundings 
of a 
particularly 
hazardous 
nature. 
14. High 
voltage 
Electric shock 53. Contact with electricity – high voltage cables 
 
15. Fire Fire 54. Fire – flammable and easily combustible substances 
55. Fire – fire extinguishing 
 
16. Lack of 
oxygen and 
water 
Suffocation, 
poisoning or 
drowning 
56. Suffocation/poisoning – work in confined spaces 
57. Suffocation/poisoning – work with respirators 
58. Drowning – work in/under the water or liquids 
59. Drowning – work above/in the proximity of water 
 
17. Explosion Explosion 60. Physical explosion 
61. Chemical explosion – vapour or gas 
62. Chemical explosion - dust 
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Characteristics Activity Risk Hazards 
63. Chemical explosion - explosives 
64. Chemical explosion – exothermic reaction 
 
 Diagram 21 shows the connection between the 4-17-64 division, between activities and hazards.  
A person can very well be subjected to multiple hazards at the same time, e.g. when working with 
hand tools (35) while on a roof (8), where there is also the possibility of things one works with 
falling down (17) e.g. in an area where other persons are walking at the same time (15) as they carry 
heavy loads (51) 
This structuring offers a method for evaluating risks on concrete workplaces, such as e.g. when 
carrying out a workplace evaluation.  
The intention is that one starts by focusing on one of the 4 primary risk situations that are covered 
by step 1 and asking the following questions: 
 How are your legs – What kind of foundation do you stand, work or walk on? 
 What are your surroundings like – What hazards do your surroundings involve (from above, 
from the side, from other’s work) 
 What do you use your hands for- What do you work with? 
 Are there any particularly hazardous conditions in this workplace 
By focusing on these primary risk situations one at a time, the risk evaluation becomes manageable, 
as one e.g. for “where one has one's legs", shall evaluate the risk for 1) falls from heights and 2) fall 
to a lower level and first thereafter can go to the specific hazards 1-16. 
5.1.2 Safety barriers and risk observations 
The WORM project differentiates safety barriers on three levels, cf. figure 20 and figure 23: 
1. Primary Safety Barrier, PSB 
2. Support Safety Barrier, SSB 
3. Probability Influencing Entity, PIE 
In many cases the primary safety barriers are abstractions or generalisations of the “support” safety 
barrier, and most are not “visible” to users of the calculation program.  
In DanWorm there has been a simplification and collection of the most important safety barriers, 
which primarily constitute the supporting safety barriers as the “support” safety barriers can be 
described more concretely in relation to observations. Likewise, a selection of the quality 
parameters has occurred, which are the most important in relation to influence of the likelihood for 
accidents. 
Diagram 22 shows an example of how these terms are handled for the activity “Work on moveable 
ladders”.  
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Diagram 22 
Hazardous 
activity 
Primary 
safety 
barriers 
(PSB) 
“Support” 
safety 
barriers 
(SSB) 
Quality parameters: ” ( PIE) 
Work on 
moveable 
ladders/fall 
from heights 
1. Strength: 
ladder 
 
Ladder type 
and/or state 
Are there measures against skidding with the aid of 
non-slip or anchoring? 
Does the ladder reach less than 1 metre higher than the 
desired work or climbing height? 
Are the steps kept free from dust (such as mud, oil, 
paint, snow, ice, etc.)? 
Is it an industry-produced ladder for professional use, 
with a valid approval seal? 
2. Stability: 
ladder 
Placement 
and safety 
Is the ladder on a tilted or uneven base? 
Is the ladder anchored at the tope, possibly when the 
ladder has a steep placement? 
Are measures taken to prevent the ladder from sliding 
out at the base, possibly because it is far away from the 
wall? 
Are moveable ladders longer than 7 metres anchored? 
Is the ladder protected against blows from doors, etc. 
pushes or being driven into? 
Is there a warning sign informing that work is being 
carried out on ladders? 
3 Stability: 
user 
Ability Is the body position according to instructions (standing 
on the ladder side, feed not in the middle, face turned 
away form steps)? 
Is the user (sick, faint, under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or medication) or equipped (shoes without 
profile, or muddy) not in good condition? 
Does the user not use hands as support (e.g. because 
the user is carrying a load)? 
Does the user not behave appropriately while on the 
ladder (e.g. standing on the ladder with both hands 
free, moving of extending the ladder while one it, to 
slide down without using the steps, hanging out on the 
side)? 
Diagram 22 shows an example of the division between primary safety barriers, supporting safety 
barriers and quality parameters 
An evaluation of the safety barriers is achieved by observing and evaluating the quality parameters.  
In a concrete case, a single quality parameter is evaluated at a time.  It is either “in order” or "not in 
order”. There is no evaluation half way.  Note that a defective quality parameter does not directly 
involve errors on a safety barrier, or lead to an accident, but it increases the likelihood for the safety 
barrier failing, and through this a dangerous situation occurs.  
By observing the same activity several times (for the same employee, for a company or for a whole 
industry) one receives a distribution of how often a quality parameter is “in order”.  The average of 
this distribution can be used to evaluate the likelihood of an accident (for a company or industry). 
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The control situation or standard of reference is the observed Dutch accident frequency in 
combination with the Dutch average distribution of  quality parameters, based upon the Dutch 
questionnaire studies. 
5.1.3 INFO card 
Presented here are 2 x 17 generic INFOcard targeted, respectively, toward the employer and the 
employee. 
The background is an understanding of which duties rest upon the employer and those that 
necessarily must rest upon the employees, who have significant independence in their work. 
The manager shall generally ensure that the necessary safety barriers are provided, used correctly, 
maintained and controlled. The safety barriers are fundamentally linked to equipment, procedures 
and competencies.  That is to say, for example: 
 That the employer shall ensure that the correct equipment is in place and in order, that 
employees know, how they shall use it, and are motivated for using it correctly, and that the 
employee knows what he must do, when and if the equipment fails or does not suit the task. 
 The employer shall organise the work so that there is clarity over what he expects of the 
employee behaviourally, that the employee knows this and is motivated to fulfil these 
expectations. 
 The employees shall pay regard to the competencies the individual has when organising the 
work, and he shall take part in improving these competencies, when this is needed out of 
regard to the job‟s performance. 
That is to say, that the employee shall ensure himself: 
 That he knows which safety barriers shall be in order before he starts working. 
 That he has the correct equipment and knows how it shall be used.  He must also be 
motivated to use it. 
 That he knows procedures and the manager‟s expectations for carrying out the work, and 
finally have acquired the necessary competencies.  
 That he takes part in communicating with the employer, when equipment, procedures, 
working conditions fail, or are not in order, so that a solution can be found that is safety-
wise in order. 
Both the employer and the employee shall be familiar with the concrete safety barriers linked to the 
individual types of risks and these safety barriers function, and the consequences this has, if they are 
not in order.  
The concept for filling out the 2 x 17 INFOcard is built up on the generic safety barriers for the 
individual risk areas and with 3 main questions that have the purpose of observing, evaluating and 
acting on the quality parameters, and which tell how good or how lacking the safety barriers are.  
The 3 main questions are: 
 What shall be observed, which concerns observation of safety barriers 
 How shall the observed safety barriers be quality assessed 
 What types of action shall be taken based upon observations and the evaluation 
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Figure 43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43 illustrates the concept for situation-determined attention, which forms the basis for the 
structure of INFOcard. 
For the individual risk types there will be a number of conditions, which both the employer and 
employee shall be in a position to observe, evaluate and act on.  That is to say, both parties shall be 
able to observe the necessary safety barriers and understand what meaning they have to safety, and 
which action possibilities there are at their disposal. 
The difference is, that the employer shall observe and evaluate beforehand without necessarily 
knowing the concrete situation and at the same time act by ensuring that the equipment is in order, 
etc. and at the same time ensure that employees have the knowledge, competence and possibility to 
observe, evaluate and act correctly in the actual situations they come into. 
The employee shall be able to observe, evaluate and act in the situation without his employee being 
present.  I.e. he shall be able to act independently but based upon the guidelines that the employer 
has set forth. 
The presentation of the 2x17 INFOcard in appendix A is the following: 
a) Introduction of the risk type and associated hazards and safety barriers, including 
exemplifications and concretizations retrieved from the 2 industries described in chapter 4. 
b) INFO card for the employer. 
c) INFO card for the employees. 
What type of barriers are 
relevant for the risk 
situation and are they 
avaialable and in a good 
condition
How evaluate the quality 
of the barriers and the 
possible consequences if 
the barriers are in a bad 
condition or not in place
How to 
observe
How to evaluate
How to 
act 
What has to happen if 
the barriers are not in 
place or in a good 
condition and what 
action are possible in the 
situation
Kompetences og motivation
Understand
*Images
*Scripts about processes
*Language set (restricted 
vocabulary)
*Assumptions and relations
*Possibilities
*Related mental models
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The content in these INFO cards is taken from the list of all hazards, their safety barriers and 
associated quality parameters. 
5.2 Risk assessment and calculation 
The DanWorm project has, during its project period, cooperated closely with the Dutch project and 
had an influence on the user-friendliness of the software in the ORCA light version. 
The DanWorm project has also secured a Danish version of the Dutch software program.  
5.2.1 A Danish version of the risk calculator ”ORCA” 
ORCA stands for Occupational Risk Calculator Assessment. Fundamentally, ORCA is a program 
that makes it possible to calculate the risk of being subjected to a fatal accident, accident involving 
invalidity or other accident with a severe but recoverable injury. 
ORCA is available in two versions. The first version is a “stand-alone” application, which is the 
latest development of the WORM project. Described in section 5.3.2 is how the DanWorm project 
has developed some interfaces to the “full” ORCA program with its major requirement for input 
with a view to simplifying this input. 
The WORM project has also developed a simplified web-based system- Web Orca, 
www.weborca.nl  - which is a light version of the full ORCA, inspired by the simplifications that 
DanWorm has developed. This web version is also available in Danish. 
But in order for the calculations to be done, it is necessary with a number of details about the work 
one wants the calculations performed for and the conditions under which this work is performed.  
Input to Web ORCA  
The details that are needed to enter into Web ORCA are: 
 Statement of which trade groups that are included e.g. in a company 
 Statement of the number of persons that are included in each trade group and how many are 
over the age of 50. 
 Details about their working hours with hours per day, days per week and weeks per year. 
 Carried out for each trade group was a division of the tasks that each individual trade group 
performs. The intention of this is to have demarcated concrete job tasks that can be 
evaluated for hazards, and for exposure time and quality of the safety barriers.  
 The requirement is that there is a statement of which risk situations/hazards, the individual 
task contains, as one can chose from a step-by-step selection of hazards in the 4-17-64 
grouping. 
 Also required for each task is a specification of what scope, time spent, the task is performed 
by a % of the total working hours.  
 The requirement is final, that an evaluation of the quality parameters for the safety barriers 
occurs, which the system finds on the basis of the details of what hazards have been 
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specified.  Used here is a simple 5-step scale going from “poor-unreliable-average-
outstanding”. 
In other words, quite a few details are needed, about the entire company, as well as about the 
individual employee and his specific tasks. 
Output from Web ORCA  
The results one can obtain from Web ORCA, are a calculation of the likelihood of a workplace 
accident occurring, with a consequence of either death, invalidity or other severe but recoverable 
injury. 
Information will be given about the entire company, as well as for the individual trade groups and 
the individual tasks.  
It is also possible for the user to specify their own acceptance limits, after which they will be 
included in the display of likelihood calculations with the colours red, yellow and green for how 
severe the risk is in relation to the given acceptance limits.  
Furthermore, the system contains details about the Dutch national average for the relevant trade 
groups, which one can compare oneself with.  
The last level in ORCA is an “Optimiser”, where the system informs about the initiatives it will be 
appropriate to perform in order to change the risk image and what these initiatives cost. 
Thus, the final result is a diagram showing the actual calculated risk stating which initiatives that 
are financially most appropriate to carry out cf. figure 27. 
With this, a basis is given for prioritisation and decision making in a management system for safety. 
Web ORCA – Danish version can be found at http://weborca.nl, where a password and username 
can be requested (this page is available in Dutch and English). 
5.2.2 Risks at industry and trade group level 
Compiled in the Dutch material are a number of general tables for industries, trade groups and 
hazards, which show the exposure conditions in The Netherlands. 
Under the assumption that the working conditions and risk situation within industries and trade 
groups in The Netherlands correspond to the conditions in Denmark, one can here gain a general 
risk picture, which it has not previously been possible to draw up. 
5.3 Risk observations and results from two trade groups 
As described above, the use of ORCA requires many detailed pieces of information before the 
calculations of the accident risk can be carried out.  The DanWorm project realised early on that 
especially small businesses would never be able to find resources or motivation to use such an 
electronic system, among others, due to the requirement of the large amount of information.  The 
idea was, therefore, that others could gather information for a number of employees and thereby 
create the basis for an average calculation of risks for e.g. a certain trade group.  
In connection with this idea, an aid was developed for recording data, in the form of a little software 
that can be downloaded onto a PDA. With the help of this tool, it was possible to follow a person 
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throughout his working day and record his tasks, risk situations, exposure time and the quality of 
the safety barriers, all together in an electronic form where data can be transferred directly to a PC. 
5.3.1 An electronic tool for risk observation 
 The method for mapping out the risk of workplace accidents, which is described in the above 
section, is built in an electronic registration tool. The system consists of a PDA (handheld 
computer), that runs a program based upon Microsoft®Windows Mobile™ version 5.0. With the 
aid of the program, data can be collected (scoring) which can subsequently be transferred to a 
normal PC for further analysis and processing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44 Example of PDA screen while recording activities, hazards, safety barriers and quality 
parameters 
The program leads the observer step-by-step through the structure for risk observation. The data 
collection basically is comprised of one selecting the activities, in “real time”, that the observed 
person performs, i.e. one “notes” the beginning and end of the activity. For each observed activity, 
each safety barrier and what deficiencies one observes among the quality parameters can be noted.  
The procedure under the observation is illustrated with the aid of screen shots of the PDA in figure 
44. In the example, it is about a caretaker who is performing the task “Building maintenance”, 
which is stated in the top line in figure 44 to the left under "Task". The next lines show how one, 
with the aid of the structure in 4-17-64 risk situations finds it or the relevant activities the relevant 
person is in the process of performing. 
150 
One can select up to 3 simultaneous activities.  The PDA‟s rolling menus go down from the general 
characteristic (Level 0) “A: Foundation, where walked, worked” via the activity/hazard (Level 1) 
“A1, Work at heights/(risk for) fall” to the concrete “bowtie” (Action) for “Working on ladders” 
(and the screen informs us that this activity is registered as being started at 12:34:53). 
When a concrete activity is selected, one must subsequently register the quality of the safety 
barriers that are relevant to the concrete activity. The line under “Action Start Time” contains 
precisely the safety barriers that the chosen activity need in order to be evaluated.  Again there is a 
scrolling menu, that can show the relevant safety barriers and one can choose them one at a time 
and perform the evaluation. 
The evaluation itself is performed with the use of the green-red lines. The chosen safety barrier‟s 
quality depends on a number of quality parameters, and on the two lines one indicates which quality 
parameters are “in order” (the green line) and which are “not in order” (the red line). 
The program is constructed so that all quality parameters are per defaults “in order”, so one must 
actively choose the quality parameters that are not in order and move them down to the red line.  
One can shift quality parameters with the aid of the arrow keys to the right of the lines.  
It can keep track of three1 simultaneous activities/hazards under the same task (one can only be 
occupied with one task at a time). The active activities/hazards are shown in the three bottom lines. 
It is possible to change the quality parameters once an activity/hazard is activated.  
5.3.2 Preparation and analysis of PDA data 
For observations and analysis of data several computer programs have been developed.  The 
programs are enclosed on the report‟s CD and contains a help file (in English), which describes the 
program functions and effects. The same helpfile contains a step-by-step description of the 
installation of the PDA application and how the PDA program shall be used.  
The PDA application requires a program, “DanWORM score” and two data files installed on the 
PDA system. These data files contain, respectively: 
1) The description of ORM‟s activities/hazards, safety barriers and quality parameters  
2) Definition of the tasks, which are specific for the job to be analysed and observed.  
These files can be edited with a PC program “DanWORM PrepareInput”. The first data file is 
structured according to the “4-17-64” principle. 
The PDA program saves the scoring in a file, which must be transferred to a PC for further analysis. 
For this purpose, another PC tool, “DanWORM Analyse Score” has been developed. This program 
permits scores to be visualised, which can be used for quality assurance of data: the time elapsed of 
the tasks and activities are shown as a function of time.  
 
1
 In theory one can be subjected to more than three “bowties”, but based upon practical considerations, both with 
respect to the observer and layout of the PDA screen, the tool is limited to three. 
The program puts scorings from different observations together with a view to generating different 
averages of data, and in the scope it is possible, statistical variance of this data. One can choose to 
combine data for individual persons, individual companies or for an entire industry. 
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The most important result of the analysis is for each defined, job specific “task”: 
 Time spent on the task; 
 Which activities/hazards are included in the task and what percent of the time they constitute 
(the total sum of percentages can exceed 100%, i.e. that actions may overlap each other); 
 For each quality parameter that is related to the above activities, it is counted how often 
(frequency) and how long (time) a quality parameter was not in a correct state – this leads to 
an average score for these quality parameters based upon the frequency or time, 
corresponding to ORM‟s “Dutch National Average-DNA” 
 The same analysis of quality parameters is also performed as a total average for all tasks (i.e. 
that a quality parameter status exists, both per task and as a “job average”) 
The program can export data to CSV files (which can be used in normal spreadsheet programs such 
as Excel), but it can also generate an MS Access database which is used in the program 
“DanWORMLight”. 
DanWORMLight is used to define an input data set for the Dutch ORCA program 
(ORCA=Occupational Risk Calculation). It simplifies the data input in the way that the user must 
only enter the time spent on the tasks. With the aid of the average distribution of activities/hazards 
per task (which is generated on the basis of observations with the aid of the “Analysis” program), 
DanWORM-Light calculates the exposure for the different activities.  
The program also generates a risk profile but it is only based upon the Dutch average (DNA) for the 
quality parameters.  Afterwards, ORCA can input the project file produced by DanWorm light for a 
closer specification of the quality parameters and for calculation of the optimal safety measures.  
Figure 45 shows the schematic connection and results of the different tools and data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
”4 - 17 - 64”  
definition 
Task 
definition 
PDA program 
Observations 
PrepareInput program 
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Figure 45 Tools for analysis of the observations. DanWORM tools are marked with the DanWORM 
logo. Grey box is data generated with the aid of DanWORM tools. Pink box is tools or data from 
the original Dutch WORM projects. Boxes with bold edges can be understood as end results from 
DanWORM’s observations. 
5.4 Results from 60 observations in two sectors 
The result of DanWorm project‟s data collection among respectively carpenters and caretakers is 
presented here. 
5.4.1 Time utilisation for tasks 
At the same time as the electronic collection, the observed persons were asked to state, how much 
of their work time they expected to spend on the individual tasks.  In some cases, the “Master” also 
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made an estimate for the employees in his company- The results are shown in figures 46-49. 
Figures 46 and 48 show the average time spent according to the study person‟s own expectation and 
the time spent when they were observed the few days the observations were carried out. There is a 
surprisingly good agreement between observation and expectation, especially in light of the 
individual study person‟s expectations varying greatly as shown in figures 47 and 49.  
The figures show the average plus/minus a standard deviation (i.e. 60% safety interval). The large 
variations are due to the fact that there is a great difference between the activities that the businesses 
or the employees are employed with. This points to the risk analyses preferably being based on a 
company or personal level. 
Remarkable is the difference between own expectation and the observation of “Other tasks and 
breaks”, especially with regard to caretakers. This is explained by the employees having more 
breaks underway, which according to their own perception are included in other activities. This 
points to that data collection based upon reflection of own work (which forms the basis for the 
Dutch WORM project) can contain some systematic deviations from practice. 
Figure 46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46. Time utilisation for carpenters of the carpenter trade’s specific tasks, stated according 
to their own expectation (based upon one year) and stated after the registered observations (based 
upon 467 observed working hours). 
 
Figure 47 
 
 
 
 
154 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47. Variation in the carpenters' own expectations for time utilisation for one year of work. 
Figure 48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48. Time utilisation for caretakers on the caretakers’ specific tasks, stated according to their 
own expectations (based upon one year) and stated after the registered observations (based upon 
355 observed working hours). 
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Figure 49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 49 Variation in the caretakers’ own expectations for time utilisation for one year of work. 
5.4.2 Activities that are included in job-specific tasks 
With the aid of the observations it was possible to gain an impression of how often and how long 
the workers become exposed to the dangers, which WORM has defined via the 64 hazards, while 
they perform a job specific task. For each of the tasks that were identified for carpenters, 
respectively, caretakers, a "standard exposure" has been achieved. Standard exposures are shown in 
figure 50 and 51.  
These standard exposures are placed in input data for the software tool “DanWORMLight”. This 
tool makes it possible to simplify data input from an evaluation of 64 hazards at a fraction of time 
of the 8 to 9 job specific tasks. 
Both for carpenters and caretakers the normal “movements” are the most frequent activity for all 
job specific tasks.  
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Figure 50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 50 shows an overview over exposure for the different job specific activities/hazards for 
carpenters. 
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Figure 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 51. shows an overview over exposure for the different job specific activities/hazards for 
caretakers.  
 
158 
 
5.4.3 Observation of the quality parameters of the safety barriers 
The observation also contains an evaluation of the safety barriers quality parameters i.e. that it is 
noted when a factor that affects the safety barrier is not in a satisfactory state. The purpose is to 
investigate whether the statistic for these quality parameters will deviate from the Dutch national 
average (DNA). The number of observations is, unfortunately, a limiting factor for achieving 
statistically significant results. Observations for carpenters include, in principle, more than 600 
quality parameters.  Of these, it is only possible for 35 to show an average factor that deviates from 
100% (which is the default value of the observations). These 35 factors are shown in diagram 23. 
The values for the quality parameters are worked out both with regard to the number of times an 
activity begins and the total time that an activity is carried out.  As the time, which an activity is 
performed for, can be different, the results are also slightly different.  
Under the observations it has also been attempted to evaluate the carpentry businesses' safety 
equipment and safety culture.  The assumption was, that the company with a good safety culture 
would show a higher average quality score.  This connection could not be proven.  
In light of the lack of statistic significance for most of the quality parameters, they are not used in 
the further analyses. 
Diagram 23 
   PIE value 
Activity 
Secondary 
Safety barriers 
(SSB) PIE factor 
Based 
upon 
time 
fraction 
Based 
upon the 
number 
of events 
Work with hand tools Working subject’s state 
Placement and adherence of 
subject 
99% 97% 
Work with hand tools User ability; placement non-awkward positions 80% 81% 
Work with hand tools 
Personal protective devices 
(PPE) 
Use of PPE 96% 93% 
Work with machines Physical safety barriers 2 
Complete shielding of moving 
machine parts 
91% 90% 
Work with machines Physical safety barriers 2 
Presence of safety 
equipment 
95% 95% 
Work with machines 
Control over movements and 
attention 
Marking and signal for 
danger zones 
86% 92% 
Work with machine Machine’s integrity CE labelling 81% 93% 
Work with heavy/bulky 
objects 
Position Positions 98% 95% 
Work with heavy/bulky 
objects 
Technical aids Aids in poor state 89% 95% 
Work on fixed scaffolding User ability 
Scaffolding floor clean and 
tidy during the course of the 
work day 
86% 94% 
Work on fixed scaffolding Railings 
Sufficient railings fixed to 
scaffolding 
89% 90% 
Work on movable ladders User stability; behaviour 
Use of hands for other 
than holding on 
48% 71% 
Work on movable ladders User stability; behaviour 
Appropriate position on 
the ladder 
87% 94% 
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   PIE value 
Activity 
Secondary 
Safety barriers 
(SSB) PIE factor 
Based 
upon 
time 
fraction 
Based 
upon the 
number 
of events 
Work on mobile 
scaffolding 
Own erection of 
scaffolding 
Used brakes 79% 83% 
Work on mobile 
scaffolding 
Own erection of 
scaffolding 
Measures against the 
scaffolding rolling away 
80% 84% 
Work on mobile 
scaffolding 
Railings Sufficient railings 46% 53% 
Work on ladder stairs User stability; behaviour 
Appropriate position on 
the ladder 
0% 0% 
Work on ladder stairs User stability; behaviour 
Use of hands for other 
than holding on 
75% 83% 
Work on ladder stairs User stability; behaviour 
Appropriate position on 
the ladder 
83% 89% 
Work on ladder stairs Placement and securing 
Placement of ladder at 
foot 
0% 0% 
Work on ladder stairs Placement and securing 
Placement of ladder at 
top; angle 
0% 0% 
Work on ladder stairs Placement and securing 
Good placement of ladder 
by foot 
94% 96% 
Work on roof Fall securing (5 PIES!) Use of harness 73% 61% 
Work on roof Railing Railing in place? 85% 83% 
Work on roof 
Roof’s surface; carrying 
capacity 
Roof under construction or 
demolition 
37% 36% 
Work with holes Covering strength Covering of holes 13% 34% 
Work with holes Railing Railing 71% 54% 
Work with/with open 
containers containing 
chemicals - spill 
Containers placement and 
protection 
Placement and handling of 
container; especially 
handling and manner of 
placing on 
37% 38% 
Activities Surface’s state Holes; disorder; edges; 89% 92% 
Activities Surface’s slipperiness 
Loose things; slip 
increasing 
98% 96% 
Activities Presence of obstacles 
cables; materials; 
equipment 
68% 71% 
Activities/work with limited 
freedom of movement 
Control over movements Disorder; mess 57% 62% 
Activities/work with limited 
freedom of movement 
Control over movements 
State of surface; holes; 
step 
81% 87% 
Activities/work with limited 
freedom of movement 
Equipment; object state 
No suitable entering and 
alighting facility 
95% 92% 
Stay/work in/on vehicle Driver’s ability to drive Attention 96% 94% 
Diagram 23: Barrier quality factors (PIE value) that are significantly different from the default 
value (100%) for carpenters. 
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5.4.4 Risk analyses for carpenters and caretakers 
With the aid of the software tool “DanWORMLight” the risk profiles are calculated for caretakers 
and carpenters based upon the average expected time expenditure for the specific tasks and the 
observed exposures for these tasks. Figure 52 shows the result for carpenters and figure 53 for 
caretakers. 
These figures are limited to the 20 activities/hazards that contribute most to the risk, where the risk 
is weighted: the risk of death and permanent injury is weighted with a factor 100 respectively 10 in 
relation to the risk of recoverable injury. This means that the choice of the most important 20 
activities is not sensitive toward the choice of these factors.  
In comparison with the exposure, these risk profiles are, to a higher degree, determined by the most 
“risk filled” activities, even the normal “activity” is the most frequent activity, it only contributes to 
a minor degree (on respectively  9. 9th and 6th place) to the carpenter‟s and caretaker‟s risk.  
Figure 52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52 Risk profile for carpenters based upon the anticipated time spent and observed exposure. 
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The figure is limited to the 20 activities with the greatest contribution to the total risk. 
Figure 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 53 Risk profile for caretakers based upon the anticipated time spent and observed exposure. 
The figure is limited to the 20 activities with the greatest contribution to the total risk. 
5.5  Summary 
This chapter presents the immediate results that the DanWorm project has developed. These results 
can be regarded as basic tools that can be used for risk assessment and to create safety. How this 
can occur is presented in chapter 6. 
The developed tools are: 
1. A systematised overview of the hazards that lead to accidents. Systematisation in the 4-17-
64 model gives an clear method to work with the many types of hazards, which can give rise 
to an accident.  It is the systematisation and clarity that are in the centre here.  
2. Also, knowledge is obtained from the Dutch WORM project about the generic safety 
barriers that are linked to the individual hazards, and the quality parameters that are 
determining to how good or poor the individual safety barriers are.  
3. Based upon this systematisation and knowledge INFOcards have been drafted for both the 
employer and the employee about what is important to observe about the safety barriers, 
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how they shall adapt the observed information, and how they should act when the conditions 
are not in order. For the employer it is about observing and acting beforehand, while for the 
employee it is about being able to evaluate one‟s own work situation at any concrete point in 
time.  
4. The Dutch WORM project has developed an electronic system for the calculation of the risk 
of death, invalidity and other serious accidents – ORCA.  The Danish project has 
contributed to making this system user-friendlier, ensured that there is a Danish version and 
made this available for Danish users. 
5. The general analyses for the Dutch data, which is compiled in the Dutch Worm project 
about risks for industries and trade groups is also translated to Danish and made available 
through the Danish project. The data is unique; as it is the first time it has been possible to 
have knowledge about the exposure basis behind the accidents.  This data is views as 
relevant in a Danish perspective based upon an assumption that the conditions in the Dutch 
and Danish workplaces are comparable. 
6. The use of ORCA requires the collection of rather a lot of details about the tasks, job, 
activities, etc.  To help with this data collection task, in the Danish project a small program 
has been developed for a simple PDA (hand-held computer). This makes it possible to 
follow a person in a job and record the concrete exposure conditions he/she is subjected to. 
7. The Danish project has carried out a such registration for 20 carpenters and 20 caretakers, 
where is followed over 3 days, i.e. 120 days registration per trade.  The details are 
subsequently transferred to ORCA, and a risk calculation is carried out. 
The results from this are, among others, a risk profile for the two trade groups, as far as it applies to 
the two trade‟s tasks in a number of small businesses.  Also developed is an aid that makes it 
possible to calculate an individual risk profile based upon the collected data and that only requires a 
fraction of the information in relation to the original ORCA tool. 
These results give a fundamental knowledge about the risks and the immediate safety barriers that 
shall be in place in order to avoid accidents.  But this knowledge cannot stand alone. One simply 
cannot just spread this knowledge out without being aware of how this knowledge will be received 
and used in the businesses. Without such an understanding the developed tools risk simply being 
yet another in the row of tools that no one quite understands how they shall be used. 
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6. Injuries are prevented by creating safety 
The goal of the DanWorm project is to utilise knowledge regarding accidents and accident risks and 
knowledge about how one creates safety, so that accidents are avoided.  
The results, that the previous section has arrived at are gathered in this chapter and set into a frame 
for their use. 
6.1 Compilation of theories and tools for “safety creation” 
In chapter 2 it was concluded that it is important that management in a company takes the question 
about creating safety seriously and that management prioritises this high in the company‟s strategy 
and organisation.  This applies not only to large companies, but also for small even if strategies and 
organisation here very often occur in a more informal manner.  
It was also concluded that people‟s ability to foresee when the concurrency of events that leads to 
accidents occurs is limited.  One must instead look at the factors, that safeguard against accidents 
occurring.  In that connection terms such as safety barriers occur and situation determined attention 
as conditions that can be used both to create safety and to evaluate the safety level. 
The advantage of focusing on safety barriers and situational determined attention is that it is 
conditionate that either can be observed or asked about and therefore are suited as effort targets, 
training targets and evaluation targets.  
The understanding of the barrier term is taken from the ARAMIS project presented by Hale & 
Guldenmund (2003).  
The understanding of the term situationally determined attention has been taken from Endsley 
(2000).  One method that is connected to the situationally determined attention is present through 
maps”, that Flin et al (2006) has developed.  This way of thinking has meant the development of 
INFO card, presented in chapter 5 and shown in appendix A. 
The idea behind the INFO Cards is to be able to tell both the employers and employees which 
hazards and safety barriers they have a responsibility for.  
In the Danish study described in chapter 4, it shows that there are some things that necessarily must 
be done by the employer beforehand, which in addition to strategy and organisation include 
observations of both the technical safety barriers and the behavioural safety barriers. These include 
procedures, agreements, guidelines, motivation and communication to employees about what the 
manager expects with respect to the performance of the job safety-wise. 
The Danish study also shows, however, that employees to a high degree have independent   tasks of 
a highly varied nature and that they are often performed away from the employer‟s home address or 
when their employer is not present.  Such tasks require the employee to be able to evaluate his/her 
own risk in concrete work situations and act in relation to them.  Furthermore, this also requires the 
employee to be prepared for the task both in relation to equipment, procedures, ways of doing 
things and in relation to the knowledge and will/understanding for what the employer expects of 
him. 
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The knowledge that exists from, respectively, the Dutch WORM project and the Danish DanWorm 
project is a knowledge of hazards, safety barriers, quality parameters, risk calculations and risk 
profiles, etc.  But the question is how can one get this knowledge integrated into the employer‟s as 
well as the employee‟s competencies and attention. 
Most would say that it is about building up a good safety culture in management, as well as for 
employees. The question is, however, what it will mean. One simply does not create a good safety 
culture without having both a method and an understanding of what the safety culture shall be 
targeted toward. It requires planning, prioritisation, organising and engagement from the side of 
management, who quite simply must want it. 
On the other hand it also requires the knowledge about risks, that just the Worm results give. It is 
this combination of management concepts and knowledge about risks, which can ensure, that one 
has directed the attention toward accident risks in a systematic manner in order to create a good 
safety culture through this. 
As it was concluded in chapter 2, one of the leadership methods that has especially shown safety-
related results is to establish a goal, carry it out, check it and give feedback on how it went, to then 
set new goals, etc.  For most companies, which want an improved safety level there is talk of a 
change management task.  The principles in change management can therefore, with advantage, 
also be used in a safety field.   
One must thus carry out initiatives in order to create a learning process for managers and 
employees. One must create a political process, where responsibility is placed and safety integrated 
both overall and in the daily work. Finally, one must create a symbolic process that contains 
histories, successes, visibility and clarification of the culture that is necessary in order to maintain a 
continuous high safety level. 
In the following there will, therefore, be given an example of how the developed tools in the 
DanWorm project can be used.  This occurs through a managerial level method of change and 
guidance as well as involvement and motivation of the employees. 
6.2 Prevention in a change management and target management 
perspective 
In order to increase the attention regarding risk and safety barriers within the chemical industry, in 
2008 a management level concept was developed by Jørgensen and Bellamy (Bellamy et al 2008). 
This concept will be used here to illustrate how the developed tools can be used to identify risks, 
increase attention to risks and improve the safety culture.   
The concept is based upon a coupling between change management (Kamp et al 2005) and Aims - 
the feedback system (Glendon et al 2007). 
6.2.1 Aims and feedback as motivation to safety 
To learn effectively it is necessary to be motivated.  This motivation can be created from outside 
through rewarding or other encouragement/ incentives, or from inside through an own desire to 
perform work good and safely.  
This safety related behaviour can be influenced by: 
 Increasing the individual‟s confidence by performing the work in a safe manner 
 By focusing on the individual improvements in relation to safety objectives 
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For this to be a success, however, it requires: 
 That the goals shall be a challenge but absolutely achievable and 
 That the feedback programme shall be precise and punctual. 
Particularly important factors for achieving a good effect are: 
 That it is obligatory to participate - it is something management requires and expects. 
 That management clearly supports a development both through top management and 
through the daily management. 
 That there is a steering committee to kick off initiatives, but that activities shall 
subsequently be integrated in the local units and employees. 
 That training occurs based upon a relevant and clear programme. 
 The requirement for obligatory participation is to be preferred instead of voluntary participation, if 
it is appropriately organised. The goal is that employees, through participation, feel a personal 
control when they understand that carrying out observations and receiving feedback instead of 
creating a negative feeling and opposition. However, this depends completely upon management‟s 
practices and to what degree employees play a role in steering the process. 
The visible support from top management and middle management is important. This means, for 
example, that the financial support for activities shall be guaranteed and the necessary time should 
be set aside for observations, analysis and the use of results. Management must also implement the 
changes that are suggested and that have an influence of working conditions and safety procedures. 
It may be appropriate to start a change process by establishing a form of steering committee, who 
can kick off a programme and take the first steps in a decision making process.  The choice of 
participants for a such steering committee must occur in a thoughtful manner and in such a way that 
employees cannot perceive this group as being something that has negative motivations. Also, it 
should be ensured that there is employee participation in this group.  Finally, such a steering 
committee shall have the primary task of setting the process underway and being ready to let go of 
the reins when the local divisions and employees are ready to take over themselves. 
It should be ensured that the training offered is relevant for the job and tasks carried out by the 
business and the working conditions that the employees work under.  It is also important that the 
training does not contain elements of criticism or that blame is laid on employees, on the contrary, 
motivation and competence shall be created.  
The training shall also focus on simple and relevant knowledge, which can continually be 
developed and that can support learning. 
6.2.2 Change management in a safety perspective 
According to the change management concept, the strategy for change should include the following 
3 components: 
A learning process where all that are involved gain knowledge about which safety problems 
one would like to have solved and in what way. 
A political process where the participants in the process are given roles and responsibilities 
possibly especially privileges and power and where a coalition of 
participants is established that shall measure the changes. 
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A symbolic process where a new culture receives an identity through symbols, rituals, 
rewards, story telling and own language. 
The learning process has a focus on how the organisation functions beforehand in relation to safety 
and the possibilities and conflicts for reflection and learning that the participants have in the 
organisation. Demand for change of the safety conditions opposite the participants, acquisition of 
new competencies for a safety related behaviour, change of the point of view on safety and risks, 
including methods and relationships, are necessary for a learning process.  Key words in achieving 
a high safety level are a high degree of employee participation and that employees take ownership 
to achieve it through a number of learning activities. 
The political process shall organise the change process in the safety area.  The future organisation 
of the safety work should be looked into, where certain participants and groups or participants 
receive special privileged roles in the change process.  In this way a coalition of special dedicated 
participants can contribute to supporting the process in the organisation.  The content will be a form 
of co-operation that after a bit of time can become a natural way of doing things.  
The symbolic process is to create a new identity for the safety work and for the change.  The 
symbols can support a change process through the integration of new safety activities.  This can be 
done through the way that they are expressed and the rituals that give the change in safety an image 
and status for different participants. 
In this process it is crucial that management goes ahead and shows credibility toward the 
established safety targets, so that employees can have confidence in the management.  This 
requires, among others, that the management follows the same rules that they demand of employees 
and a prioritisation of the safety considerations occurs, when situations arise that are in conflict with 
other prioritisations. 
6.2.3 Awareness among the management 
As stated it is completely necessary that management commits itself to wanting to achieve new 
targets for safety in the company and that it becomes a strategic goal for the company.  This 
requires, however, that a consciousness is created in management that there is a problem and that 
the problem can only be solved through a change in the company in management as well as with the 
employees.  
This insight can come due to a serious accident or by registering many accidents and the 
consequences that it immediately has for absence and costs to the company. It is not uncommon that 
the insight comes from a parent company, which due to an international strategic decision has a 
particular demand for safety level and performance.  But the insight can also come from demands 
from authorities, customers, and the insurance system or from top management‟s own ideological 
manner of thinking.  
But wanting to have a high level of safety is not the same as getting it, unless one understands why 
accidents occur and what is needed to ensure that the likelihood of accidents is minimised.  
 It is about accepting that the accident risk is present the entire time but that it can be 
minimised through the maintenance of safety barriers, which includes technological, as well 
as organisational and behavioural measures.  
 It is also about accepting that it is difficult to be able to predict all of the events that can 
occur and make an accident sequence possible. 
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 It is also about accepting that one cannot, at all times, be aware of the risks and possibilities 
for accidents and therefore demand a constant attention to extend, install, maintain, keep up 
and control safety barriers.  
One can remove some risks, but one cannot remove them all. The risks that are present shall be 
identified and they shall be handled so they become adhered to on a level that ensures that the 
likelihood of unfortunate coincidences is minimal.  
One of the accident risks greatest problems is that this attention and consciousness degenerates over 
time, when and if nothing has occurred for a longer period of time.  It can dull the control by 
maintaining the safety barriers. 
If many small accidents or near accidents occur, where “nothing serious happens”, it is in itself an 
expression for one not taking one‟s own or one‟s colleague‟s safety seriously.  It will also mean that 
accidents will occur, also with severe consequences.  These can occur when no one has taken care 
of creating a high level of risk consciousness in either management or in employees. 
6.3 Programmes to create risk awareness 
6.3.1 Preparation of the programme 
It begins with management making a decision to create a change in the safety area.  The next step is 
to find out what risks there are in the company and which one must tackle first in a change process.  
This requires a survey, which can be carried out in different ways. One can hire external experts to 
perform a survey but one can also perform it oneself.  
One method can be to go through the company task by task and check out the risks based upon a 
systematic going through of the 4-17-64 risk sources.  Such a going through together with the 
employees who perform the tasks will be able to provide a systematic and good picture of the risks. 
These details can either be entered into ORCA, where a risk calculation can be made or one can 
also relate to the themes that the employee and manager find the most relevant to have tackled.  
Another method can be to allow selected persons follow employees for a number of days and with 
the help of registrations in the developed program to a PDA, obtain a survey of activities and safety 
barriers. Thereafter the details are transferred to ORCA and a risk profile can be worked up.  
A more simple way can be to be near the industry‟s general risks and tackle the hazards that are 
shown in the industry profiles. 
A survey created one way or another will provide a basis so that management can set its goals and 
its strategies for a change process.  
The next step will be to establish a steering committee or similar to put the process in motion and to 
keep up with targets, strategies, processes and a monitoring of the necessary changes occurring.  
As the change management concept requires, this steering committee should be comprised of 
management as well as employees and in such a composition that it supports reliability and 
confidence in the employees. 
In companies where there are several leadership teams, there shall be an anchoring of targets and 
strategy through all of these management teams, so that everyone understands what it is about and 
ensures that the process is supported by top management as well as middle management. It is first 
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when an anchoring of safety consciousness is achieved in both employees and their daily 
management that one can expect to achieve a high safety level.  
A change process about safety is a line management responsibility that cannot be transferred to, for 
example, a safety organisation.  However, the safety organisation or perhaps a safety department 
manned by particularly safety conscious people can be a very good support to having built up the 
necessary competence in both management and employees. A safety organisation can also be an 
agency that contributes to carrying out risk mapping and a subsequent audit of target fulfilment, etc.  
The last link in the preparation is that all become fully informed about the programme‟s idea, 
structure, target, and implementation.  It is important that everyone understands their roles and co-
operation in the programme, and their responsibility for its implementation. It also requires all 
manages being made competent in the knowledge about accident risks, safety barriers, quality 
parameters, including possibly with the use of INFO cards.  
First when there is consensus and competence in managers as well as the steering committee, and 
all employees are informed about what management has decided in the way of goals and strategies 
can one tackle the change programme. 
6.3.2 The programme’s learning process 
The goal of this part of the programme is to create an understanding for accident risks and safety 
barriers and the conditions one shall be aware of.  It is also about how observations shall be used 
and what action possibilities one has.   Here can one use INFO cards and their potential 
development. 
The project proposes 4 steps (Steps 1-4), which all shall be carried out to ensure a whole and mutual 
synergy. 
The goal of the learning process is to create knowledge, competence and awareness about the above 
named conditions. The learning process shall also secure the goals that are established within each 
individual programme step and the associated control and feedback system with expectation 
harmonisation and rewards for good performance. 
Step 1 
The first step is a training programme, which shall probably be organised by external experts or in 
the best case by a well-trained working environment co-ordinator from a safety organisation.  
The purpose of the training programme is to present the content of the teaching process and of the 
more technical knowledge about risks, safety barriers and the conditions that quality determine the 
safety barriers. A motivation of the programme shall also occur.  This can e.g. happen by showing 
the results of the survey and management‟s aim and strategy, as well as giving a general 
presentation of  the entire course in the change process, so that all have as broad a knowledge as 
possible about what shall happen, how and why. 
Management and employees should participate in the training in order to ensure that there is a 
dialogue between the parties and that everyone receives the same information.  Also that 
management, at the same time, knows that they prioritise the change process that they have set in 
motion.  
The result of this step is: 
 That all have knowledge and understanding of the change process,  
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 That all know management‟s goal and strategy in the safety field, 
 That all understand what risks are prioritised,  
 That all understand what safety barriers must be in order,  
 That all know and understand what conditions they shall observe continuously and how they 
shall act when they meet conditions that are not in order,  
 That all know who has a responsibility for what, 
Aim and feedback can be about how many have participated in the training programme and an 
evaluation of the training that was carried out. 
Step 2 
The second step is to have the newly acquired knowledge transformed into practice, e.g. by carrying 
out a type of "on the job" training. This training may necessarily be job specific and occur in a co-
operation between manager and employee, possibly in a group of employees.  
The task will consist in identifying the risks that quite actually occur in the tasks, occur in the daily 
work and presence of safety barriers, and an estimation of the quality parameters.  This could, for 
example, be done by asking the following question: 
 What risks from list 4-17-64 are there in the job generally, 
 What safety barriers are in place and which are lacking, 
 In what state are the safety barriers that are present, 
 Are there particular situations where the risk is particularly difficult and where the safety 
barriers are insufficient/difficult to maintain, 
 Have there been situation, where a risk has been close to developing itself into an accident, 
and what safety barriers were lacking,  
 What risks and safety barriers are connected to the use of technical aids, processes, 
machines, etc.,  
 What risks and safety barriers are connected to the organisation and the work‟s organisation, 
 What risks and safety barriers are connected to the workplace, maintenance, cleaning, 
facilities, access potential, etc. 
 What risks and safety barriers are connected to pressure of work, pressure of time, external 
conditions,   
 What risks and safety barriers are connected to the a lack of information, guidance, 
motivation, co-operation, etc. 
The answers to such questions can lead to a dialogue between employees and day-to-day managers 
about what changes shall be carried out by the manager and which observations the individual 
himself shall make to ensure that the safety barriers are continuously in order.  
Through this dialogue, both a change of the working conditions and an increased attention to the 
concrete risk conditions can be created. Naturally, this requires that there is talk of a dialogue and 
that resources are allocated to carry out the changes the employees demonstrate there is a need for. 
Only in that way can the change process be made credible. 
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Aim and feedback must be about how many that actually carry out a proper “on the job” training, 
what changes it carries with it and an evaluation of the attention to safety that is created among 
employees. It is, therefore, both the manager and employee who are evaluated. Feedback can occur 
through a visible response to concrete measurements and a reward to those who especially do it 
well. 
Step 3 
The third step is to ensure that all have an easy access to the necessary information about the change 
process, risks, safety barriers, etc.  Here, it is about ensuring that everyone can “remember” or have 
easy access to be able to remember what is now introduced.  This means that the information shall 
be made accessible in a way that must be adapted to employees and be placed where the work is 
performed. 
The necessary information is both aims and strategies, action plans, time and task plans, etc. but 
also job specific information about particular risks and particular measures.  One can imagine that 
some information becomes a part of the work descriptions, a part of the building decoration, a part 
of the notice board or a part of the electronic knowledge system.  It is important that employees 
participate in determining how they want the knowledge made accessible, so it fits into their 
understanding of what makes the work easy.   
It shall be such that if the individual becomes in doubt about what was agreed or what risks there 
shall now be attended to, or who now has responsibility for what, he/she shall know where this 
information is and at the same time be able to have access to it in an immediately easy manner.  
The same applies to all part aims and feedback results. 
Aim and feedback must be about this information being made accessible and that all know where 
they can find the information and otherwise perceive it as being an easy access.  Here it is the 
system‟s function that is evaluated and the feedback is an ongoing communication of what new 
information is supplied. 
Step 4 
The fourth step is to constantly follow up the development and changes, not least through a 
registration of the accidents and near accidents that may occur. By mapping and analysing these 
cases in depth for the conditions that continue to lead to accidents occurring one receives an 
indication of where there are still problems with safety. Beyond the obvious, that action shall be 
taken for the concrete problems associated with the individual accidents, so can knowledge about 
the accident‟s fundamental causes be used for a re-evaluation of what safety barriers are not in order 
and questions asked about the priority and targets, as well as any defects in the change processes 
implementation. 
This will require that accidents and near accidents are registered and that they are investigated and 
analysed.  Furthermore, it requires that feedback is given to employees about the results of the 
analyses and the actions this results in.  
Aim and feedback is about this occurring and that action is taken on the results. 
6.3.3 Political process of the programme 
The goal of this process is to create an organisation in the company that takes responsibility for 
safety and risk consciousness in an interplay between management and employees. It is through this 
process that the work with safety can become rooted and made into a good tradition – as the way of 
working. 
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The project suggests 4 steps (Steps 5-8) as examples of how this can be done but many others can 
be used. The fundamental principle is, that a tradition is created to lead an ongoing dialogue about 
safety and risks in relation to the tasks that shall be solved. 
Step 5 
The first step is to involve employees in the changes that shall be carried out.  This applies both to 
the changes that are a direct result of the change process in relation to the safety, but also other 
forms of changes, where e.g. new technology shall be purchased, changes to the working 
organisation made, or when external players shall be involved, etc.  The purpose of this is to utilise 
the employees knowledge about how the work can be carried out, but also by obtaining a thorough 
analysis of the risks and safety problems one shall be aware of in relation to the changes that one 
wants carried out. By involving employees in this process and by involving their knowledge, one 
gets to a higher degree an ownership created to the change and at the same time competence in the 
employees and management.  
The analysis can take a point of departure in the 4-17-64 hazards and the associated safety barriers.  
By going through possible risks and having a dialogue about which safety barriers are needed and 
how they shall be installed, used, maintained and controlled, one has a possibility for imaginary 
safety already in the planning stage. 
Aim and feedback results will be that one has such a dialogue that one has a thorough analysis, and 
that the safety barriers one has reached and established. 
Step 6 
The second step is, that the day-to-day manager leads a dialogue with employees about safety and 
what risks, the individual shall be conscious of in the work that shall be performed the day in 
question. It is proven (Zohar 2003) that a ongoing dialogue about safety between day-to-day 
management and employees leads to a general higher risk consciousness and better safety related 
behaviour. However, it must be included in the daily dialogue in a natural and integrated manner.  
The dialogue shall be about the task, how the task shall be carried out, what risks it contains, what 
safety barriers, there shall be ensured are in place and eventually if there are safety barriers that are 
missing or are not sufficient, a clear agreement of how the employee shall behave and how one has 
brought things in order. 
Aim and feedback results will be a target of the day-to-day manager/supervisor entering into a 
dialogue with his employees about safety and risks. 
Step 7 
The third step is to hold toolbox meetings with a special focus on safety and risks.  It could include 
tasks that may only be performed seldom or that contain special risks or tasks, where groups of 
people shall have their activities co-ordinated, when new employees shall be introduced to a task.  
Such toolbox meetings are comprised of a supervisor discussing the task through with the group of 
people that shall perform the task and going through what risks the task holds, who does what and 
when, how the communication shall be secured underway, what safety barriers that shall especially 
have an eye kept on and what each shall especially do if there is a failure in the safety barriers.  
Toolbox meetings do not need to take a long time and should be carried out immediately before the 
work commences. But it requires a certain preparation, so one has the equipment that shall be used 
and the knowledge and competence that is needed. 
Aim and feedback results are that this preparation occurs, that toolbox meetings are held and that 
employees have competencies to carry out and co-ordinate the job tasks. 
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Step 8 
The fourth step is, that an ongoing form of internal audit occurs with focus on the safety level and 
maintenance of safety barriers.  It is proven (Rasmussen 1997), that safety has the tendency to 
degenerate over time, when accidents don‟t occur for a period and one, therefore, sees that 
everything is in order. It is also through an audit that one can observe the fulfilment of goals from 
the results of the other steps so that after an internal review, feedback can occur to management as 
well as employees.  One can carry out an internal audit in different ways both with internal or 
external resources.  It is essential that everyone is clear over it occurring, what is observed and 
when and that everyone knows about the results.   
Aim and feedback of the audit is that it is carried out and that feedback is given on the results from 
the audit. 
6.3.4 Symbolic process of the programme 
The aim of this process is to create motivation, pride and happiness over achieving the goals that the 
change process has set for itself. It is through this that a new identity is created and hopefully also 
an acceptance of a new cultural level in the safety area. 
The project proposes 2 steps (Steps 9-10), which can be developed into many separate steps. 
Step 9 
The first step is to secure management‟s visibility and trust in the entire change process. This can 
e.g. occur by him regularly carrying out “walk-arounds”, where he shows his interest and priority 
for tasks and the safety that is associated with this. Generally, it is important that the manager 
always adheres to the guidelines himself, which are developed for the employees, and that the 
manager never goes past a workplace where a safety barrier is not in order without taking action. 
On the other hand it is just as important that the manager in his walk-around expresses praise and 
recognition to the employees who perform their work in a safe manner. 
Management‟s visibility and trust also comes to an expression through resource allocation when 
there are desires for a safety condition, just as a reaction occurs when there is a violation.  This 
should apply in communication and co-ordination from management toward both employees and 
middle management. Similarly, it should apply when management reward in the form of giving 
greater responsibility, better salaries, new tasks, etc. 
Step10 
The second step is to develop and create symbols, stories, events, etc., which give colouring to 
everyday, create fellowship and social identity. It is these arrangements that hold both 
management‟s and employee attention, because it is here an expectation is created and a joy when 
the goals are attained and rewarded. There can be talk of many different activities, which 
fundamentally shall be of a type that employees value. Examples of such activities are: 
 Social events, both small and large, cakes on Fridays, parties, dinners, etc. 
 The good stories in a newsletter of simply on a notice board with praise and recognition. 
 Prizes awarded for good initiatives and good execution. 
 A symbol of recognition visibly placed in the departments that have earned it.  
 Honour and credit to the frontrunners 
It is important that ongoing information occurs about the results, initiative, prioritisations, changes, 
rewards that means everyone has an understanding that something is happening and that notice is 
being paid to how it is going. 
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6.4 APV and Injury Risk Audit  
The concepts for an APV and an Audit for accident risks should necessarily be based upon an 
evaluation of hazards and associated safety barriers: The other is an evaluation of the activities that 
are implemented to ensure that there is an ongoing control of the risk conditions, maintenance of the 
safety barriers and adherence to risk consciousness. 
6.4.1 APV concept for injury risk 
An APV concept for injury risk should take a point of departure in the 4-17-64 hazards, i.e. diagram 
22.  One can start with the 4 main areas and specify which of the 17 risk areas that are relevant to 
go further with. In this way one can limit the scope of risk, which shall be observed on the more 
specific 64 level. First, the following main areas are taken each on its own: 
A. The foundation where it is walked or worked 
B. The surroundings where it is walked or worked 
C. What is worked with or by 
D. Surroundings of a particularly dangerous nature. 
For each main area, focus is placed on sub-areas, such as e.g. Point A whether there is risk for fall 
to a lower level, or falls to the same level.   
If there is a risk of fall to a lower level an evaluation can be carried out with the aid of the 
INFOcard.  But if there is talk of one of more specific types of risks, one can look at them by first 
pointing out them in the list of hazards and then checking the safety barriers and quality parameters 
in the Dutch materials. 
Falls from heights – movable ladder 
Falls from heights – fixed ladder 
Falls from heights – stepladders 
Falls from heights – rope ladders 
Falls from heights – mobile scaffolding 
Falls from heights – fixed scaffolding 
Falls from heights – erection/dismantling of scaffolding 
Falls from heights – roofs 
Falls from heights – areas, floors with large differences in level 
Falls from heights – fixed platforms 
Falls from heights into holes (e.g. in the earth, floors) 
Falls from heights – mobile platforms 
Falls from heights – stationary vehicles 
Falls from heights – other work at height without protection 
By taking the hazards step by step in this systematic manner, one has the possibility to have carried 
out a risk assessment for accidents. 
It presupposes that the APV concept is carried out for each individual job and task as the risk varies 
with which task is carried out, where it is carried out, how it is carried out and under what 
conditions they are performed. It is therefore appropriate to involve the individual employee in the 
identification of hazards in the concrete tasks and at the same time have a dialogue about which 
hazards are present and what safety barriers are in use, as well as in what way the safety barriers are 
guaranteed used and maintained. Here can either the INFOcards in Appendix A be put into use or 
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the more detailed information from the Dutch materials depending on which level of risk 
specification one is on.  
With regard to the evaluation of accident risks it is important to be aware of tasks that are seldom 
performed but where the risk is great and perhaps where not much observance is attached with 
regard to method and safety, but where very little needs to go wrong before an accident occurs. An 
APV for accident risks shall especially seek to identify such tasks.  Contrary to other working 
environment influence, the accident risk is a factor that simply needs to be high rather briefly, on 
order for an accident to occur with the resulting personal injury. 
The APV concept must also evaluate the activities that are started in order to ensure a high risk 
consciousness in managers as well as employees.  Under here, if one has carried out processes that 
create learning, responsibility and motivation to maintain a constant high level of safety.  Herein 
lies an evaluation of the activities, their implementation and achievement of goals.  Some of the 
indicators that can be included in an evaluation can be the following: 
On top manager level: 
 
Marker for “Good” behaviour 
 
Marker for “Bad” behaviour 
Understand the need for evaluation of accident risks and 
what the safety barriers are. 
Do not feel the need for evaluation of accident risks and 
do not know what safety barriers are. 
Understand what the threat is against maintaining good 
safety barriers and what there is a need for in the 
company. 
Feels there is not a threat against maintaining good safety 
barriers and does not feel there is a need for it in the 
company. 
Understand what is needed to get employees to be risk 
conscious. 
Feels that it is the employee‟s own problem to be risk 
conscious. 
Understands the need for management being obliged to 
create a high safety level in the company. 
Does not think that management can do more to increase 
the safety level in the company. 
Understands the need for a learning process. Does not think there is a need for a learning process. 
Understands the need for a political process and clear 
distribution of responsibility. 
Does not think there is a need for a political process and 
special placement of responsibility for safety. 
Understands the need for a symbolic process and own 
role. 
Does not feel there is a need for a symbolic process and 
does not have any own role. 
Is willing to prioritise having a good safety culture 
created. 
Does not feel there are grounds to prioritise a change in 
the safety culture.  
Is willing to support the process with resources and 
energy. 
Does not feel there is money or grounds to support a 
process with resources and energy. 
 
 
On a middle management level/the small employer: 
Marker for “Good” behaviour Marker for “Bad” behaviour 
Understand the need for evaluation of accident risks and Do not feel the need for evaluation of accident risks and do 
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what the safety barriers are. not know what safety barriers are. 
Understand what the threat is against maintaining good 
safety barriers and what there is a need for in the 
company. 
Feels there is not a threat against maintaining good safety 
barriers and does not feel there is a need for it in the 
company. 
Understand what is needed to get employees to be risk 
conscious 
Feels that it is the employee‟s own problem to be risk 
conscious. 
Understands the need for the middle manager 
contributing to create a change with regard to risk 
consciousness in his/her own division. 
Does not believe that the middle manager shall contribute to 
creating a change with regard to risk consciousness in 
his/her own division. 
Understands the middle manager‟s responsibility and 
task in the learning process. 
Does not feel that the middle manager has a responsibility 
and task in a learning process. 
Understands the middle manager‟s responsibility and 
task in the political process. 
Does not feel that the middle manager has a responsibility 
and task in a political process. 
Understands the middle manager‟s responsibility and 
task in the political symbolic process. 
Does not feel that the middle manager has a responsibility 
and task in a symbolic process. 
Is willing to prioritise in order to have a good safety 
culture created in his/her own division. 
Does not feel there is the need for prioritising to change on 
safety culture created in his/her own division. 
Is willing to support the process with resources and 
energy. 
Does not feel there is the need for using special resources 
and energy on safety. 
Employee level: 
Marker for “Good” behaviour Marker for “Bad” behaviour 
Understands what risks his/her job involves. Does not have insight into what risks his/her job involves. 
Understands what safety barriers must be in order in the 
tasks he/she performs. 
Is not familiar with what safety barriers must be in order 
in the tasks he/she performs. 
Understands what risk consciousness he/she shall be in 
receipt of while performing the tasks. 
Does not have appreciable risk consciousness in relation 
to the tasks that he/she shall perform. 
Is positive toward participating in a change process, where 
he/she can develop his/herself further. 
Does not feel there is the need for changing anything. 
Is positive toward participating in a learning process. Does not feel there is a need for any form of learning 
process. 
Is positive toward participating in a political process. Does not feel there is a need for a political process with 
particular responsible tasks. 
Is positive toward working in a symbolic process. Feels a symbolic process is unimportant. 
Is willing to contribute to increase the safety culture. Does not feel there is any ground to increase the safety 
culture. 
Is prepared to make his contribution with own resources 
and energy on safety. 
Does not wish to contribute own resources and energy on 
safety. 
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6.4.2 Audit concept in the area of injury 
An audit programme does not differ significantly in its content from the APV concept, as it contains 
an overview of the concrete hazards and their safety barriers, as well as an overview of initiatives 
that are taken or lack being taken to create a high level of safety and a good safety culture.  
An audit of the concrete hazards and their safety barriers should be based on what one can see and 
that one can ask about within a reasonable amount of time.  That is to say, that it will not be 
possible to go through all tasks together with the employees that are described in an APV survey. 
But one can still go through unit by unit and look for hazards and safety barriers in the same way as 
stated under APV, namely by looking first at the 4 main areas, then the sub-areas and in each place 
check whether the safety barriers are in place, maintained, controlled and whether the quality 
parameters are filled. 
The INFO cards in Appendix A and the specific lists safety barriers and PIE´s are the basis for this 
check. 
It is also important that in an audit it is asked about the rare, but particularly risk filled tasks and 
what safety barriers are established in association with the performance of these tasks.  
An Audit going through of the implementation of initiatives and changes in order to achieve a high 
risk consciousness and a good safety culture can include the following: 
Identification of deficiencies in the learning process 
Marker for “Good” behaviour Marker for “Bad” behaviour 
A training programme about risk consciousness and 
safety barriers is worked out for all in the management 
team. 
There is not a training programme about risk consciousness 
and safety barriers for the management. 
There is a training programme about risk consciousness 
and safety barriers for all supervisors. 
There is not a training programme about risk consciousness 
and safety barriers for the supervisors. 
There is a training programme about risk consciousness 
and safety barriers for all supervisors. 
There is not a training programme about risk consciousness 
and safety barriers for the employees. 
There is a special training programme about risk 
consciousness and safety barriers for all new employees 
and especially for young employees. 
There is not a training programme about risk consciousness 
and safety barriers for new employees or the young. 
There is a special programme for external players, which 
for a shorter or longer time will work at the company. 
There is not a special programme for external players, that 
for a shorter or longer time will work at the company. 
That a thorough APV investigation about the presence of 
risks and safety barriers in the company has been carried 
out, which can be included in this training. 
That a thorough APV investigation about the presence of 
risks and safety barriers has not been carried out in the 
company. 
That “On the job” training has been carried out in a co-
operation between supervisor and employees. 
That “On the job” training has not been carried out in a co-
operation between supervisor and employees. 
That all employees have been made aware of what risks 
they shall be aware of, what safety barriers they shall 
observe if they are in order and what expectations there 
are to their actions on this. 
That none of the employees have been made aware of what 
risks they shall be aware of, what safety barriers they shall 
observe if they are in order and what expectations there are 
to their actions on this. 
That all important information about risks and safety 
barriers is made easily accessible and understandable for 
That no information about risks and safety barriers are 
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employees. made available or understandable for employees. 
That all employees know where they can find this 
information and know how they shall use it.  
That no employees know where they can find this 
information or know how they shall use it.  
That all employees know how they shall report accidents 
and near accidents and that they are motivated to do it. 
That no employees know how they shall report accidents 
and near accidents and no-one is motivated to do it. 
That all reported events are analysed and the results are 
reported, and that actions are taken to secure against 
repeats. 
That no analysis of any events is made and there is no form 
of action to guarantee against repeats. 
 
Identification of deficiencies in the political process 
Marker for “Good” behaviour Marker for “Bad” behaviour 
That management understands their responsibility for the 
change process and what they shall do to increase the risk 
consciousness and ensure the safety barriers. 
That management does not intend to carry out a change 
process and they do not understand what they shall do to 
increase the risk consciousness and ensure the safety 
barriers.  
That supervisors understand their responsibility and what 
they shall do to increase the risk consciousness and to 
insure the safety barriers. 
That supervisors do not know their responsibility or what 
they shall do to increase the risk consciousness and to 
insure the safety barriers. 
That a daily dialogue occurs between day-to-day 
managers/supervisors and employees about the risks and 
safety barriers. 
That there is not form of daily dialogue between day-to-
day managers/supervisors and employees about the risks 
and safety barriers. 
That supervisors carry out toolbox meetings, especially 
when new tasks shall be started or special tasks shall be 
performed.  
That supervisors do not carry out toolbox meetings. 
That employees are always involved when new plans are 
made new initiatives are launched, new equipment is 
purchased, etc. 
That employees are never involved when new plans are 
made, new initiatives are launched, and new equipment is 
purchased, etc. 
That employees actually participate and know how they 
can make their influence valid. 
That employees never participate or know how they can 
make their influence valid. 
That employees can tell about how their supervisor 
contributes to making aware of risks and checks safety 
barriers. 
That employees can tell that their supervisor never makes 
them aware of risks and checks the safety barriers. 
That employees can tell about how their supervisor 
conducts toolbox meetings and involves risk 
consciousness and the evaluation of safety barriers in 
these meetings. 
That employees can tell that their supervisor never 
conducts toolbox meetings and involves risk 
consciousness and evaluation of safety barriers. 
That regular internal audits for safety barriers and risk 
consciousness are carried out. 
That internal audits are never carried out for safety 
barriers and risk consciousness. 
That there is a feedback system for audit results and that 
they are communicated out to the employees. 
That no form of feedback is given for any audit results. 
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Identification of deficiencies in the symbolic process 
Marker for “Good” behaviour Marker for “Bad” behaviour 
That management has informed about goals for a changed 
risk consciousness and quality assurance of the safety 
barriers. 
That management has not set any goal for a changed risk 
consciousness and quality assurance of the safety barriers. 
That management has informed about the goals being 
achieved and how ongoing feedback will occur for this. 
That management does not have any information about 
how the safety could be improves or achieved. 
That management understands how important it is that 
he/she is visible in relation to prioritisation of risk 
consciousness and quality assurance of the safety barriers. 
That management doe not feel there are any grounds to 
prioritise risk consciousness and quality assurance of the 
safety barriers. 
That management regularly carries out “walk-arounds” 
and speaks with both middle management and employees 
about risks and safety. 
That management never carries out “walk-arounds” and 
speaks with both middle management and employees 
about risks and safety. 
That management itself always follow the procedures for 
safety barriers, which he wants the employees to follow 
and that he observes the safety barriers that contain 
deficiencies, and acts on them straight away so that they 
can be corrected. 
That management itself does not always follow the 
procedures for safety barriers, which he wants the 
employees to follow and that he does not observe the 
safety barriers, that contain faults. 
That management primarily has focus on the positive 
results for risk consciousness and qualitative safety 
barriers and that recognition occurs to those who 
participate in achieving the good results. 
That management only focuses on the negative results for 
a lack of shown risk consciousness and defective safety 
barriers. 
That special events are organised when intermediate aims 
are achieved or when there is reason for celebrating such a 
particular success. 
That no special events ever occur that have to do with 
safety and risk consciousness. 
That both middle management and employees are 
rewarded for good results in the safety field. 
That no form of reward occurs for those who have shown 
risk consciousness. 
That there is a history telling in the company about the 
good results and an identity and pride over working in a 
place with good safety. 
That the histories told in the company are about accidents 
and how lucky or unlucky one can be in near accidents. 
6.5 Safety in SME 
The conclusion in chapter 3 is that the small businesses have the need for methods and materials, 
which are easy to understand and that they can use with few resources.  One of the characteristics if 
the small company‟s management is that they generally view safety as something the individual 
employee has an own responsibility for, simply by the manager ensuring that the necessary 
equipment is available. This understanding must necessarily be changed to an understanding of 
what the manager can do daily in order to build up a good safety culture in the company, so that the 
employees take their part of the responsibility for safety.  
The INFO cards are precisely created to fulfil this need.  However, it cannot be sufficient enough to 
simply hand over such INFO cards, without placing their use in a frame.  In that way the little 
company separates itself from the big company. In many ways the little company must go through 
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the same process as the large. The difference lies, on the other hand, in the formalisation and 
communication paths. 
The need for creating a consciousness at the employer in the little company corresponds completely 
to the need in the large company. However, it can be more difficult in the little company, where it 
can be a long time between accidents, and where the managerial competencies are perhaps too 
limited to understand the opportunities and need to influence the safety. Precisely because accidents 
occur so seldom in the small company, the motivation and consciousness need to come from 
another place. 
Demands from larger companies, from the insurance company or from an authority are central, but 
a network of companies that communicate about development and supplementary training or the 
like are a good supplement. In many ways, the first link in the chain of having created a higher 
safety consciousness it the most difficult. 
As research shows (Hasle et all 2004), the road from decision and action is short in the small 
businesses. That is to say, that when the employer first has realised what he/she shall and wants, it 
doesn‟t take long until it is done. 
Yet, he must still go through change management‟s 3 process steps and an ongoing aim and 
feedback management. But it can be made significantly less formalised in the small business. For 
example, training can be done with a short teaching course, where an external teacher comes to visit 
and introduces an understanding of the most relevant risks and safety barriers.  “On the job” 
training and the continuous dialogue can occur daily, where the tasks are assigned.  Small toolbox 
meetings with groups of employees can be carried out ad hoc, when the work gives rise to it.  The 
employer can carry out ad hoc “walk-arounds” at the same time as he inspects the tasks that are 
performed. The employer can therefore carry out many of the process steps that a change process 
requires both informally and integrated.  The important thing is, however, that the employer 
understands his role and has the necessary competence to carry out the process. 
It will naturally be an aid to the employer in the small business that he shall not start from the 
bottom in relationship to train and practice a risk consciousness in his employees. Therefore it will 
be a good help to have an understanding of risks and safety barriers introduced as necessary 
competencies, which can be acquired through the educational systems.  
It is important that especially young people are trained in such good competencies with regard to 
understanding risks as possible It is also important that particular attention is paid to young people‟s 
education about the risks at work, as this is not something young people are automatically familiar 
with or in a position to realise. It is something that shall be learned, trained and order to be 
respected. 
6.6 Need for further development 
The development process in the DanWorm project has led to a number of tools for accident 
prevention and an understanding for ways that these tools can be put into use. 
However, there are still a number of wishes for a continued process with that, which is lacking.  
Mentioned here are 3 areas where we can immediately see a developmental need. This applies to 
the following: 
1. To have the change concept tested in a number of companies and have a result documented. 
2. To have the perspective on safety barriers further developed and build it into the INFO cards. 
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3. To have the ORCA calculation tested in Danish conditions and to develop a set of Danish data. 
 
6.6.1 Testing the change concept in the area of safety 
The concept that is presented in this chapter 7 is developed on the basis of the theory basis from 
chapter 3 and the results from chapter 6. But the concept has not been tested in the real world.  
A new step could therefore be to carry out a regular intervention in a number of companies to 
investigate how the concept functions and what it requires to achieve a desired effect. 
The intervention will involve a motivation of the management a demonstration of a need to have the 
risk consciousness increased, and raise the quality of the safety barriers.  In that way an entire 
course of the change process is carried out and an evaluation of the effects that are achieved, which 
can be placed in relation to time and resource consumption.  
Parallel to this, interventions should be carried out in special small businesses in order to illustrate, 
how a change process can be carried out and increase the risk consciousness, as well as which 
potentials that could be aimed at in a campaign for small businesses. 
6.6.2 Development of INFO card and the perspective of safety barriers 
In the DanWorm project INFO cards are drafted for the 17 groups of hazards, where the content 
involves a certain generalisation and therefore can lack the more detailed instructions. 
A further development should therefore include the test of the existing INFO cards and draft INFO 
cards for all the 64 hazards.  It will also be a goal to have a concept developed, after which 
companies can draft their own INFO cards targeted toward concrete hazards or activities.  
In this connection it will also be appropriate to work further with the safety barrier concept itself 
and have it fully extended to the understanding that is expressed in figure 10. 
Furthermore, it is important to arrange this way of looking at accident risk assessment and create an 
understanding for:  
 safety barriers being in order, so that one can avoid accidents  
 that safety barriers shall be in order even if no accidents have occurred in a long time  
 that risk consciousness is a necessity in all forms of work  
 that it is a managerial responsibility to have created and improved the risk consciousness in 
employees  
6.6.3 Testing ORCA and establishment of a Danish data basis  
The third development area is to have the calculation program ORCA used and test in what 
situations and contexts it can be put into use with a good result. The testing of the PDA program 
and transfer of data to ORCA and usage of the calculations are important development areas. 
But it is naturally not usable in all forms of risk assessment. The requirements for the input that the 
calculations shall be performed on must be highlighted further. Partly so they can be minimised the 
most possible, but also so the calculations become as realistic and correct as possible to the 
situations they shall state the risk for. 
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An additional development of the software in ORCA can be appropriate in order to increase in 
relation to user friendliness and thereby create a larger use of the system.  
There are also parts of the ORCA content itself that should be developed further.  This applies, 
among others to: 
 The basis that the recommendations to minimise the risk with are based on. 
 The risks that are not included in ORCA, such as e.g. the traffic risk and expansion of the 
risk of different types of technical equipment. 
 The question is whether the Danish conditions can be covered by the Dutch data, 
 The possibilities for establishing Danish data that can counterbalance any differences. 
6.7 Summary 
There is no easy path to create a prevention of accidents, and there is no universal model that can be 
recommended as the way of making work in a company safe. In the Dutch Worm project and in the 
Danish DanWorm project a number of tools have been developed that can be used to evaluate the 
risk, predict dangers and perform preventive actions.  But none of these tools will solitarily be able 
to prevent injuries. 
Safety and a good safety culture are something one creates, and that shall be held onto in an 
ongoing and constant process. One will never be able to remove all dangers, but one can reduce the 
likelihood of accidents occurring by ensuring that the safety barriers are in place and function 
according to purpose. 
Chapter 2 shows that safety is a management task, and an improvement of safety can be achieved, 
for example, through an aim-feedback system set into a change management concept. These 
management concepts are placed into use, as an illustration of, how the developed tools from 
chapter 5 can be used in a company. 
One or more of the tools are taken into use both in a learning process, in a political process and in a 
symbolic process. Also shown is how one can in an APV as well as in an Audit can evaluate the 
safety level by using the knowledge of hazards and their safety barriers together with the function of 
the managerial level processes that shall ensure that the knowledge is used.  
A small company shall, in principle, go through the same course and processes as larger businesses 
shall, but they can carry out the processes significantly more informally because their 
communication paths are simpler. On the other side, it will be more difficult to get the small 
companies to realise that they should work with safety in a systematic manner. This question is not 
solved in this project.  
It is recommended to have the change concept tested in a safety field, so experiences can be 
harvested from the use of the tools in a managerial process. There will also be the need to have 
further developed the INFO cards for the specific 64 hazards and perhaps even on certain types of 
activities. There will also be the need to test the Dutch material behind the risk calculation and look 
at the need for an adaptation to Danish data and Danish conditions.  
It is the hope that the project has given a contribution to an understanding of what the prevention of 
accidents requires and the tools and processes that are necessary for one to achieve a higher safety 
level in the work places.
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A 1 INFO CARD for Falls from heights 
In the WORM project, risk types that are associated with this risk factor are described through 12 different 
types of situations, where the risk for falls from heights occurs. This includes, for instance, stays on: 
 
1. moveable ladders  
2. fixed ladders,  
3. step ladders,  
4. rope ladders,  
5. mobile scaffolding,  
6. fixed scaffolding,  
7. putting up/taking down scaffolding,  
8. roofs,  
9. surfaces with a difference in level,   
10. fixed platform,  
11. mobile platform,   
12. vehicles, which stand still. 
 
These 12 different risk types have different types of requirements and safety barriers, which among others, 
there is legislation for or guidelines drafted for.  In WORM analyses these risk types fundamentally contain 
4 generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
 
1. The equipment’s strength  
2. Railings, etc.  
3. The equipment’s placement and basis  
4. User stability  
 
The equipment’s strength is about the carrying capacity in relation to the actual load, if it is maintained, 
cleaned and if it is used correctly, e.g. if the ladder’s steps are in good condition and can bear the weight of 
a man and materials, or if the roof’s carrying capacity can handle the weight of the persons who are on it. 
 
Railings or other protection against falls is about special safety equipment, which shall ensure, they do not 
fall from heights if they should step wrong, stumble, or lose their balance for some other reason.   
 
The equipment’s placement and basis is about a person having chosen the correct equipment and that it is 
used properly. For ladders, this applies to e.g. the ladder’s slope and securing, for scaffolding, this applies to 
the support and securing.  
 
User stability is about behaviour, as well as physical and mental condition in relation to what is required for 
working at heights.  It is about how a person stands, walks and works at heights with or without tools, and 
how a person handles materials.  
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MANAGEMENT  
Hazard: Fall from heights 
Includes stays at and work on all forms of ladders, scaffolding, platforms, differences in level, roofs, etc. 
Barrier types Observe/investigate 
 
Understand/interpret and 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
The 
equipment’s 
strength 
 
Observe whether the 
equipment is in order, cleaned 
and maintained. 
Investigate what equipment is 
needed for the tasks and its 
carrying capacity. 
Investigate whether there is a 
need for other equipment for 
the tasks. 
Observe whether employees 
give feedback when the 
equipment is not in order. 
Observe employee behaviour 
and use of the equipment.  
Evaluate whether the carrying 
capacity and construction are 
appropriate to the task. 
Evaluate the maintenance 
condition. 
Evaluate the need for remedial 
measures.  
Evaluate the need for information 
to employees.  
Evaluate the need for special 
instruction. 
Evaluate the need for motivating 
initiatives for the employees. 
Ensure faults are rectified and 
remove defective equipment. 
Inform employees about which 
equipment they must use and 
which 
equipment is defective or being 
repaired. 
Ensure there are procedures for the 
work and for cleaning and 
maintenance. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how they work at heights, 
and what feedback they must give 
when they find that things are not 
in order. 
Railings Observe the need for railings. 
Observe the railing quality.  
Observe whether railings are 
mounted correctly and in good 
maintained condition. 
Evaluate accessibility, maintenance, 
strength and set-up of railings. 
Evaluate the motivation to ensure 
maintenance of the railing quality. 
Evaluate the need for special 
instruction. 
Evaluate the need for motivating 
initiatives for the employees. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Inform employees about how they 
shall behave.  
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to 
behave when railings are lacking or 
are not in order.  
The 
equipment’s 
placement 
and basis 
Observe the equipment’s 
placement and basis. 
Observe the possibility that 
external circumstances can 
affect the equipment. 
Observe the need for special 
measures for protection. 
Observe employees ability to 
protect the equipment.   
Check approval of the 
equipment . 
Evaluate the possibility for 
sideslipping, tipping. 
Evaluate the possibility that 
someone can bump into or affect 
the equipment’s balance.  
Evaluate employees’ ability and 
motivation to set up and use 
equipment correctly. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Inform employees of the correct 
method and ensure that it is used. 
Instruct on setup, securing, 
foundation, placement, etc. 
Motivate employees to comply with 
procedures.  
User stability Observe employees’ state of 
health before they are sent to 
heights. 
Observe the weather before 
the task starts up. 
Observe the employees' 
behaviour towards footwear, 
free hands 
Evaluate whether employees are 
OK 
Evaluate whether employees can 
handle the task 
Evaluate whether employees  know 
how their behaviour should be 
when working at heights 
Evaluate employees’ motivation to 
exhibit safe behaviour 
Ensure instructions/agreements are 
clear 
Ensure there is a good division of 
responsibility and tasks 
Create positive motivation to safe 
behaviour 
Ensure there is a consequent 
attitude for violations 
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: Fall from heights 
Includes stays at and work on all forms of ladders, scaffolding, platforms, differences in level, roofs, etc. 
Barrier types Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
The 
equipment’s 
strength 
 
Observe whether the 
equipment is in order, cleaned 
and maintained. 
Investigate what equipment is 
needed for the tasks and its 
carrying capacity. 
Investigate whether there is a 
need for other equipment for 
the tasks. 
 
Evaluate whether the carrying 
capacity and construction are 
appropriate to the task. 
Evaluate the maintenance 
condition. 
Evaluate the need for remedial 
measures.  
 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Ensure that the correct equipment 
comes into use. 
Remove defective equipment. 
Inform the employer and possibly 
colleagues, if the conditions are not 
in order.  
Follow the given instructions and 
procedures. 
Need for 
railings 
Observe the need for railings. 
Observe the quality and 
strength of the necessary 
railing. 
Observe whether the railing is 
mounted correctly and is in 
good maintained condition. 
Evaluate accessibility, maintenance, 
strength and set-up of railings. 
 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Inform the employer and possibly 
colleagues, if there are deficiencies 
and what measures are necessary. 
Follow the given instructions and 
procedures. 
The 
equipment’s 
placement 
and basis 
Observe the equipment’s 
placement and basis. 
Observe the possibility that 
external circumstances can 
affect the equipment. 
Observe the need for special 
measures for protection.  
Check approval of the 
equipment . 
Evaluate the possibility for 
sideslipping, tipping. 
Evaluate the possibility that 
someone can bump into or affect 
the equipment’s balance.  
 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Inform the employer and possibly 
colleagues, if there are deficiencies 
and what measures are necessary. 
Follow the given instructions and 
procedures. 
User stability Observe your state of health 
before you work at heights. 
Observe the weather before 
the task starts up. 
Observe the need for 
particular behaviour, including 
footwear and free hands to 
hold on with. 
Evaluate your own ability to work at 
heights. 
Evaluate whether you can handle 
the task 
Evaluate which behaviour is needed 
in the task for you and your 
colleagues’ safety 
Evaluate methods of transport of 
materials and tools that shall be 
used for working at heights. 
 
Know the necessary 
instructions/agreements. 
Know who has the responsibility 
and tasks. 
Ensure there are aids to lift up 
materials and equipment, so you 
have one hand free to be able to 
hold on. 
Carry out the task with safe and 
professional behaviour. 
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A 2 INFO CARD for Falls in the same level 
In the WORM project, risk types that are associated with this risk factor are described through 2 different 
types of situations, where the risk for falls occurs. This includes, for instance, stays on: 
 
1. Stays and activities in levels anywhere at all 
2. Stays and activities on stairs 
 
One can argue for, that stays and activities on stairs with the risk for falls, in just as high a degree, belong 
under falls at a lower level.  The reason for bringing this risk condition under here is, partly that stays and 
activities in the same level and on stairs are very general risks that are often closely associated.  Also, the 
safety barriers and PIE’s are quite identical in these two risk types. 
Furthermore, the 2 risk types have in common that they, on the one hand, are not perceived as being 
particularly risk filled because it is something we all do every day without something happening, and on the 
other hand, it is the risk condition that as an individual risk creates the basis for the most accidents.  
 
 In WORM analyses these risk types fundamentally contain 4 generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
1. The surface’s condition and maintenance 
2. The surface’s slipperiness and cleaning 
3. The presence of obstacles 
4. User stability 
 
The surface’s condition and maintenance is about the presence of unevenness and clutter. For stairs, it is 
also about the stair construction, the kind of step,  appropriate banisters, etc.  
 
The surface’s slipperiness is about cleaning, the presence of ice, snow, water, oil and the like.  
 
The presence of obstacles is about access conditions, space to walk, and if there are leads and materials in 
the trafficked areas, etc.  
 
User stability is about behaviour, as well as physical and mental condition in relation to what is required for 
the work.  It is about how a person stands, walks and works with or without tools, and how a person 
handles materials.  Does a person use the banisters when they walk the staircase? If a person runs, then 
there is a risk of falling. Is there enough light so that a person can walk? Is a person wearing the correct 
footwear for the task? 
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: Falls in the same level 
Includes stays and work in areas and stairs, etc.  
Barrier types Observe/investigate 
 
Understand/interpret and 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
Surface’s 
condition and 
maintenance 
Observe whether the areas and 
surfaces are in order, cleaned and 
maintained. 
Observe where there are holes, 
irregularities or other, which can 
cause falls. Including whether 
areas shall be walked on that 
involve a temporarily increased 
risk of fall. 
Observe the state of the stairs and 
whether there are many tasks 
with handling loads on stairs. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for performing maintenance 
Evaluate whether there is the 
need for new cleaning procedures 
Evaluate the need for marking out 
e.g. holes and irregularities until 
they can be repaired 
Evaluate the need for special 
measures where it will be 
temporarily walked on 
Evaluate whether handing of 
loads on stairs can be avoided  
Ensure that deficiencies are 
repaired 
Ensure that procedures for 
cleaning and maintenance are 
adhered to 
Ensure that the use of stairs is 
minimised when handling loads 
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to act 
when they walk, especially on 
stairs 
 
The surface’s 
slipperiness 
and cleaning 
Observe the surface’s 
slipperiness, including the 
presence of ice, snow, water, oil, 
grease, etc. 
Observe the level of cleanliness 
Observe whether there are 
procedures and instructions for 
actions, when situations occur 
where surfaces are slippery. 
Evaluate whether surfaces are 
more slippery than they need to 
be. 
Evaluate whether situations can 
occur where surfaces can become 
slippery. 
Evaluate whether the cleaning 
level is in order. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for special procedures, when 
situations occur where surfaces 
become slippery 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Inform employees about how 
they shall behave.  
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to 
behave when situations occur 
with slippery surfaces or a lack of 
cleanliness.  
Correct the level of cleanliness 
and implement procedures for 
clearing e.g. snow and ice, spills 
on floors, etc. 
Presence of 
obstacles 
Observe areas where employees 
walk. 
Observe what obstacles for 
activities do not need to be there. 
Observe behaviour, which creates 
obstacles for the activities of 
others. 
 
Evaluate whether the areas 
walked in can be changed, 
adapted so that it eases the 
general activities.  
Evaluate the need for procedures 
that ensure obstacles are not 
created for general activities. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Ensure there is a procedure to 
avoid obstacles for activities. 
Instruct in avoiding obstacles for 
activities 
Motivate employees to comply 
with procedures.  
User stability Observe employees’ state of 
health 
Observe behaviour and actions 
during activities, not least when 
handling loads. 
Observe whether there is 
sufficient lighting to see where 
one walks. 
Evaluate whether correct 
footwear is used 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
changing the division of tasks 
and the tasks organisation. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for instruction 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for better lighting 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for special footwear 
Ensure that employees who have 
health problems are assigned 
tasks that take this into regard. 
Inform and instruct employees 
about how you expect them to go 
about and otherwise perform the 
work. 
Inform about how the lighting 
shall be adapted and possibly 
about the use of correct footwear. 
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: Falls in the same level 
Includes stays and work of all forms on areas and stairs, etc.  
Barrier types Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
Surface’s 
condition and 
maintenance 
Observe whether the areas and 
surfaces are in order, cleaned and 
maintained. 
Observe where there are holes, 
unevenness or other that can 
cause falls. 
Observe the areas where you will 
walk, also including areas that 
temporarily involve an increased 
risk of falls. 
Observe the state of the stairs and 
whether you will handle loads 
when walking on the stairs.  
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for maintenance. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for cleaning. 
Evaluate the need for marking out 
e.g. holes and irregularities until 
they can be repaired 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for special measures, where you 
will walk temporarily. 
Evaluate whether handing of 
loads on stairs can be avoided 
Inform your employer of faults. 
Rectify those faults you can 
yourself.  
Keep the area where you work 
clean. 
Ensure that you minimise the use 
of stairs when handling loads. 
 
The surface’s 
slipperiness 
and cleaning 
Observe the surface’s 
slipperiness, including the 
presence of ice, snow, water, oil, 
grease, etc. 
Observe the level of cleanliness 
Observe whether there are 
procedures and instructions for 
situations where surfaces are or 
can become slippery. 
Evaluate whether the surface is 
slippery.  
 Evaluate whether sudden 
situations can occur where 
surfaces can become slippery. 
Evaluate whether the cleaning 
level is in order. 
Evaluate whether there are others 
who can take care of the problem 
or whether you need to take care 
of it yourself. 
Inform your employer of faults. 
Rectify those faults you can 
yourself.  
Ensure you keep the area where 
you are working clean, remove 
ice, snow, water, spills. 
 
 
Presence of 
obstacles 
Observe areas where you walk. 
Observe which obstacles for 
walking that do not need to be 
there. 
Observe behaviour, which creates 
obstacles for the activities of 
others. 
Evaluate whether the areas 
walked in can be changed, 
adapted so that it eases the 
general activities.  
Evaluate whether there are others 
who can take care of the problem 
or whether you need to take care 
of it yourself. 
Inform your employer of faults. 
Rectify those faults you can 
yourself.  
Ensure you keep order and 
remove obstacles where you walk. 
User stability Observe your state of health 
Observe your own behaviour and 
actions during activities, not least 
when handling loads. 
Observe whether there is 
sufficient lighting, so you can see 
where you are walking. 
Observe whether you are using 
the correct footwear. 
 
 
Evaluate whether you are fit for 
the task. 
Evaluate whether you need an aid 
e.g. for handling loads. 
Evaluate whether you have 
enough light to see where you are 
walking.  
Evaluate whether you need to use 
other footwear.  
Inform your employer if you 
cannot manage the task. 
Retrieve those aids that are 
appropriate to the task. 
Rectify those faults you can 
yourself.  
Exercise safe behaviour where 
you walk. 
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A 3 INFO CARD for Struck by objects, which can fall down 
In the WORM project, risk types that are associated with this risk factor are described through 5 different 
types of situations, where the risk for falls occurs. This includes the risk for being struck by falling objects 
from:  
 
1. Crane or lift 
2. Other mechanical lifting situations 
3. Means of transport of conveyor belt 
4. Manual lifting 
5. Storage of objects at heights 
 
The 5 risk types have in common that they lift, handle or store objects, materials, etc. in a manner that 
involves the risk that these objects or materials can fall down and strike those who may be under them.  
That is to say, that it is about a combination of something falling down, at the same time as someone can 
be below where it may fall down.  
 
In WORM analyses these risk types fundamentally contain 5 generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
1. The equipment’s placement and basis 
2. Lifting method and storage method 
3. Influence from external forces 
4. Delimitation of the danger zone 
5. The user’s abilities and behaviour 
 
The equipment’s placement and basis is about whether the equipment is correct for the task with respect 
to capacity and carrying capacity, whether it is in a well-maintained state, whether it is complete in its 
construction and adheres to the applicable rules for design and function.   It is also about the equipment’s 
foundation, e.g. whether the crane or lifting equipment is supported correctly, if the storage shelves are 
supported appropriately.  
 
Lifting method and storage methods are about the choice of lifting equipment and lifting methods, 
including the choice of manner of fastening, stability of the loads that are lifted, lifting speed, overload, 
etc., and about the choice of storage methods and stacking methods.  
 
Influence from external forces is about the potential for external conditions can create instability of either 
the lifting equipment, storage equipment or of the loads that are lifted. It can, for example, be when driving 
or in heavy winds. 
 
Delimitation of the danger zone is about access to the areas, where falling objects, materials can occur.  
This concerns, among others, all areas within which lifting over 2 metres high occurs, but it also applies e.g. 
to areas, where work occurs on a level at heights.  
 
The user’s ability and behaviour is about the ability to operate the equipment, the respect for the risk and 
danger zones, the use of safety helmet where it is required, the ability to handle loads manually and 
attention to the use of aids.  
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: Struck by objects that can fall down 
Includes all areas where lifting occurs using cranes, lifts and other mechanical lifting situations, lift with 
means of transport and conveyor belts, as well as with manual lifts and storage of objects at heights 
Barrier types Observe/investigate 
 
Understand/interpret and 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
The 
equipment’s 
placement 
and basis 
Investigate whether the 
equipment’s capacity and carrying 
ability is in order in relation to the 
task. 
Observe whether the equipment 
is complete, is quality assured and 
in a good maintained state. 
Observe whether the equipment 
has the correct foundation 
Evaluate the task’s possibilities for 
loading equipment.  
Evaluate the need for 
maintenance measures.  
Evaluate the need for special 
instructions. 
Evaluate the need for 
improvements for foundations, 
support.  
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Ensure that procedures for 
cleaning and maintenance are 
adhered to. 
Ensure that load requirements, 
set-up requirements, foundation 
requirements are adhered to. 
 
Lifting 
method and 
storage 
method 
Investigate which lifting method is 
best suited to the task, including 
the manner of fastening. 
Investigate which storage 
methods are best suited for 
storage and stacking of concrete 
objects, when it occurs at heights.  
Evaluate the variation of lift, 
loads, tasks, which shall be 
handled with the equipment that 
is chosen. 
Evaluate the variation of needs for 
goods to be stacked and their 
stability. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Ensure that procedures for lifting, 
loads, methods, stacking, etc. are 
adhered to. 
 
Influence 
from external 
forces 
Observe the possibility of external 
influences, e.g. collision.  
Observe weather conditions, 
especially in heavy winds. 
Observe whether there are other 
conditions and collision 
opportunities associated with 
concrete lifting tasks. 
Evaluate which safety provisions 
are necessary to set into work. 
Evaluate whether the task shall be 
put on hold temporarily.  
Evaluate the need for co-
ordination with other tasks that 
can collide. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified or necessary safety 
measures are carried out. 
Ensure that procedures in heavy 
winds are adhered to. 
Carry out co-ordinated 
agreements, where necessary.  
 
Delimitation 
of the danger 
zone 
Observe whether there is clear 
delimitation of danger zones with 
all lifting above 2 metres. 
Observe whether this delimitation 
is respected. 
Observe whether there are other 
tasks performed within the 
danger zone. 
 
Evaluate which safety provisions 
are necessary to set into work. 
Evaluate the need for co-
ordination with other tasks and 
people’s activities within the 
danger zone.  
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified or necessary safety 
measures are carried out. 
Carry out co-ordinated 
agreements, where necessary.  
 
The user’s 
abilities and 
behaviour 
Observe employee competence 
for the task and in usage of the 
equipment. 
Observe whether safety 
equipment is used (helmet). 
Observe whether manual lifting 
occurs, where an aid could be 
used. 
Evaluate the concrete task’s 
requirements for competence and 
experience.  
Evaluate the need for instruction 
on the use of safety equipment 
and the use of aids.  
Ensure that the correct 
competencies are in place.  
Implement guidelines for the use 
of safety equipment and aids.  
Motivate and instruct employees 
in how tasks are carried out and 
how you want them to behave. 
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: Struck by objects that can fall down  
Includes all areas where lifting occurs using cranes, lifts and other mechanical lifting situations, lift with 
means of transport and conveyor belts, as well as with manual lifts and storage of objects at heights 
Barrier types Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
The 
equipment’s 
placement 
and basis 
Investigate whether the 
equipment’s capacity and 
carrying ability is in order in 
relation to the task. 
Observe whether the equipment 
is complete, is quality assured 
and in a good maintained state. 
Observe whether the equipment 
has the correct foundation 
Evaluate the task’s possibilities for 
loading equipment.  
Evaluate the need for maintenance 
measures.  
Evaluate the use of special 
instructions 
Evaluate the need for 
improvements for foundations, 
support.  
Ensure that deficiencies are 
reported to the employer and 
rectify what you can yourself. 
Ensure that procedures for cleaning 
and maintenance are adhered to 
Ensure that load requirements, set-
up requirements, foundation 
requirements are adhered to. 
Lifting 
method and 
storage 
method 
Investigate which lifting method 
is best suited to the task, 
including the manner of 
fastening. 
Investigate whether the chosen 
storage methods are suited to 
the concrete object. 
Evaluate whether the lift can be 
done with the equipment that is 
available, including the load’s 
weight, shape, strength, lifting 
height, span, etc. 
Evaluate whether storage and 
stacking of objects is appropriate 
and stable. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
reported to the employer and 
rectify what you can yourself. 
Ensure that procedures for lifting, 
loads, methods, stacking, etc. are 
adhered to. 
 
Influence 
from external 
forces 
Observe the possibility of 
external influences, e.g. collision.  
Observe weather conditions, 
especially in heavy winds. 
Observe whether there are other 
conditions and collision 
opportunities associated with 
concrete lifting tasks. 
Evaluate whether necessary safety 
measures are in place before you 
begin a lift.  
Evaluate whether the task shall be 
stopped temporarily until the 
conditions are in order. 
Evaluate the need for co-ordination 
with other tasks that can collide. 
Ensure that safety related 
deficiencies and problems are 
reported to the employer and 
rectify what you can yourself. 
Ensure that procedures in heavy 
winds are adhered to. 
Carry out co-ordinated agreements, 
where necessary.  
Delimitation 
of the danger 
zone 
Observe whether there is clear 
delimitation of danger zones 
with all lifts above 2 metres. 
Observe whether this 
delimitation is respected. 
Observe whether there are other 
tasks performed within the 
danger zone. 
 
Evaluate whether necessary safety 
measures are in place before you 
begin a lift. 
Evaluate whether the task shall be 
stopped temporarily until the 
conditions are in order. 
Evaluate the need for co-ordination 
with other tasks and people’s 
activities within the danger zone.  
Ensure that safety related 
deficiencies are reported to the 
employer and rectify what you can 
yourself. 
Carry out co-ordinated agreements, 
where necessary.  
Ensure that procedures are 
adhered to and agreements about 
activities and stays in the danger 
zone.  
The user’s 
abilities and 
behaviour 
Investigate which competencies 
the use of equipment requires. 
Investigate the requirement 
about the use of safety 
equipment. 
Investigate the possibilities for 
the use of aids in tasks that 
require manual lifting. 
Evaluate whether you possess the 
necessary competencies and 
experience.  
Evaluate your need for instruction 
and the procurement of aids. 
Ensure that you receive the correct 
competencies and do not take on 
tasks where you lack these. 
Use the prescribed safety 
equipment. 
Use the aids that are available or 
that can be procured.  
Follow the assigned procedures 
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A 4 INFO CARD for Struck by flying object 
 
In the WORM project, risk types that are associated with this risk factor are described through 2 different 
types of situations. This includes the risk for being struck by falling objects from:  
 
1. Machines and hand tools 
2. Products subjected to pressure or stress 
3. Subjection to strong wind 
 
Common to the 3 risk types is that they contain an influence of materials, objects, tools, etc., which has the 
consequence that either all or parts of what is machined can be flung out into an area where people are.  
Different technical machining forms, in addition to pressure or stress, are included in such influences. 
 
In WORM analyses these 3 risk types fundamentally contain 5 generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
 
1. Material’s or product’s state and attachment 
2. The tool’s or machine’s state and function 
3. Technical safety equipment 
4. Delimitation of the danger zone 
5. The user’s abilities and behaviour 
 
The material’s and product’s state and attachment is about whether there is a fault in the product and its 
strength, or if the product is not attached correctly or is subjected to an unsuitable pressure/stress, also if 
the product is handled appropriately, and whether it has become stuck in the equipment and thereby 
placed under pressure that was not intended, or if it is subjected to strong wind 
 
The tool’s or machine’s state and function is about whether the correct equipment is used, whether the 
equipment is used for beyond what it is constructed for, whether the equipment is defective or functions 
incorrectly. This applies both to the equipment as a whole, as well as for individual parts. 
 
Technical safety equipment is about the safeguarding of equipment that exerts pressure or stress, of 
safeguarding equipment that is not in use, of protection, which ensures that flying parts are captured 
where one knows they can occur, including emergency stop with error function or securing objects that can 
be subjected to strong winds.   
 
Delimitation of danger zones is about access to areas where one knows that there are flying materials, 
which can be purely technical obstacles in access to safety zones, as procedures for who and where one 
may walk.  
 
The user’s behaviour and abilities is about ability and competence to operate equipment and handle 
products, but it is also about the respect for danger zones, and about the use of safety equipment, e.g. for 
eye protection, where it is necessary.   
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: Being struck by flying objects 
It includes areas, where there is a risk of being struck by flying objects from either machines or hand tools, 
from products subjected to pressure or stress or from objects in heavy winds 
Barrier types Observe/investigate 
 
Understand/interpret and 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
Material’s or 
product’s 
state and 
attachment 
 
Investigate the product’s quality, 
state, strength and design. 
Investigate whether the products 
can be fastened incorrectly, 
become stuck or become 
subjected to incorrect 
pressure/stress. 
Investigate fastening in relation to 
subjection for heavy wind. 
Evaluate whether action shall be 
taken toward products of poor 
quality.  
Evaluate whether technological 
changes shall occur to equipment 
or methods. 
Evaluate the need for procedures 
for handling risk situations, 
including heavy wind. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. Ensure that the quality 
of the products increases, and 
that a sorting out occurs before 
processing.  
Carry out the necessary 
technological changes. 
Establish the necessary 
procedures. 
The tool’s or 
machine’s 
state and 
function 
 
Investigate whether the tools and 
machine capacity and 
performance are in order in 
relation to the task. 
Observe tool and machine 
maintenance and cleaning 
Observe whether there are 
individual parts in tools or 
machines that need to be 
replaced or maintained 
Evaluate the task’s possibilities for 
overloading tools or machines. 
Evaluate the need for 
maintenance measures.  
Evaluate the need for special 
instructions. 
 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Ensure that procedures for 
cleaning and maintenance are 
adhered to 
Ensure that load requirements, 
usage requirements are adhered 
to. 
 
Technical 
safety 
equipment 
Observe whether the necessary 
safety equipment is in place, in 
order and in use, including fencing 
that can capture flying parts and 
emergency stop, which can stop 
tools and machines in the event of 
an error or when subjected to 
heavy winds. 
Evaluate the need for additional 
technical safety equipment. 
Evaluate the need for 
maintenance of safety equipment. 
Evaluate the need for instruction 
in the use of safety equipment. 
Ensure that defects are rectified 
or new equipment purchased/ 
developed.  
Ensure that procedures for 
cleaning and maintenance are 
adhered to 
Ensure that usage requirements 
are adhered to. 
Delimitation 
of danger 
zones 
 
Observe whether there is a clear 
delimitation of danger zones, 
where one knows that materials 
can fly out and that they are 
respected. 
Observe whether tasks are 
performed within the danger 
zone, which safety is not created 
for. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for additional delimitation of 
safety zones. Evaluate the need 
for instruction in relation to 
respect for danger zones. 
Evaluate the need for tasks that 
are performed within danger 
zones and associated safety 
equipment. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified or necessary safety 
measures are carried out. 
Start the work preparations that 
ensure danger zones can be 
respected. 
 
The user’s 
abilities and 
behaviour 
Observe employee competence in 
relation to the task and in usage 
of the equipment. 
Observe whether safety 
equipment is used (eye 
protection). 
 
Evaluate the concrete task’s 
requirements for competence and 
experience.  
Evaluate the need for instruction 
on the use of safety equipment 
and the use of aids.  
Ensure that the correct 
competencies are in place.  
Ensure there are  guidelines for 
the use of safety equipment and 
aids. Motivate and instruct 
employees about how you want 
them to perform tasks. 
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: Being struck by flying objects 
It includes all areas, where there is a risk of being struck by flying objects from either machines or hand 
tools, from products subjected to pressure or stress or from objects in heavy winds 
Barrier types Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
Material’s or 
product’s 
state and 
attachment 
 
Investigate the product quality, 
state, strength and design. 
Investigate whether the products 
can be become stuck, fastened 
incorrectly or become subjected 
to incorrect pressure/stress. 
Investigate fastening in relation to 
subjection for heavy wind. 
Evaluate whether action shall be 
taken toward products of poor 
quality.  
Evaluate whether technological 
changes shall occur to equipment 
or methods. 
Evaluate the need for procedures 
for handling risk situations, 
including heavy wind. 
Ensure that safety related defects 
and problems are reported to the 
employer and rectify what you 
can yourself. 
 Ensure that bad products are 
sorted out for working on. 
 
The tool’s or 
machine’s 
state and 
function 
  
 
Check whether the tools and 
machine capacity and 
performance are in order in 
relation to the task. 
Observe tool and machine 
maintenance and cleaning 
Observe whether there are 
individual parts in tools or 
machines that need to be 
replaced or maintained 
Evaluate the task’s possibilities for 
overloading tools or machines. 
Evaluate the need for 
maintenance measures.  
Evaluate the need for special 
instructions. 
 
Report safety related defects and 
problems to the employer and 
rectify what you can yourself. 
Adhere to procedures for cleaning 
and maintenance.  
Replace machine parts and tool 
parts when they are worn out. 
Observe requirements for loads 
and usage. 
Technical 
safety 
equipment 
Observe whether the necessary 
safety equipment is in place, in 
order and in use, including 
screening that can capture flying 
parts and emergency stop, which 
can stop tools and machines in 
the event of an error or when 
subjected to heavy winds. 
Evaluate the need for additional 
technical safety equipment. 
Evaluate the need for 
maintenance of safety equipment. 
 
Report safety related defects and 
problems to the employer and 
rectify what you can yourself. 
Adhere to procedures for cleaning 
and maintenance.  
Ensure that usage requirements 
are adhered to. 
Delimitation 
of danger 
zones 
 
Observe whether there is a clear 
delimitation of danger zones, 
where one knows that materials 
can fly out and whether they are 
respected. Observe whether tasks 
are performed within the danger 
zone, which there has not been 
safety created for. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for additional delimitation of 
safety zones and your behaviour 
in relation to danger zones. 
Evaluate the tasks you shall 
perform within danger zones and 
the special safety-related 
measures it requires. 
Ensure that safety related defects 
and problems are reported to the 
employer and rectify what you 
can yourself. Respect danger 
zones. 
Take the necessary safety-related 
measures. 
The user’s 
abilities and 
behaviour 
Investigate which competencies 
the use of equipment requires. 
Investigate the requirement about 
the use of safety equipment. 
Investigate requirements for 
special safety-related behaviour. 
Evaluate whether you possess the 
necessary competencies and 
experience.  
Evaluate your need for instruction 
and the procurement of aids. 
Ensure that you receive the 
correct competencies and do not 
take on tasks where you lack 
these. Use the prescribed safety 
equipment and the aids that are 
available or that can be procured. 
Read the usage instructions and 
follow the assigned procedures. 
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A 5 INFO CARD for Struck by, colliding with or bumping into objects  
In the WORM project, risk types that are associated with this risk factor are described through 7 different 
types of situations where the risk that people can be struck by, colliding with or bumping into objects 
occurs.  It includes the risk of being struck by, colliding with or bumping into in the following situations:  
 
1. Struck by means of transport 
2. Stays and activities, where objects can roll or glide into people 
3. Stays and activities in areas where others work with hand tools 
4. Stays and activities in areas where others handle objects 
5. Stays and activities near hanging and swinging objects 
6. Stays and activities where there is the risk of becoming squeezed in between objects 
7. Stays and activities that cause one to bump into objects, building parts, materials, etc. 
 
The 7 risk types have in common that they contain a movement of either people or objects or both, which 
leads to one or another form of collision or squeezing together. It is the inappropriate movement of either 
the object in the people’s surroundings or of the person himself it is about here. 
 
In WORM analyses these 7 risk types fundamentally contain 5 generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
1. Equipment’s condition and functionality 
2. Object’s position and movement 
3. Working method and execution 
4. Delimitation of the danger zone 
5. Overview and visibility 
6. Technical safety equipment 
7. The user’s abilities and behaviour 
 
The equipment’s condition and functionality are about, partly whether it is in order, maintained and 
cleaned, partly whether it has the correct physical protection and control instruments, which mean that it 
doesn’t come out of control and strike people, or that people do not strike themselves on it or become 
squeezed. 
 
Equipment and product’s position and movement is about storage or movement in relation to people’s 
stays and activities. Here it is about avoiding collision due to either the equipment/product’s placement 
and movement or people’s placement and movement in relation to this. 
Working method and execution is about activities in relation to the surroundings they shall take place in. 
Here, it is about space for the task and the opportunities to carry out the work, without collisions occurring. 
Delimitation of danger zones is about access to areas where equipment or products have a movement that 
is either controlled mechanically/electronically or by other people. It can, for example, by transport, or 
where technical equipment moves around on objects or in another manner is in motion. 
Overview and visibility is about the possibility for the individual person to be able to see and watch what is 
happening around him, and thereby give him the possibility to act appropriately. 
Technical safety equipment is about the purely technical measures, which shall ensure that there is not 
anything that can roll, slide or in any other manner move itself unintentionally. It can be securing of 
machines, of products, of vehicles, of equipment, of building parts (doors), i.e. anything that can move itself 
in areas where people stay or walk, but where it is not the intent that it shall occur. 
User’s behaviour and abilities is about ability and competence to operate the equipment and handle the 
products, but it is also about respect for danger zones and attention to surrounding. It is also about ways, 
one goes about, where one stays and what behaviour a person exercises in relation to the surroundings a 
person is in.  
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: Struck by, colliding with or bumping into objects  
It includes all areas where there is a risk of being struck by a means of transport, rolling/sliding objects, 
other’s hand tools, other’s handling of objects, hanging/swinging objects, objects that can squeeze 
together, other due to own behaviour. 
Barrier types Observe/investigate 
 
Understand/interpret and 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
Equipment’s 
state and 
functionality 
Investigate the equipment’s 
quality, state, maintenance and 
cleaning. 
Observe whether the equipment’s 
physical safety is in order. 
Observe whether instruments, 
etc. function and are 
designed/placed appropriately. 
Evaluate whether action shall be 
taken toward equipment that is 
not in order or is lacking 
maintenance and cleaning 
Evaluate whether the physical 
safety or equipment itself can be 
improved. 
 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Ensure that the quality of the 
equipment is increased.  
Carry out the necessary 
technological changes. 
Establish the necessary 
procedures. 
Object’s 
position and 
movement 
Observe the equipment’s and 
product’s placement and 
movement in relation to people’s 
stays and activities. 
Evaluate whether the object shall 
be placed in another location. 
Evaluate whether people shall 
stay or be moved to other 
locations. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. Redo layouts, 
procedures, work arrangements 
so placements and movements or 
equipment/ products and people 
do not give rise to collision 
Working 
methods and 
execution 
Observe work arrangements of 
tasks in relation to where they 
shall occur.  
Observe whether there is 
appropriate space to perform the 
work in. 
Evaluate the room and conditions 
under which different tasks are 
performed in relation to the risk 
of bumping into, colliding with, 
etc. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Re-do layouts, procedures, work 
arrangements so placements and 
movements or equipment/ 
products and people do not give 
rise to collision 
Delimitation 
of the danger 
zone 
Observe the possibilities for 
collision between moving 
equipment/products and people 
and whether danger zones are 
identified and clearly marked. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for additional marking of danger 
zones. Evaluate whether the 
danger zones are respected and 
whether there is a need for 
special instruction. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified 
Start the work in a way that 
ensures danger zones can be 
respected. 
Overview and 
visibility 
Observe whether opportunities 
are created for an overview and 
visibility of moving parts, etc. for 
the people that are walking. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for another layout of areas where 
people are and walk to ensure an 
appropriate overview and 
visibility in relation to smash-ups, 
collisions, etc.   
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Implement the changes that shall 
ensure that employees have an 
overview and can see what 
happens. 
Technical 
safety 
equipment 
Observe whether the technical 
equipment is installed that shall 
ensure that equipment and 
products do not come in an 
inappropriate movement. 
Evaluate the justification and 
need for increasing the technical 
safety. Evaluate the need for 
procedures in the use of technical 
safety equipment. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Commence development/ 
purchasing of lacking technical 
safety equipment. 
The user’s 
abilities and 
behaviour 
Observe employee competencies 
and motivation to stay or move in 
a safe manner in the surroundings 
that are made available. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for stepping in over inappropriate 
behaviour. 
Evaluate the need for special 
instruction and motivation. 
Make it clear to employees what 
safety-related behaviour you 
expect of them. 
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: Struck by, colliding with or bumping into objects  
It includes all areas where there is a risk of being struck by a means of transport, rolling/sliding objects, 
other’s hand tools, other’s handling of objects, hanging/swinging objects, objects that can squeeze 
together, other due to own behaviour. 
Barrier types Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
Equipment’s 
state and 
functionality 
Examine the equipment’s quality, 
state, maintenance and cleaning. 
Observe whether the equip-
ment’s physical safety is in order. 
Observe whether instruments, 
etc. function and are 
designed/placed appropriately. 
Evaluate whether action shall be 
taken toward equipment that is 
not in order or is lacking 
maintenance and cleaning 
Evaluate whether the physical 
safety can be increased. 
 
Report safety related defects and 
problems to the employer and 
rectify what you can yourself. 
Object’s 
position and 
movement 
Observe the equipment and 
product placement and 
movement in relation to your 
activities. 
Evaluate whether the object shall 
be placed in another location. 
Evaluate whether you shall stay 
or be moved to other locations. 
Report safety related defects and 
problems to the employer and 
rectify what you can yourself. 
Working 
methods and 
execution 
Observe the work’s organisation 
in relation to the surroundings. 
Observe whether there is space 
to perform the work in. 
Evaluate the space and condi-
tions under which your task is 
performed in relation to the risk 
of bumping into or colliding with,  
Report safety related defects and 
problems to the employer and 
rectify what you can yourself. 
Delimitation of 
the danger zone 
Observe whether it is possible 
that you can collide between 
moving 
equipment/products/other tools 
Observe whether there are 
danger zones that are not 
identified and clearly marked 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for additional marking of safety 
zones. Evaluate your behaviour in 
relation to safety zones.  
Evaluate your stay and move-
ments within the safety zone and 
the safety consideration it 
requires 
Ensure that safety related defects 
and problems are reported to the 
employer and rectify what you 
can yourself. 
Overview and 
visibility 
Observe whether you have an 
overview and visibility over the 
surroundings you are in or walk 
in and whether you know what 
happens and where 
Evaluate if you can see and 
monitor what happens around 
you and whether it requires 
particular attention from your 
side. Evaluate whether you can 
improve your overview and 
visibility 
Ensure that safety related defects 
and problems are reported to the 
employer and rectify what you 
can yourself. 
Technical safety 
equipment 
Observe whether the technical 
equipment is installed that shall 
ensure that equipment and 
products do not come in an 
inappropriate movement. 
Evaluate whether the technical 
equipment is proper and the 
need for increasing the technical 
safety. Evaluate the need for 
instruction in the use of technical 
safety equipment. 
Report safety related defects and 
problems to the employer and 
rectify what you can yourself. 
The user’s 
abilities and 
behaviour 
Investigate what competencies 
are required for being and 
walking in the area. Investigate 
requirements for special safety-
related behaviour. 
Evaluate whether you possess 
the necessary competencies and 
experience. Evaluate your need 
for instruction and the 
procurement of aids. 
Ensure that you receive the 
correct competencies and do not 
take on tasks where you lack 
these. Use the prescribed safety 
equipment and the aids that are 
available or that can be procured. 
Follow the assigned procedures 
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A 6 INFO CARD for Being buried under loose material 
In the WORM project, risk types that are associated with this risk factor are described through 1 different 
type of situation. This includes the risk for being buried under loose material when one works close to piled 
up materials, which can slip out or collapse.  
 
This risk type includes all forms of piled up materials, which have the possibility to slip out or in another 
way bury the people who are nearby. This applies to bunkers of materials such as grit, sand, corn, shavings, 
plastic materials and similar materials, but also earth with excavations, waste and residual products that 
are accumulated, etc. 
 
In WORM analyses this risk type fundamentally contains 5 generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
 
1. Material’s inner stability 
2. Material’s outer protective capacity 
3. Base’s stability and capacity 
4. Storage equipment’s stability and function 
5. User’s abilities and behaviour 
 
The material’s inner stability is about e.g. the material bunker’s angle of slope, presence of artificial 
protection or “learning walls”, the presence of mixed materials, that changes occur in the bunker stability, 
when something is removed, the presence of wet materials and draining/drainage, stability in the manner 
of accumulation up, etc. 
 
The material’s outer protective capacity is about there being protection of the material bunkers or the 
accumulation against external influences such as e.g. collision, influence from the weather or similar. 
 
The base’s stability and capacity is about whether the base is strong enough, whether it can absorb 
vibrations and whether it can absorb water e.g. from rain and similar. 
 
The storage equipment’s stability and function is about e.g. the container’s potential to become overfilled 
or broken fencing that can collapse from unilateral pressure and similar. 
 
The user’s ability and behaviour is about where one stays in relation to the piled up materials and whether 
a person has the knowledge and competence to realise that situations are about to occur that create 
instability in the piled up materials.  
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: to become buried 
This includes work nearby piled up materials that can slip out or fall together with the risk for being buried 
under loose material. 
Barrier types Observe/investigate 
 
Understand/interpret and 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
Material’s 
inner stability 
 
Observe the material bunkers 
slope, mixture and moisture. 
Observe whether changes have 
occurred that have significance to 
the stability. 
 
Evaluate whether there is 
instability in the piled up 
materials, or whether there is a 
condition that could create 
instability. 
Evaluate whether there is the 
need for new procedures or 
instructions when dealing with or 
working with such materials. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Ensure that piled up materials are 
stabilised. 
Establish the necessary 
procedures. 
 
The material’s 
outer 
protective 
capacity 
 
Observe whether there has been 
or can be a collision or influence 
from other forms of external 
forces (wind and weather) that 
can influence material stability. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for new fencing, changing of 
transport and traffic roads, etc. 
Evaluate whether there is the 
need for new procedures or 
instructions when dealing with or 
working with such materials. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Ensure that there is the necessary 
protection. 
Ensure that transport roads and 
traffic are adapted for placement 
of piled up materials. 
Establish the necessary 
procedures. 
Base’s 
stability and 
capacity 
 
Observe the base’s strength, skid- 
proofness, absorption, 
absorbency, etc. in relation to the 
materials the base shall support 
or bear. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for changes of methods, including 
base for storage of materials.  
Evaluate whether there is the 
need for new procedures or 
instructions when dealing with or 
working with such materials. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Ensure that the base is adapted to 
materials and conditions. 
Establish the necessary 
procedures. 
 
Storage 
equipment’s 
stability and 
function 
 
Observe the containers, 
receptacles or fencing that shall 
contain the materials, if they are 
overfilled, if there is spill, if they 
are damaged beyond repair, if 
they can hold the quantity, etc. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for maintaining receptacles, 
containers and fences.  
Evaluate whether there is 
sufficient capacity and that 
methods for filling, collection can 
occur without spill. 
Evaluate whether there is the 
need for new procedures or 
instructions when dealing with or 
working with such materials. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Ensure that containers, 
receptacles, fences are 
maintained or replaced when they 
are damaged beyond repair.  
Establish the necessary 
procedures. 
 
The user’s 
abilities and 
behaviour 
Observe whether materials are 
stored in areas where people are 
and walk. 
Observe whether people being or 
walking near piled up materials is 
appropriate.  
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for stepping in over inappropriate 
behaviour. 
Evaluate the need for special 
instruction and motivation. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
in how you want them to act 
regarding procedures and 
requirements, and how the tasks 
shall be performed.  
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: to become buried 
This includes work nearby piled up materials that can slip out or fall together with the risk for being buried 
under loose material. 
Barrier types Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
Material’s 
inner stability 
 
Observe the material bunkers 
slope, mixture and moisture. 
Observe whether changes have 
occurred that have significance to 
the stability. 
 
Evaluate whether there is an 
instability in the piled up 
materials, or whether there is a 
condition that could create an 
instability. 
 
Report safety related defects and 
problems to the employer and 
rectify what you can yourself. 
Do not stay near piled up 
materials that are unstable. 
Follow the assigned procedures 
The material’s 
outer 
protective 
capacity 
 
Observe whether there has been 
or can be a collision or influence 
from other forms of external 
forces (wind and weather) that 
can influence material stability. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for new fencing, changing of 
transport and traffic roads, etc. 
 
Report safety related defects and 
problems to the employer and 
rectify what you can yourself. 
Do not stay near piled up 
materials that are unstable. 
Follow the assigned procedures 
Base’s 
stability and 
capacity 
 
Observe the base’s strength, skid 
proofness, absorption, 
absorbency, etc. in relation to the 
materials the base shall support 
or bear. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for changes of methods, including 
base for storage of materials.  
 
Report safety related defects and 
problems to the employer and 
rectify what you can yourself. 
Do not stay near piled up 
materials that are unstable. 
Follow the assigned procedures 
Storage 
equipment’s 
stability and 
function 
 
Observe the containers, 
receptacles or fencing  that shall 
contain the materials, if they are 
overfilled, if there is spill, if they 
are damaged beyond repair, if 
they can hold the quantity, etc.  
 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for maintaining receptacles, 
containers, fences.  
Evaluate whether there is 
sufficient capacity and that 
methods for filling, collection can 
occur without spill. 
 
Ensure that safety related defects 
and problems are reported to the 
employer and rectify what you 
can yourself. 
Do not stay near piled up 
materials that are unstable. 
Follow the assigned procedures 
The user’s 
abilities and 
behaviour 
Observe whether materials are 
stored in a manner that allows 
you to be or walk nearby in a safe 
manner  
Investigate what competencies 
are required for being and walking 
in the area.  
Investigate requirements for 
special safety-related behaviour. 
Evaluate your safety by being or 
walking near the piled up 
materials. 
Evaluate whether you possess the 
necessary competencies and 
experience.  
Evaluate your need for instruction 
and the procurement of aids. 
Do not stay near piled up 
materials that are unstable. 
Ensure that you receive the 
correct competencies and do not 
take on tasks where you lack 
these. 
Use the prescribed safety 
equipment. 
Use the aids that are available or 
that can be procured.  
Follow the assigned procedures 
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A 7 INFO CARD for Exposure to aggressiveness 
In the WORM project, risk types that are associated with this risk factor are described through 2 different 
types of situations, where people can be exposed to aggressiveness. It includes the risk of being exposed to 
one or another form of violence from 
 
1. Other people 
2. Animals 
 
The 2 risk types have in common that they contain a presence of either people or animals that have or can 
have an aggressive behaviour. In both cases it is about provocations, misunderstandings, tense situations, 
stress situations, a lack of physical distinction, the possibility to get help, self-defence, etc. But, there are 
also a number of differences where interaction with people, as a rule, is about communication and mutual 
relationships, while interaction with animals is about people’s understanding for animal behaviour. 
 
In WORM analyses these 2 risk types fundamentally contain 8 generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
 
1. Presence of aggressive people or animals 
2. Safeguarding against provocations 
3. Stressful situations 
4. Prevention of aggressiveness 
5. Physical separation 
6. Breaking contact 
7. Respect for danger zone 
8. User ability and behaviour 
 
Presence of aggressive people or animals, which without provocation are aggressive, is in the case of 
people e.g. about sick people and in the case of animals it is about dangerous animals found in the wild or 
that have escaped captivity. 
Safeguarding against provocations between people is about avoiding arguments, misunderstandings in 
communication, verbal abuse, assault or excessive teasing. In relation to animals it is about the same 
conditions, where it solely is about people’s provocation of the animal and not the reverse. 
Stressful situations is about tense surroundings or situations, sudden changes in surroundings, wrong 
surroundings or the treatment of patients, criminal provocations, work with problematic people. 
Prevention of aggressiveness is about the possibility to predict aggressive action and thus have the 
possibility to step in and change the situation so that it does not develop. 
Physical separation is about separating people from either special groups of persons that one knows can 
have aggressive behaviour, e.g. criminal, certain patient groups, persons with financial debts, etc. Physical 
separation in relation to animals is about separating dangerous animals from people or “inexperienced 
people” from animals, this includes keeping animals on e.g. leashes. 
Breaking of contact is about the possibilities for alarming and on call assistance, the possibilities for flight or 
the possibilities for self-defence. 
Respect for danger zones is primarily about the relationship between people and animals, where people 
must understand animals reactions, especially toward strangers, e.g. dogs in other people’s homes, wasps, 
horses that ride past and similar. 
User’s ability and behaviour in relation to people is about the ability to bypass other people, the ability to 
handle provocations. In relation to animals it is about the ability to work with animals, such as riding, 
tending to cows, keeping control of a dog, etc. but also whether one has experience and permission to deal 
with the relevant animal. 
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: exposure to aggressiveness 
This includes all situations where there is a risk that people can be exposed to aggressiveness and violence 
from either other people or from animals  
Barrier types Observe/investigate 
 
Understand/interpret and 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
Presence of 
aggressive 
people or 
animals 
Investigate whether employees 
can come in contact with 
aggressive people or animals. 
Evaluate who there can be talk of 
and what measures should be 
implemented. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Establish the necessary procedures. 
 
Safeguarding 
against 
provocations 
Examine the physical working 
environment and the employee's 
behaviour in relation to other 
people and toward animals. 
Evaluate where there are problems 
and who there can be talk of and 
what measures should be 
implemented. 
Implement change measures that 
can improve the physical working 
environment. 
Establish the necessary procedures. 
 
Stressful 
situations 
Investigate the physical working 
environment and what situations 
seem particularly stressful 
Evaluate where there are problems 
and what measures should be 
implemented in order to minimise 
stressful situations 
Implement measures that can 
minimise stressful situations. 
Establish the necessary procedures. 
 
Prevention of 
aggressive-
ness 
Investigate who can be subjected 
to aggressive persons or animals 
Evaluate what competencies these 
employees have use for so that 
they can anticipate and react 
Ensure that these employees 
receive the necessary competencies 
to anticipate and react toward 
potentially aggressive persons or 
animals 
Physical 
separation 
Investigate the need and 
potential for a physical 
separation between employees 
and potentially aggressive 
persons or animals, they have or 
can come into contact with.  
Evaluate the need and possibilities, 
and in what situations and 
circumstances there can be talk of 
creating a physical separation. 
Implement change measures that 
can ensure a physical separation 
between employees and potentially 
aggressive persons or animals. 
Establish the necessary procedures. 
 
Breaking 
contact 
Investigate whether there is the 
need and possibility for ensuring 
alarming, on call assistance and 
self-defence for those employees 
who can come in contact with 
potentially aggressive persons or 
animals. 
Evaluate the need and possibilities, 
and in what situations and 
circumstances there can be talk of 
using an alarm, on call assistance 
and self-defence. 
Implement change measures that 
can ensure that there is an alarm, 
help can be called for and self-
defence offered. 
Establish the necessary procedures. 
 
Respect for 
danger zone 
Investigate whether employees 
understand where the danger 
zones is in relation to strange or 
dangerous animals they can 
come in contact with.  
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for efforts toward other people’s 
securing of their animals when 
strangers (employees) come close. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for special instruction and 
procedures for employees 
behaviour. 
Implement change measures that 
can secure those places employees 
come near strange or dangerous 
animals.  
Ensure safety is created 
surrounding these animals.  
Establish the necessary procedures. 
The user’s 
abilities and 
behaviour 
Observe employee behaviour 
and ability to mix with other 
people and animals, especially 
including handling animals that 
are used in work.  
Evaluate the need for special 
education and training, as well as 
special procedures for  employee 
behaviour. 
Implement the necessary education 
and training. Establish the 
necessary procedures. Motivate 
and instruct employees about how 
you want them to behave. 
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: subjection to aggressiveness 
This includes all situations where there is a risk that people can be exposed to aggressiveness and violence 
from either other people or from animals 
Barrier types Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
Presence of 
aggressive 
people or 
animals 
Investigate whether there is a 
possibility that you can come into 
contact with aggressive people or 
animals. 
Evaluate what situations there 
can be talk of and what measures 
you should implement. 
 Inform your employer of the 
situation and take your measures. 
Safeguarding 
against 
provocations 
Observe whether provoking 
behaviour occurs in your 
surroundings, such as arguments, 
excessive teasing, assault, etc. 
Evaluate what situations there 
can be talk of and what measures 
you should implement. 
Inform your employer of the 
situation and take your measures. 
 
Stressful 
situations 
Observe the situations you feel 
are stressful for you. 
Evaluate which situations there 
can be talk of and how you can 
tackle them without becoming 
stressed. 
Inform your employer of the 
situation and take your measures. 
Learn to tackle stressful situations 
Prevention of 
aggressivenes
s 
Investigate whether you can enter 
into situations where you can be 
subjected to aggressive persons or 
animals 
Evaluate what competencies you 
have use for so that you can 
anticipate and react 
Ensure that you receive the 
necessary competencies to 
anticipate and react toward 
potentially aggressive persons or 
animals 
Physical 
separation 
Investigate the need and potential 
for a physical separation between 
yourself and potentially 
aggressive persons or animals, 
you have or can come into contact 
with.  
Evaluate the need and 
possibilities, and in what 
situations and circumstances 
there can be talk of creating a 
physical separation. 
Inform your employer of the 
situation and take your measures. 
Ensure that the physical 
separation is in place.  
Breaking 
contact 
Investigate whether you have the 
need and opportunity for 
alarming, on call help and self-
defence, when or if you come in 
contact with potentially 
aggressive persons or animals 
Evaluate where there is the need 
and possibilities, and in what 
situations and circumstances 
there can be talk of using an 
alarm, on call assistance and self-
defence. 
Inform your employer of the 
situation and take your measures. 
Ensure that you know how you 
must alarm or call for assistance. 
Learn self-defence techniques 
Respect for 
danger zone 
Observe strange or dangerous 
animals that you can come in 
contact with and respect the 
danger zone. 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for efforts toward other people’s 
securing of their animals. 
Evaluate whether you have the 
need for special instruction in 
dealings with animals. 
Inform your employer of the 
situation and take your measures. 
Ensure you know how you must 
act near the danger zone with 
strange or dangerous animals.  
The user’s 
abilities and 
behaviour 
Observe your own behaviour and 
ability to mix with other people 
and animals, especially including 
handling animals that are used in 
work.  
Evaluate your own need for 
special teaching and training and 
special procedures for what your 
behaviour should be. 
Inform your employer of the 
situation and take your measures. 
Investigate whether there are 
special instructions and guidelines 
you can keep to. 
Show respect for the people and 
animals you are around. 
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C 8 INFO CARD for Contact with moving machine parts 
In the WORM project, risk types such as these are described through 4 different situations where the risk of 
contact with machine parts occurs. These include:  
  
1. Work with machines    
2. Maintenance of machines    
3. Preparing machines   
4. Cleaning machines    
 
These 4 different risk types have different types of requirements and safety barriers, which there is 
legislation for or guidelines drafted for.  In WORM analyses these risk types fundamentally contain 5 
generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
 
1. Physical barriers  
2. Control over danger zone  
3. User ability 
4. Machine’s integrity 
5. Safety system 
 
Physical barriers is about the necessary safety equipment being in place, whether the safety equipment is 
in order and used, in addition to whether it ensure complete protection of moving parts, whether there is 
systematic stop with access to the danger zone and whether there is an emergency stop with errors. 
 
Control over the danger zone is about whether there is access to moving parts/danger zone, whether there 
is marking and signal upon access to the danger zone and whether the person respects the danger zone.  
 
User ability is about whether the operator has the ability and knowledge for safe use of the machine. Is the 
operator aware in relation to the danger zone, among others, if it is fixed or dynamic and where there is 
access to moving machine parts. It is also about space, the person’s physical condition and mental 
awareness about these relationships, and among others, questions about the risk of whether loose hanging 
hair or clothing can become stuck. 
 
Machine’s integrity is about whether the machine is CE-marked, if a risk assessment has been performed 
with changes to the machine and whether the machine’s condition i.e. is in a good state. 
 
Safety system is about whether there is a systematic stop upon access to the danger zone and whether 
there is an emergency stop in the event of error. 
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: Contact with moving machine part 
This includes work with technical aids, in addition to maintenance, making ready and cleaning. 
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Physical 
barriers 
Observe whether the safety equipment 
is in place and in order, if there is 
systematic stop upon access to the 
danger zone and whether there is 
emergency stop in the event of error 
Investigate whether the safety 
equipment is sufficient in relation to 
the task. 
Observe whether employees feedback 
when the equipment is not in order. 
Observe employee behaviour and use 
of the equipment.  
Evaluate whether the safety 
equipment is appropriate for the 
task. 
Evaluate the maintenance state. 
Evaluate the need for information to 
employees and possibly procedures 
for the work. 
Evaluate the need for special 
instruction. 
Evaluate the need for motivating 
initiatives for the employees. 
Ensure that deficiencies are rectified. 
Ensure that the correct equipment 
comes into use. 
Remove defective equipment. 
Inform employees about which 
equipment they must use  
Inform employees about what 
equipment is defective or being 
repaired. Ensure there are 
procedures for cleaning and 
maintenance. Motivate and instruct 
employees about what feedback 
they must give when they find that 
things are not in order. 
Control over 
danger zone 
Observe whether there is access to 
moving parts. 
Observe whether there is an indicator 
and signal upon access to the danger 
zone. 
Observe whether the indicator and 
signal are visible, functioning and in 
good condition. 
Observe whether employees respect 
indicators and signals. 
Evaluate whether the indicator and 
signal are visible, functioning and in 
good condition. 
Evaluate the motivation to ensure 
maintenance of the indicator and 
signal. 
Evaluate the need for special 
instruction. 
Evaluate the need for motivating 
initiatives for the employees. 
Ensure that deficiencies are repaired 
Inform employees about how they 
shall behave.  
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to behave 
when indicators and signals are 
lacking or are not in order.  
User ability Observe whether the employee has the 
ability and knowledge about safe use of 
the machine.  
Observe the employees condition in 
relation to the space. Observe the 
employee’s attention in relation to 
access to the danger zone and 
consciousness regarding the danger 
zone’s dynamics. 
Observe employee behaviour including 
about the risk for loose hanging hair or 
clothing becoming caught. 
Evaluate whether employees are OK 
Evaluate whether employees can 
handle the task 
Evaluate whether employees know 
how their behaviour should be when 
working with the machine. 
Evaluate employees’ motivation to 
exhibit safe behaviour 
Ensure instructions/agreements are 
clear 
Ensure there is a good division of 
responsibility and tasks 
Create positive motivation to safe 
behaviour 
Ensure there is a consequent 
attitude for violations 
Machine’s 
integrity 
Observe whether the machine is CE 
marked. 
Observe whether a risk assessment has 
been performed for changes to the 
machine. Observe whether the 
machine is in good order. 
Observe employees ability to protect 
the equipment.   
Evaluate employees’ ability and 
motivation to set up and use the 
equipment correctly. 
Ensure that deficiencies are repaired 
Inform employees of the correct 
working method and ensure that it is 
used. 
Instruct about the correct use of the 
machine. Motivate employees to 
comply with procedures.  
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: Contact with moving machine part 
This includes work with technical aids, in addition to maintenance, making ready and cleaning. 
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Physical 
barriers 
Observe whether the safety 
equipment is in place and in order, if 
there is systematic stop upon access 
to the danger zone and whether 
there is emergency stop in the event 
of error 
Investigate whether the safety 
equipment is sufficient in relation to 
the task in question. 
 
Evaluate whether the safety 
equipment is appropriate for the 
task. 
Evaluate the maintenance state. 
 
Ensure that deficiencies are rectified. 
Ensure that the correct equipment 
comes into use. 
Remove defective equipment. 
Inform the employer and possibly 
colleagues, if the conditions are not 
in order.  
Follow the given instructions and 
procedures.  
 
Control over 
danger zone 
Observe whether there is access to 
moving parts. 
Observe whether there is marking 
and signal upon access to the danger 
zone. 
Observe whether the indicator and 
signal are visible, functioning and in 
good condition. 
 
Evaluate whether the indicator and 
signal are visible, functioning and in 
good condition. 
 
Ensure that deficiencies are repaired 
Inform the employer and possibly 
colleagues, if the conditions are not 
in order.  
Follow the given instructions and 
procedures.  
 
 
User ability Observe whether the employee has 
the ability and knowledge about safe 
use of the machine.  
Observe the need for special 
behaviour including about the risk for 
loose hanging hair or clothing 
becoming caught. 
Evaluate your own ability to work 
safely with the machine. Evaluate 
whether you can handle the task 
Evaluate which behaviour is needed 
in the task for you and your 
colleagues’ safety 
Evaluate employees’ motivation to 
exhibit safe behaviour 
Know the necessary 
instructions/agreements. 
Ensure instructions/agreements are 
clear 
Ensure there is a good division of 
responsibility and tasks 
Ensure that any necessary aids are 
available and in order. 
Carry out the task with safe and 
professional behaviour. 
Machine’s 
integrity 
Observe whether the machine is CE 
marked. 
Observe the machine’s condition i.e. 
whether it is in good order. 
Observe the need for special 
measures for protection.  
Evaluate your ability to set up and 
use the equipment correctly. 
Ensure that deficiencies are repaired 
Inform the employer and possibly 
colleagues, if there are defects and 
what measures are necessary. 
Follow the given instructions and 
procedures. 
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C 9 INFO CARD for Loss of control over vehicle 
In the WORM project, risk types such as these are described through 2 different situations where the risk of 
loss of control over vehicle occurs. These include:  
  
1. Stops in the vehicle    
2. Work in/on the vehicle    
 
These 2 different risk types have different types of requirements and safety barriers, which there is 
legislation for or guidelines drafted for.  In WORM analyses these risk types fundamentally contain 5 
generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
 
1. People’s position  
2. Vehicles speed and stability 
3. Driver’s driving ability 
4. Vehicle’s condition  
5. Loading of the vehicle 
 
 
People’s position is about being at the right place in the vehicles or passengers getting on too early or too 
late, if persons have parts of the body outside the vehicle or are e.g. on the footboard, cargo area or other 
parts that are not suited for/intended for persons.  
 
The vehicle’s speed and stability is about safe speed, if the vehicle’s stability becomes impacted by bad 
weather, strong wind, driving (close to!) edges, about the loading platform’s strength and mounting, errors 
with stabilising weights (crane) and placing vehicles on unstable surfaces/earth conditions.  
 
The driver’s driving ability is about whether the person has a driver’s licence for the vehicle in question. It is 
about the driver’s physical condition, whether the driver’s attention and placement on the vehicle e.g. 
getting out too early and whether there is a clear view or a bad view. It is also about the roadway’s layout 
(big enough for the vehicle including manoeuvring), obstacles on the road – also: vehicle settings (fork too 
low on a forklift), state of the road surface (slippery, uneven) and signalling - Are hazards on the roadway 
marked? 
 
The vehicle’s condition and loading is about the mechanical maintenance (brakes, tyres, steering gear) and 
whether the load, load conditions, securing, balance and stacking method. 
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: Loss of control of VEHICLE 
This includes stays in the vehicle and work in/on the vehicle.  
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
People’s 
position 
 
Investigate where drivers and 
other persons are on the vehicle 
while driving, while getting on or 
off and loading/unloading. 
Observe employee behaviour on 
the vehicle. 
Evaluate where people can safely 
be on the vehicle during operation 
and loading/unloading 
Instruct the driver and employees 
about the correct position on the 
vehicle during operation, getting 
on or off and loading/unloading. 
Motivate employees to maintain a 
safe position on vehicles.  
Vehicle’s 
speed and 
stability 
 
Observe the loading platform’s 
strength and mounting 
Observe the possibility that 
external circumstances can affect 
the vehicle’s stability e.g. inclimate 
weather, strong wind, driving over 
edges, faults with stabilising 
weights (crane) and placement of 
vehicle on unstable surface/earth 
conditions. Observe employee 
behaviour in relation to safe speed. 
Evaluate the possibility for 
sideslipping, tipping. 
Evaluate the possibility that 
someone can bump into or affect 
the equipment’s balance.  
Evaluate employee ability and 
motivation to use the vehicle 
correctly 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
repaired 
Motivate and inform employees 
about how you want them to 
behave in relation to safe driving, 
and what feedback they shall give 
when they find things are not in 
order.  
 
Driver’s 
driving 
ability 
 
Observe whether drivers have a 
driving licence for the vehicle in 
question.  
Observe the driver’s physical state 
before they go out and drive.  
Observe whether the vehicle is 
suited to the selected road (large 
enough for the vehicle including 
manoeuvring, obstacles on the 
road) also: vehicle settings (fork 
too low on a forklift). 
Evaluate whether drivers are OK 
Evaluate whether drivers can 
handle the task 
Evaluate whether drivers know 
how their behaviour should be 
when using the vehicle 
Evaluate the drivers’ motivation to 
exhibit safe behaviour 
Ensure instructions/agreements 
are clear 
Ensure there is a good division of 
responsibility and tasks 
Create positive motivation to safe 
behaviour 
Ensure there is a consequent 
attitude for violations 
Vehicle’s 
condition  
 
Observe whether the vehicle is in 
order, cleaned and maintained 
(brakes, tyres, steering gear). 
Observe whether employees 
feedback when the equipment is 
not in order. 
Observe employee behaviour and 
use of the equipment.  
Observe whether the vehicle is in 
order, cleaned and maintained 
(brakes, tyres, steering gear). 
Evaluate the maintenance state. 
Evaluate the need for remedial 
measures.  
 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Inform employees about what 
vehicles are defective or being 
repaired. Inform employees about 
which vehicles they must use   
Ensure there are procedures for 
cleaning and maintenance. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
about what feedback they must 
give when they find that things are 
not in order. 
Loading of 
the vehicle 
 
Observe employee’s ability to 
secure the load, load connections, 
securing, balancing and stacking 
methods. 
Evaluate employee ability to secure 
the load.  
 
 
Inform employees about how they 
secure the load. 
Ensure there are procedures for 
stacking methods and securing.   
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: Loss of control of VEHICLE 
This includes stays in the vehicle and work in/on the vehicle. 
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
People’s 
position 
 
Investigate where persons are on 
the vehicle while driving, while 
getting on or off and 
loading/unloading. 
Evaluate where people can safely 
be on the vehicle during operation 
and loading/unloading 
Motivate and instruct passengers 
and colleagues about the right 
place to be on the vehicle so that  
passengers do not get on too early 
or too late, persons have parts of 
the body outside the vehicle or are 
e.g. on the footboard, cargo area 
or other parts that are not suited 
for/intended for persons.  
Inform the employer if there are 
problems getting colleagues to 
follow instructions.   
Vehicles 
speed and 
stability 
 
Observe the loading platform’s 
strength and mounting 
Observe the possibility that 
external circumstances can 
influence the vehicle’s stability e.g. 
inclimate weather, strong wind, 
driving over (close to!) edges, 
faults with stabilising weights 
(crane) and placement of vehicle 
on unstable surfaces/ earth 
conditions. 
Evaluate the possibility for 
sideslipping, tipping. 
Evaluate the possibility that 
someone can bump into or affect 
the equipment’s balance.  
 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
repaired 
Inform the employer and possibly 
colleagues, if there are defects and 
what measures are necessary. 
 
Driver’s 
driving 
ability 
 
Investigate whether your driver’s 
licence applies to the vehicle in 
question.  
Observe your state of health 
before you drive. 
Observe whether the vehicle is 
suited to the selected road (large 
enough for the vehicle including 
manoeuvring, obstacles on the 
road) also: vehicle settings (fork 
too low on a forklift). 
Evaluate whether you are OK 
Evaluate which behaviour is 
needed in the task for you and 
your colleagues’ safety 
. 
 
Know the necessary 
instructions/agreements. 
Know who has the responsibility 
and tasks. 
Carry out the task with safe and 
professional behaviour. 
Vehicle’s 
condition  
 
Observe whether the vehicle is in 
order, cleaned and maintained 
(brakes, tyres, steering gear). 
 
Observe whether the vehicle is in 
order, cleaned and maintained 
(brakes, tyres, steering gear). 
Evaluate the maintenance state. 
Evaluate the need for remedial 
measures.  
 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Inform the employer and possibly 
colleagues, if the conditions are 
not in order.  
Follow the given instructions and 
procedures. 
Loading of 
the vehicle 
 
Observe the load, load 
connections, securing and balance 
and stacking method. 
Evaluate employee ability to secure 
the load.  
Follow procedures for stacking 
methods and securing.  
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C 10 INFO CARD for Contact with electricity 
In the WORM project, risk types such as these are described through 2 different situations where the risk of 
contact with electricity occurs. These include:  
  
1. Work with electricity 
2. Work with technical aids  
 
These 2 different risk types have different types of requirements and safety barriers, which there is 
legislation for or guidelines drafted for.  In WORM analyses these risk types fundamentally contain 4 
generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
 
1. Protection against live parts/electric arcs/ nearness to non-insulated active parts 
2. Protection against electricity in earth 
3. Safeguarding against access 
4. Procedure if affected by electricity  
 
Protection against live parts/electric arcs/nearness to non-insulated active parts is about whether the live 
parts are sufficiently protected e.g. about installation of double insulating tools and the use of low voltage 
equipment based upon needs and legislation. Or whether the live parts are not protected, but should be, 
whether they are protected but insufficiently or if the protection has been wilfully removed. It is about 
whether it is protected against proximity of unisolated parts, or if one is intentionally too close, whether 
installation is carried out under voltage and whether there is space for manoeuvring. Finally, whether there 
is protection against burns when working with an electric arc. 
 
Protection against electricity in earth is about the necessary personal protective devices being used, such as 
rubber footwear as double insulation. 
 
Safeguarding against access is about, access protection being respected, that there are procedures for 
securing against unauthorised access and that ignoring of access protection does not occur. 
     
Procedure if affected by electricity is about, knowledge about whether others have experience if one 
receive an electric shock, and own experience with regard to help if others get an electric shock. 
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: for contact with ELECTRICITY 
This includes work with/near high-voltage lines, with electricity and with technical aids. 
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Protection 
against live 
parts/electric 
arcs/ nearness 
to non-
insulated 
active parts 
 
Observe whether double 
insulation is installed on tools and 
whether low-voltage equipment is 
used based upon needs and 
legislation.  
Observe whether the live parts are 
sufficiently protected  
Evaluate whether the protection is 
in order. 
Observe whether the live parts are 
visible, whether there are signals 
about voltage on the line/high-
voltage  
Observe whether there is space 
for manoeuvring.  
Observe whether there is 
protection against burns when 
working with an electric arc. 
Observe whether double 
insulation is installed on tools and 
whether low-voltage equipment is 
used based upon needs and 
legislation.  
Evaluate whether the live parts 
are sufficiently protected e.g. 
whether they are not but should 
be, whether they are protected 
but insufficiently or if the 
protection has been wilfully 
removed.  
Evaluate the need for special 
instruction. 
Evaluate whether there is 
sufficient protection against burns 
when working with an electric arc. 
 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
repaired 
Inform employees about how they 
shall behave.   
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to 
behave when protection is lacking 
or is not in order.  
Protection 
against 
electricity in 
earth 
 
Investigate whether the necessary 
personal protective devices are 
used such as rubber footwear as 
double insulation. 
 
Evaluate the motivation to use 
personal protective devices such 
as rubber footwear and double 
insulation. 
 
Ensure there are personal 
protective devices available. 
Instruct employees in the use of 
personal protective devices. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to 
behave when protection is lacking 
or is not in order.  
Safeguarding 
against access 
 
Investigate whether safeguarding 
against access is sufficient and in 
order. 
Investigate whether safeguards 
against access are respected. 
Investigate whether there are 
procedures against unauthorised 
access. 
Evaluate whether safeguards 
against access are respected or if 
there is conscious ignoring of 
safeguards against access. 
Evaluate whether there should be 
procedures for unauthorised 
access. 
Ensure that you intervene if 
safeguards against access are not 
respected. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how they shall behave if 
safeguards against access are not 
respected. 
Procedure if 
affected by 
electricity  
Investigate whether there are 
procedures/emergency plan in the 
event of electrical influence. 
Investigate whether employees 
are trained in first aid for electric 
shock. 
Evaluate whether the procedure 
for electrical influence is in order. 
Evaluate employee training in first 
aid. 
 
Instruct employees in the 
procedure. 
Ensure that employees are trained 
in the procedure with regular 
exercises. 
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: for contact with ELECTRICITY 
This includes work with/near high-voltage lines, with electricity and with technical aids. 
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Protection 
against live 
parts/electri
c arcs/ 
nearness to 
non-
insulated 
active parts 
 
Observe whether double insulation 
is installed on tools and whether 
low-voltage equipment is used 
based upon needs and legislation.  
Observe whether the live parts are 
sufficiently protected  
Observe whether there is space for 
manoeuvring.  
 
Evaluate whether double insulation 
is installed on tools and whether 
low-voltage equipment is used 
based upon needs and legislation.  
Evaluate whether the live parts are 
sufficiently protected 
Evaluate whether there is voltage 
on the line.  
Evaluate whether there is space for 
manoeuvring.  
 
Inform management about faults 
and deficiencies. 
Do not perform work if the live 
parts are not sufficiently protected. 
 
Protection 
against 
electricity in 
earth 
 
Investigate whether the necessary 
personal protective devices such as 
rubber footwear as double 
insulation are available. 
 
Evaluate whether the personal 
protective devices are sufficient 
and whether they are in order. 
 
Inform management about faults 
and deficiencies. 
Do not perform the work if the 
necessary personal protective 
devices are not available. 
Safeguardin
g against 
access 
 
Investigate whether safeguarding 
against access is sufficient and in 
order. 
Investigate whether there are 
procedures for unauthorised 
access. 
Evaluate whether unauthorised 
persons respect access safeguards 
or if they are consciously ignored. 
 
Inform management if access 
safeguards are not respected. 
Motivate and instruct unauthorised 
persons to respect the access 
safeguards and intervene if they 
are not respected, 
. 
Procedure if 
affected by 
electricity  
Investigate whether there are 
procedures/emergency plan in the 
event of electrical influence. 
Investigate whether your 
colleagues are trained in first aid 
for electric shock. 
Evaluate whether the 
procedure/emergency plan for 
electrical influence is in order. 
Evaluate your own and your 
colleagues’ experience and training 
in first aid for electric shock. 
 
Participate in first aid courses. 
Participate in exercises in 
emergency plan. 
Help colleagues in the case of an 
accident. 
Follow the emergency plan. 
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C 11 INFO CARD for Burning from heat/cold 
 
In the WORM project, risk types such as these are described through 3 different situations where the risk of 
contact with hazardous chemicals occurs. These include:  
  
1. Work at/with cold surfaces 
2. Work at/with warm surfaces 
3. Work at/with naked fire 
 
These 3 different risk types have different types of requirements and safety barriers, which there is 
legislation for or guidelines drafted for.  In WORM analyses these risk types fundamentally contain 6 
generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
 
1. Access protection,  
2. Personal protective devices and other protection  
3. Temperature control 
4. Equipment’s state and insulation 
5. Object’s placement 
6. Placement of parts of the body 
 
Access protection is about physical barriers and signals, which warn about risk. 
 
Personal protective devices and other protection is about the use of gloves, masks, fire proof clothing. 
 
Temperature control is about monitoring/control of surroundings, the weather and air temperature, and 
temperature control of technical aids. 
  
The equipment’s condition and insulation is about the machine’s condition, which can lead to overheating 
and process state, which can lead to overheating and heat insulation of warm/cold surfaces in relation to 
this.  
 
Object’s placement is about incorrect placement of warm/cold items, incorrect time for heating/cooling of 
items, movement of warm parts, items, ash, etc.  
 
Placement of body parts is about grip in warm/cold items, lace of knowledge about warm/cold items and 
the intervention against warm/cold items to counteract other risk. 
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: for burning  
This includes with by/with warm/cold surfaces or naked flame  
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Access 
protection  
Investigate whether the physical 
barriers are sufficient. 
Investigate whether there are 
signals, which warn of risk in a 
sufficient scope. Investigate 
whether employees respect 
barriers and signals. 
Evaluate whether the physical 
barriers and signals are maintained 
and in order. 
Evaluate employee behaviour. 
Ensure that the physical barriers 
and signals are cleaned, 
maintained and in order. 
Instruct employees.  
 
Personal 
protective 
devices and 
other 
protection  
Investigate whether there are the 
necessary personal protective 
devices and special working clothes 
available. Investigate whether they 
are CE marked, effective in relation 
to the task and whether they are 
cleaned and in order.  Investigate 
whether employees use the 
personal protective devices. 
Evaluate the personal protective 
devices such as gloves, masks and 
fireproof clothing, among others, 
regarding quality and suitability. 
Evaluate procedures for the use of 
personal protective devices. 
Evaluate employee behaviour. 
 
 Ensure that the necessary personal 
protective devices and the special 
work clothes are available and in 
order. 
Ensure cleaning, maintenance and 
regular replacement of the same. 
Ensure there are procedures for 
use. 
 
Temperatur
e control 
Investigate whether there is 
sufficient monitoring/control of 
temperatures in surroundings, 
weather and air, and technical aids. 
Investigate whether 
monitoring/control is sufficient and 
works and whether it is maintained 
and calibrated. 
Investigate employee behaviour. 
Investigate whether there is 
sufficient monitoring/control of 
temperatures in surroundings and 
in technical aids. 
Evaluate whether 
monitoring/control is sufficient and 
works.  
Evaluate employee behaviour in 
relation to temperature control.  
Ensure there is sufficient 
monitoring/control of 
temperatures. 
Ensure there is even calibration, 
cleaning, repairs and maintenance. 
Ensure there are procedures for 
action. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to 
behave if the temperature control 
is lacking or is not in order.  
Equipment’s 
state and 
insulation 
Investigate machines and 
processes potential for 
overheating.  
Investigate whether they are 
protected against overheating 
and/or whether the surface’s 
insulation is sufficient. 
Evaluate whether it is sufficiently 
protected against overheating 
and/or whether the surface’s 
insulation is sufficient to protect 
against subjection. 
Ensure that machines and 
processes are protected in relation 
to overheating and ensure there is 
sufficient insulation against this. 
Inform employees of hazards and 
about safe behaviour. 
Object’s 
placement 
Investigate placement of 
warm/cold items. 
 
Evaluate whether there is incorrect 
placement of warm/cold items, 
incorrect time for heating/cooling 
of items, movement of warm parts, 
items, ash, etc.  
Ensure that you protect 
effectiveness against the risk for 
warm/cold items. 
Ensure there is information for 
employees about the risk for 
subjection. 
User ability Investigate whether employees are 
familiar with and are conscious of 
the risk of subjection to warm/cold 
items. 
Evaluate employee behaviour. Train employees in safe behaviour. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to 
behave. 
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: for burning with  
work by/with warm/cold surfaces or naked fire  
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Access 
protection  
Investigate whether the physical 
barriers are in place and in order. 
Investigate whether there are signals, 
which warn of risk. 
 
Evaluate whether the physical barriers 
and signals are maintained and in 
order. 
 
Ensure you report errors and 
deficiencies to management. 
Do not perform the work if 
barriers and signals are not in 
order. 
Respect signals and barriers. 
Follow instructions. 
Personal 
protective 
devices and 
other 
protection  
Investigate whether there are the 
necessary personal protective devices 
and special working clothes available.  
 
Evaluate the personal protective 
devices such as gloves, masks and 
fireproof clothing, among others, 
regarding quality and suitability. 
 
 
Use the necessary personal 
protective devices and the 
special working clothes. 
Follow procedures for use. 
Ensure you report errors and 
deficiencies to management. 
Do not perform the work if 
personal protective devices 
and special working clothes 
are not available.  
 
Temperatur
e control 
Investigate whether there is sufficient 
monitoring/control of temperatures in 
surroundings, weather and air, and 
technical aids. 
 
Evaluate whether there is sufficient 
monitoring/control of temperatures in 
surroundings and in technical aids. 
  
Be aware of 
monitoring/control of 
temperatures. 
Follow procedures for action. 
Ensure you report errors and 
deficiencies to management. 
Do not perform the job if the 
temperature control is 
defective. 
Equipment’s 
state and 
insulation 
Investigate machines and processes in 
relation to the potential for 
overheating.  
Investigate whether the surface’s 
insulation is intact. 
Investigate the emergency plan in 
case of overheating. 
 
Evaluate machines and processes in 
relation to the potential for 
overheating.  
Evaluate whether the surface’s 
insulation is intact. 
Evaluate the emergency plan in case 
of overheating. 
 
Follow your manager’s 
instructions for safe 
behaviour in case of 
overheating. 
Ensure you report errors and 
deficiencies to management. 
Do not perform the job if the 
insulation is defective. 
Follow the emergency plan in 
case of overheating. 
Object’s 
placement 
Investigate placement of warm/cold 
items. 
 
Investigate placement of warm/cold 
items. 
 
Follow management’s 
instructions for avoiding 
subjection to warm/cold 
items. 
 
User ability Investigate the risk of subjection to 
warm/cold items. 
Evaluate the risk of subjection to 
warm/cold items. 
Exercise safe behaviour. 
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C 12 INFO CARD for Acid etching/poisoning by contact with hazardous chemicals 
In the WORM project, risk types such as these are described through 6 different situations where the risk of 
contact with hazardous chemicals occurs. These include:  
  
1. Work by/with open containers with hazardous chemicals that can spill   
2. Work near uncovered hazardous chemicals   
3. Work with filling or tapping of hazardous chemicals  
4. Transport of closed containers with hazardous chemicals 
5. Closing of containers with hazardous chemicals  
6. Activities/work near closed containers with chemicals  
 
These 6 different risk types have different types of requirements and safety barriers, which there is 
legislation for or guidelines drafted for.  In WORM analyses these risk types fundamentally contain 5 
generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
 
1. Container’s condition and placement 
2. Process control and monitoring 
3. Ventilation  
4. Personal protective devices  
5. User ability, behaviour and access 
 
The container’s and associated equipment’s condition and placement is about these being suited to the 
chemical used, that they shall be present, stored and placed appropriately and in a good state.  
By the container’s state, it is means that a lid/covering is placed on the container and there is a sufficient 
physical covering/protection of the hazardous substances, that the container’s sides are in a good state, 
that the container/the system including openings mechanism can resist external influence from people, 
such as pushing or blows and that the container/the system can resist impact due to  tipping or falling over. 
 
The container’s placement refers to placing open containers in places where one cannot bump into them 
and so they are protected against external influences such as collision and falling objects, that they are 
protected against impact due to tipping over or falls, and that the container is placed on a stable 
foundation (not on the edge), where they are supported sufficiently and secured as needed, and that the 
container’s cables, lines, etc. are not in the way for employees.  
In addition, that hazardous substances are stored in the correct packaging and stored correctly, that they 
are secured against incompatible substances coming in contact with each other, that devices are placed so 
that they cannot come in contact with hazardous substances. 
 
The equipment’s state refers to the container’s connected elements (handles, pipes, valves, instruments) 
are in good condition and seals are made correctly, that elements are connected correctly and are 
sufficiently tight, that the containers/systems are connected correctly to the rest of the system, that the 
containers/systems (seals) are constructed out of the correct materials, that pipes and hoses are connected 
correctly and tight, that the containers/systems connections (pipes, seals) do not show signs of wear 
(erosion) or corrosion and are not damaged due to external influences.  
 
Process control and monitoring is about the process being planned and carried out so that uncontrolled 
emissions do not occur underway, and that it is monitored sufficiently so that it is possible to intervene if 
errors occur. 
 
Process control refers to the container not being filled to the edge, that the container’s contents do not run 
out over the edge, that there is an even distribution of heat in the container during the process, and that 
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the container does not suddenly become warm, that substances with a significant difference in 
temperature or that are incompatible substances do not come in contact with each other, that part of the 
chemicals do not remain in the container when it is empties, that reactive substances are mixed in the 
correct conditions and/or in the right order, to add and mix chemicals occurs with caution, that the correct 
substances are used.   Finally, that chemicals are supplied with the correct labels, and that objects are 
handled cautiously in the proximity of containers. 
 
Also that the process conditions and cleaning procedures ensure that outflow can be stopped including 
with it wrongly being closed, that accumulated gasses/steam can be released, that the correct substances 
are used, that the correct quantities of substances are used/avoiding too high quantities/concentrations, 
that there is sufficient/correct cleaning after the use of hazardous substances to prevent part of the 
chemicals remaining in the container when it is emptied. 
 
Monitoring refers to checking after securing/closing off/shutting off a closed system if this is shut correctly 
with the aid of their senses (possibly in combination with equipment such as a mirror glass), with the aid of 
measuring equipment, by keeping an eye on audio and light signals that indicate whether the system is 
running, by seeing whether the valves are in a correct position and ducts are switched/connected from 
onto the correct place to see whether the system is empty/clean/without pressure/cooled down. 
 
Ventilation is about ensuring that hazardous gasses/steam are lead away 
 
Personal protective devices refers to that the prescribed personal protective devices and safety measure 
exist and are used correctly. 
 
User ability, behaviour and access is about employees having the knowledge and skills to use equipment 
and chemicals correctly, that employees handle chemicals with the necessary caution and that it is ensured 
that no one is where there are hazardous substances. 
 
User ability refers to employees handling containers with care and caution in the proximity of containers, 
that employees use their senses (possibly in combination with equipment such as a mirror glass), and keep 
an eye on audio and light signal that indicate whether the system is running.  Prevent against coming in 
contact with hazardous substances.  
 
By behaviour, it is meant that employees respect and take action on (signs, labels, displays, audio and visual 
alarms) and clear warnings and/or pictograms on the container that warn against opening of the 
container/closed system. 
 
Access refers to preventing oneself or others from coming into contact with hazardous substances. 
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: Contact with hazardous chemicals 
This includes work with open containers with hazardous chemicals, filling, tapping or closing of containers, 
transport of and activities/work with closed containers with hazardous chemicals,   
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Container’s 
 condition 
and 
placement 
Investigate whether the container 
and equipment are suited for the 
used chemicals, that they are in 
place, stored , placed appropriately 
and in a good state.  
Evaluate whether the container 
and equipment are suited for the 
used chemicals, that they are in 
place, stored, placed appropriately 
and in a good state. 
Ensure that there are suitable 
containers and equipment 
available. 
Ensure there is safe placement and 
storage. 
Ensure that repairs, maintenance 
and cleaning are performed. 
Process 
control and 
monitoring 
Observe whether processes are 
planned and carried out so that 
uncontrolled spills do not occur 
underway.  
Observe that it is monitored 
sufficiently, so that one can 
intervene if an error occurs. 
 
Evaluate whether processes are 
planned and carried out so that 
uncontrolled spills do not occur 
underway.  
Evaluate that it is monitored 
sufficiently, so that one can 
intervene if an error occurs. 
 
Ensure that processes are planned 
and carried out so that 
uncontrolled spills do not occur 
underway.  
Ensure there is sufficient 
monitoring, so that one can 
intervene if an error occurs. 
Ensure there are procedures and 
training in process control and 
monitoring. 
Ventilation  Observe whether ventilation is 
sufficient that hazardous 
gasses/steam are led away 
efficiently. 
 
Evaluate whether ventilation is 
sufficient that hazardous 
gasses/steam are led away 
efficiently. 
 
Ensure there is sufficient 
ventilation. 
Ensure that repairs, maintenance 
and cleaning are performed. 
Instruct employees in the use of 
ventilation. 
Personal 
protective 
devices  
Investigate requirements for 
personal protective devices and 
safety measures in the safety data 
sheets.   
Observe whether the prescribed 
personal protective devices and 
safety measures are available and 
used correctly. 
Evaluate requirements for 
personal protective devices and 
safety measures in the safety data 
sheets.   
Evaluate whether the prescribed 
personal protective devices and 
safety measures are available and 
used correctly. 
Ensure there are workplace user 
instructions/procedures for the 
use of personal protective devices. 
Ensure that the prescribed 
personal protective devices and 
safety measures are in place and in 
order.  
 
User ability, 
behaviour 
and access 
Observe whether employees have 
the knowledge and ability to use 
equipment and chemicals correctly 
Observe whether employees 
handle chemicals with the 
necessary caution, observe that 
unauthorised persons are not 
where there is hazardous 
substances. 
Evaluate whether employees have 
the knowledge and ability to use 
equipment and chemicals correctly 
Evaluate whether employees 
handle chemicals with the 
necessary caution, evaluate 
whether unauthorised persons are 
where there are hazardous 
substances. 
Ensure that employees are trained 
and instructed in controlling 
processes, using equipment and 
chemicals correctly. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
regarding safe behaviour when 
working with hazardous chemicals. 
Ensure that access is prevented by 
unauthorised persons to areas 
with hazardous chemicals.  
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: Contact with hazardous chemicals 
This includes work with open containers with hazardous chemicals, filling, tapping or closing of containers, 
transport of and activities/work with closed containers with hazardous chemicals,   
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Container’s 
 condition 
and 
placement 
Investigate whether the container 
and equipment are suited for the 
used chemicals, that they are in 
place, stored, placed appropriately 
and in a good state.  
Evaluate whether the container 
and equipment are suited for the 
used chemicals, that they are in 
place, stored, placed appropriately 
and in a good state. 
Use suitable containers and 
equipment.  
Ensure there is safe placement and 
storage. 
 
Process 
control and 
monitoring 
Observe whether processes are 
planned and carried out so that 
uncontrolled spills do not occur 
underway.  
Observe that it is monitored 
sufficiently, so that one can 
intervene if an error occurs. 
Evaluate whether processes are 
planned and carried out so that 
uncontrolled spills do not occur 
underway.  
Evaluate whether it is monitored 
sufficiently, so that one can 
intervene if an error occurs. 
Carried out, so that uncontrolled 
spills do not occur underway.   
Take action if the monitoring 
shows wrong. 
Follow procedures for process 
control and monitoring. 
Ventilation  Observe whether ventilation is 
sufficient that hazardous 
gasses/steam are led away 
efficiently. 
Evaluate whether ventilation is 
sufficient that hazardous 
gasses/steam are led away 
efficiently. 
Use sufficient ventilation. 
 
Personal 
protective 
devices  
Investigate requirements for 
personal protective devices and 
safety measures in the workplace 
user instructions.  
Observe whether the prescribed 
personal protective devices and 
safety measures are available and 
can be used correctly. 
Evaluate requirements for 
personal protective devices and 
safety measures in the workplace 
user instructions.  
Evaluate whether the prescribed 
personal protective devices and 
safety measures are available and 
can be used correctly. 
Follow workplace user instructions. 
procedures for the use of personal 
protective devices. 
 
User ability, 
behaviour 
and access 
Observe whether you have the 
knowledge and ability to use 
equipment and chemicals correctly 
Investigate whether you handle 
chemicals with the necessary 
caution, observe whether 
unauthorised persons are where 
there is hazardous substances. 
Observe whether you have the 
knowledge and ability to use 
equipment and chemicals correctly 
Evaluate whether you handle 
chemicals with the necessary 
caution,  
Evaluate whether unauthorised 
persons can be where there are 
hazardous substances 
Follow instructions for safe 
behaviour when working with 
hazardous chemicals. 
Ensure that access is prevented by 
unauthorised persons to areas 
with hazardous chemicals.  
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C 13 INFO CARD for Overloading when working with heavy loads 
In the WORM project, risk types such as these are described through 2 different situations where the risk of 
contact with hazardous chemicals occurs. These include:   
 
1. Work with heavy/unmanageable objects   
2. Activities around this  
 
These 2 different risk types have different types of requirements and safety barriers, which there is 
legislation for or guidelines drafted for.  In WORM analyses these risk types fundamentally contain 4 
generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
 
1. Working position  
2. Strength  
3. Control over the body 
4. Technical aids 
 
Working position is about that there being a possibility for good working positions and handling possibilities 
of objects that are easy to drop. 
 
Strength is about being fit and healthy in relation to lifting heavy loads, about not using too much strength 
in relation to the load's weight, and ensuring that loads are not too heavy. 
 
Control over the body is about the body being in good physical condition, so that the lifting of leads can 
occur under appropriate conditions e.g. through calm movements, without running and panic, without 
subjection to slippery floors, with the use of appropriate footwear, with good balance ability and without 
an unstable foundation, uneven foundation and obstacles.  
 
Technical aids are about the aid functioning correctly, that it is in good condition, that the right aid is used 
and used correctly, also that the foundation is in order with the use of the aid so that, among others, 
jumping is avoided. 
225 
 
 
MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: for overloading 
These includes work with heavy/unmanageable objects or with moving around  
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Working 
position 
Investigate whether there are 
possibilities for good working 
positions and handling possibilities 
of objects that are easy to drop. 
 
Evaluate whether there are 
possibilities for good working 
positions and handling possibilities 
of objects that are easy to drop. 
 
Ensure that there is the possibility 
for good working positions and 
handling possibilities of objects 
that are easy to drop. 
Instruct employees.  
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how they shall act if it is not 
possible to assume good working 
positions. 
Strength  Investigate whether employees 
are healthy and fit in relation to 
lifting heavy loads. 
Investigate whether loads are too 
heavy. 
Investigate whether employees 
know good lifting techniques, so 
they do not have to use much 
force when lifting loads. 
Investigate employee behaviour. 
 
Evaluate whether employees are 
healthy and fit in relation to lifting 
heavy loads. 
Evaluate whether loads are too 
heavy. 
Evaluate whether employees have 
sufficient knowledge regarding 
good lifting techniques. 
Evaluate employee behaviour. 
 
 
Avoid getting employees to lift 
heavy loads if they are not fit for 
doing so. 
Ensure that loads are not too 
heavy. 
Ensure that employees are trained 
in good lifting techniques. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how they shall act if it is not 
possible to assume good working 
positions. 
Control over 
the body 
Investigate whether the lifting of 
loads can occur under appropriate 
conditions. 
 For example, using calm 
movements, without running and 
panic, without being subjected to 
slippery floors, with the use of 
appropriate footwear, with good 
balance and without unstable 
foundations, uneven foundations 
and obstacles. 
Investigate employee behaviour. 
Evaluate whether lifting can occur 
under appropriate conditions. 
Evaluate employee behaviour. 
 
Ensure that the lifting of loads can 
occur under appropriate 
conditions. 
Instruct employees.  
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how they shall act if it is not 
possible to assume good working 
positions. 
Technical aids Investigate whether the necessary 
technical aids are available. 
Investigate whether the aids 
function correctly, are in good 
condition and that the right aid is 
used and used correctly. Also 
whether the foundation is in 
order. 
Investigate whether employees 
use the technical aids.  
Evaluate whether the necessary 
technical aids are available to 
avoid or reduce subjection for 
heavy lifting. Evaluate whether the 
aids function correctly, are in good 
condition, that the right aid is 
used and used correctly, whether 
the foundation is in order. 
Evaluate employee behaviour.  
 
 
 
Ensure that the necessary 
technical aids are available. 
Ensure that the aids function 
correctly, are in good order. 
Instruct employees in the use of 
technical aids. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how they shall act if aids are 
not in order. 
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: for overloading 
These includes work with heavy/unmanageable objects or with moving around  
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Working 
position 
Investigate whether there are 
possibilities for good working 
positions and handling possibilities 
of objects that are easy to drop. 
 
Evaluate whether there are 
possibilities for good working 
positions and handling possibilities 
of objects that are easy to drop. 
 
Follow instructions. 
Ensure you report errors and 
deficiencies to management. 
Do not perform the work if it is 
not possible to assume good 
working positions when lifting 
heavy or manageable loads. 
Strength  Investigate you are healthy and fit 
in relation to lifting heavy loads. 
Investigate whether loads are too 
heavy. 
Investigate whether you know 
good lifting techniques. 
 
Evaluate whether you are healthy 
and fit in relation to lifting heavy 
loads. 
Evaluate whether loads are too 
heavy. 
Evaluate whether you believe that 
you have sufficient knowledge of 
lifting techniques in relation to the 
concrete task. 
Avoid lifting heavy loads if you are 
not fit for doing so. 
Do not lift loads that are too 
heavy. 
Participate in training in good 
lifting techniques and use good 
lifting techniques. 
 
Control over 
the body 
Investigate whether the lifting of 
loads can occur under appropriate 
conditions. 
 For example, using calm 
movements, without running and 
panic, without being subjected to 
slippery floors, with the use of 
appropriate footwear, with good 
balance and without unstable 
surfaces, uneven surfaces and 
obstacles. 
Evaluate whether lifting can occur 
under appropriate conditions. 
 
Follow instructions.  
Ensure you inform management if 
lifting cannot be carried out 
appropriately. 
Do not perform the work if it is 
not possible to assume good 
working positions when lifting 
heavy or unmanageable loads. 
Technical aids Investigate whether the necessary 
technical aids are available. 
Investigate whether aids function 
correctly, are in a good state and 
whether the foundation is in 
order.  
Investigate whether you know 
how the technical aids shall be 
used.  
Evaluate whether the necessary 
technical aids are available to 
avoid or reduce subjection for 
heavy lifting. Evaluate whether the 
aids function correctly, are in good 
condition, that the right aid is 
used and used correctly, whether 
the foundation is in order. 
 
 
Follow instruction on the use of 
technical aids. 
Ensure you inform management if 
lifting cannot be carried out 
appropriately. 
Avoid performing the work if it is 
not possible to use the necessary 
technical aids. 
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D 14 INFO CARD for Contact with High Voltage 
In the WORM project, risk types such as these are described through 6 different situations where the risk of 
contact with hazardous chemicals occurs. These include:  
  
1. Work at/near high-voltage lines including lines at trains and tramways, etc. 
 
This risk type has different types of requirements and safety barriers, which there is legislation for or 
guidelines drafted for.  In WORM analyses these risk types fundamentally contain 5 generic safety barriers, 
namely questions of:   
 
1. Line protection  
2. Protection against live parts/electric arcs/ nearness to non-insulated active parts 
3. Protection against electricity in earth 
4. Safeguarding against access 
5. Procedure when working near high-voltage cables 
 
Line protection refers to high-voltage lines being protected in a sufficient scope so contact can be avoided 
with signal, sign, warning, physical barriers, also that the lines are sufficiently protected in relation to tools, 
cranes and vehicles. 
 
Protection against live parts/electric arcs/ nearness to non-insulated active parts is about attention and/or 
knowledge of whether there is high-voltage, whether there is visibility of the current-carrying parts, 
whether there are signals/communication about high-voltage. Finally it is about whether there is space for 
manoeuvring, whether the necessary personal protective devices such as gloves, face guards are used. 
 
Protection against electricity in earth is about the necessary personal aids being used, such as rubber 
footwear as double insulation. 
 
Protection against access refers to access protection being respected. 
     
Procedure for electrical influence/working near high-voltage cables is about knowledge of procedures 
when working in a vehicle close by high-voltage lines. 
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: for contact with HIGH-VOLTAGE 
This includes work at/near high-voltage lines. 
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Cable 
protection 
 
Observe whether the electric 
cables are sufficiently protected 
and whether they are maintained 
and in order  
so contact can be avoided by 
signal, sign, warning, physical 
barrier. Also that the cables are 
sufficiently protected in relation to 
tools, cranes and vehicles. 
 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for additional protection.  
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for additional warnings/signs. 
Evaluate the need for information 
to employees. 
Evaluate the need for motivating 
initiatives for the employees. 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
rectified. 
Ensure there are procedures for 
work and for cleaning and 
maintenance. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to act 
when they work at/near high-
voltage lines and what feedback 
they must give when they find that 
things are not in order.  
Protection 
against live 
parts/electri
c arcs/ 
nearness to 
non-
insulated 
active parts 
 
Observe employee attention, 
knowledge and communication if 
there is high-voltage. 
Observe whether parts with high-
voltage are visible, whether there 
are signals/communication 
regarding high-voltage.  
Observe whether there is space for 
manoeuvring.  Observe whether 
the necessary personal protective 
devices are available and whether 
they are used.  
Evaluate employee behaviour, 
attention and/or knowledge and 
communication about high-voltage.  
Evaluate the need for special 
instruction. 
Evaluate the need for motivating 
initiatives for the employees. 
 
Ensure that deficiencies are 
repaired 
Ensure there are the necessary 
personal protective devices. 
Inform and instruct about the use 
of personal protective devices. 
Instruct employees about how they 
shall behave.   
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to 
behave when protection is lacking 
or is not in order.  
Protection 
against 
electricity in 
earth 
 
Investigate whether the necessary 
personal aids are used such as 
rubber footwear as double 
insulation. 
 
Evaluate the motivation to use 
personal protective aids such as 
rubber footwear and double 
insulation. 
 
Ensure there are personal aids 
available. Instruct employees in the 
use of personal protective aids. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to 
behave when protection is lacking 
or is not in order.  
Safeguardin
g against 
access 
 
Investigate whether safeguards 
against access are respected. 
Investigate whether there are 
procedures for unauthorised 
access. 
Evaluate whether safeguards 
against access are respected of if 
there is conscious ignoring of 
safeguards against access. 
Evaluate whether there should be 
procedures for unauthorised 
access. 
Ensure that you intervene if 
safeguards against access are not 
respected.  
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how they shall behave if 
safeguards against access are not 
respected. 
Procedure if 
affected by 
electricity  
Investigate whether there are 
procedures/emergency plan when 
working in a vehicle close to high-
voltage lines.  
Investigate whether employees are 
trained in first aid for electric 
shock. 
Evaluate whether procedures for 
working in a vehicle close by high-
voltage lines are in order. 
Evaluate employee training in first 
aid. 
 
Instruct employees in the 
procedures. 
Ensure that employees are trained 
in the procedures with regular 
exercises. 
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: for contact with HIGH-VOLTAGE 
This includes work at/near high-voltage lines. 
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Cable 
protection 
 
Observe whether the electrical 
cables are sufficiently protected so 
contact is avoided and whether 
they are sufficiently protected in 
relation to tools, cranes and 
vehicles. 
Observe signals, signs, warnings 
and physical barriers.  
 
Evaluate whether there is a need 
for additional protection.  
Evaluate signals, signs, warnings 
and physical barriers.  
Inform management about faults 
and deficiencies. 
Do not perform the work if 
protection is not in order. 
Respect the physical barriers.   
Respect signals and signs. 
 
Protection 
against live 
parts/electri
c arcs/ 
nearness to 
non-
insulated 
active parts 
 
Observe whether parts with high-
voltage are visible, whether there 
are signals/communication 
regarding high-voltage.  
Observe whether there is space for 
manoeuvring.  
Investigate whether the necessary 
personal protective devices are 
available.  
Evaluate whether there is voltage 
on the line.  
Evaluate whether there is space for 
manoeuvring.  
Investigate whether the necessary 
personal protective devices are 
available and in order. 
Inform management about faults 
and deficiencies. 
Use the necessary personal 
protective devices. 
Be aware of whether there is high-
voltage and ensure there is good 
communication to colleagues at 
high-voltage. 
Protection 
against 
electricity in 
earth 
 
Investigate whether the necessary 
personal aids such as rubber 
footwear as double insulation are 
available. 
 
Evaluate whether the personal aids 
are sufficient and whether they are 
in order. 
 
Inform management about faults 
and deficiencies. 
Do not perform the work if the 
necessary personal aids are not 
available. 
Safeguardin
g against 
access 
 
Investigate whether safeguarding 
against access is sufficient and in 
order. 
Investigate whether there are 
procedures for unauthorised 
access. 
Evaluate whether access 
safeguards are respected by 
unauthorised person or if they are 
consciously ignored. 
 
Inform management if access 
safeguards are not respected. 
Motivate and instruct unauthorised 
persons to respect the access 
safeguards and intervene if they 
are not respected, 
. 
Procedure if 
affected by 
electricity  
Investigate whether there are 
procedures/emergency plan when 
working in a vehicle close to high-
voltage lines. 
Investigate whether your 
colleagues are trained in first aid 
for electric shock. 
Evaluate whether procedures for 
working in a vehicle close by high-
voltage lines are in order. 
Evaluate your own and your 
colleagues’ experience and training 
in first aid for electric shock. 
 
Participate in first aid courses. 
Participate in exercises in 
emergency plan. 
Help colleagues in the case of an 
accident. 
Follow procedures when working in 
a vehicle close to high-voltage 
lines. 
Follow the emergency plan. 
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D 15 INFO CARD for Combustion and Asphyxiation in the event of a fire 
In the WORM project, risk types such as these are described through 3 different situations where the risk of 
contact with hazardous chemicals occurs. These include:  
  
1. Work near fire, hot work   
2. Work near flammable, inflammable materials   
3. Fire extinction  
 
These 3 different risk types have different types of requirements and safety barriers, which there is 
legislation for or guidelines drafted for.  In WORM analyses these risk types fundamentally contain 4 
generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
 
1. Use of work/spark permit 
2. Explosion protection 
3. Personal protective devices and clothing 
4. Protection against fire 
 
Use of the work/spark permit is about good protection in when working in areas with the risk for explosive 
vapour and/or work with combustible material in areas that are protected against ignition sources.  This 
shall ensure against hot work being performed where it is not permitted, or that hot work is used 
unnecessarily, that ignition cannot occur due to the conduction of heat from radiators, or from insufficient 
cooling down period, e.g. when roofing or uncontrolled ignition e.g. from oven. It is about avoiding the use 
of flammable fluids for cleaning in areas with ignition sources, or the use of flammable fluids with a low 
autogenous ignition temperature, when non-hazardous materials could be used e.g. the use of diesel oil 
instead of for petrol for ignition when burning branches. It is about ensuring that materials cannot be 
polluted with flammable fluids, about the subjection for warm surfaces close by flammable fluids or 
ineffective cooling/ventilation.   
  
Explosion protection is about avoiding the use of flammable material when it is possible to limit the use of 
flammable materials, to protect against sparking in areas with explosive vapour by using explosion-proof 
equipment and avoid the formation of static electricity It is about protecting against the unintentional 
discharge of flammable materials by safe storage, by  equipment being secure e.g. by safety valves blowing 
to safe areas, and it is about knowing whether materials are flammable through the correct labelling of 
packaging. 
 
Personal protective devices and clothing are about clothing protecting against fire, not giving rise to static 
electricity and that clothing is not polluted e.g. with oil. Also that there with the risk for subjection to heat, 
smoke and direct fire used the necessary personal protective aids/clothing, which protects against fire 
including full breathing protection. Also that persons, who will be close by flames, strong heat and 
explosive gasses are only subjected to such loads for a short time e.g. by keeping at a reasonable distance 
from fire and ultimately it is about ensuring against persons being subjected to heat or poisonous vapour. 
 
Protection against fire is about prohibition against smoking and the prevention of arson. 
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: for combustion and asphyxiation/inhalation of poisonous materials  
This includes work near fire, hot work, work near combustible, inflammable materials and when fire 
fighting.  
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Use of  
work/spark 
permit 
Observe whether work/spark 
permit is used in all work with the 
risk of fire and explosion 
Observe whether employees 
respect agreements and 
instructions in the spark permits 
including good termination of the 
work.  
Evaluate whether the use of 
work/spark permit effectively 
protects against fire and explosion. 
Observe whether employees 
respect agreements and 
instructions in the spark permits 
including good termination of the 
work.  
Ensure there are procedures for 
work and work/spark permits.  
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to act 
when they work in areas with the 
risk of fire/explosion and what 
feedback they must give when they 
find that things are not in order.  
Safeguardin
g against 
explosion 
Observe whether the use of 
flammable materials is 
avoided/limited in a sufficient 
scope. Observe whether explosion-
proof equipment is used and the 
formation of static electricity is 
avoided.  
Observe whether flammable 
materials are stored safely and 
whether equipment is sufficiently 
closed and whether any safety 
valves etc. blow to safe areas. 
Observe whether hazardous 
chemicals are correctly labelled. 
Evaluate whether explosion-proof 
equipment is used and the 
formation of static electricity is 
avoided in areas with explosive 
vapour.  
Observe whether flammable 
materials are stored safely and 
whether equipment is sufficiently 
closed and whether any safety 
valves etc. blow to safe areas. 
Observe whether hazardous 
chemicals are correctly labelled. 
 
Ensure that it is secured against fire 
and explosion risk in relation to 
legislation in the area. 
Inform employees about the risks. 
 
Personal 
protective 
devices and 
clothing 
Observe whether clothing and 
personal protective devices protect 
effectively against fire and the 
generation of static electricity. 
Observe whether clothing and 
personal protective devices are 
kept clean and in order. 
Observe whether employees use 
the necessary personal protective 
devices and keep at a safe distance 
from flames, heat, smoke and 
poisonous gasses.  
Observe whether clothing and 
personal protective devices protect 
effectively against fire and the 
generation of static electricity. 
Observe whether clothing and 
personal protective devices are 
kept clean and in order. 
Observe whether employees use 
the necessary personal protective 
devices and keep at a safe distance 
from flames, heat, smoke and 
poisonous gasses. 
Ensure that clothing and personal 
protective devices are available 
and in order. 
Ensure that they are cleaned, 
repaired and maintained. 
Ensure there are procedures for 
use, etc.  
Motivate and instruct employees 
about how you want them to 
behave when they find that things 
are not in order.  
  
Protection 
against fire 
Observe whether the ban on 
smoking is adhered to. Observe 
whether it, to a sufficient extent, is 
protected against unauthorised 
access to flammable fluids and 
areas with the risk of 
fire/explosion.   Observe employee 
behaviour in relation to good fire 
hygiene. 
Evaluate whether the ban on 
smoking is adhered to. 
Evaluate whether it, to a sufficient 
extent, is protected against 
unauthorised access to flammable 
fluids and areas with the risk of 
fire/explosion.   Evaluate employee 
behaviour in relation to good fire 
hygiene. 
Ensure there is a ban on smoking. 
Ensure there is  protection against 
unauthorised access to hazardous 
areas. 
Motivate and instruct employees 
about good fire hygiene and 
protection against arson. 
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: for combustion and asphyxiation/inhalation of poisonous materials  
This includes work near fire, hot work, work near combustible, inflammable materials and when fire 
fighting.  
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Use of  
work/spark 
permit 
Observe whether work/spark 
permit is used in all work with the 
risk of fire and explosion 
 
Evaluate whether the use of 
work/spark permit effectively 
protects against fire and explosion. 
 
Follow procedures for work and 
work/spark permits.  
Inform management about faults 
and deficiencies. 
Do not perform work if a spark 
permit is lacking, or if protection in 
relation to the spark permit is not 
in order. 
Safeguardin
g against 
explosion 
Observe whether explosion-proof 
equipment is used and the 
formation of static electricity is 
avoided in areas with explosive 
vapour.  
Observe whether flammable 
materials are stored safely and 
whether equipment is sufficiently 
closed and whether any safety 
valves etc. blow to safe areas. 
Observe whether hazardous 
chemicals are labelled. 
Evaluate whether explosion-proof 
equipment is used and the 
formation of static electricity is 
avoided in areas with explosive 
vapour.  
Observe whether flammable 
materials are stored safely and 
whether equipment is sufficiently 
closed and whether any safety 
valves etc. blow to safe areas. 
Evaluate whether hazardous 
chemicals are labelled. 
 
Respect rules for explosion 
protection. 
Inform management about faults 
and deficiencies. 
 
 
Personal 
protective 
devices and 
clothing 
Observe whether clothing and 
personal protective devices protect 
effectively against fire and the 
generation of static electricity. 
Observe whether clothing and 
personal protective devices are 
kept clean and in order. 
 
Observe whether clothing and 
personal protective devices protect 
effectively against fire and the 
generation of static electricity. 
Observe whether clothing and 
personal protective devices are 
kept clean and in order. 
 
Use the necessary clothing and 
personal protective devices. 
Follow procedures for use, etc.  
Inform management about faults 
and deficiencies. 
 
Protection 
against fire 
Observe whether the ban on 
smoking is adhered to. 
Observe whether there, in a 
sufficient scope, is secured against 
unauthorised access to flammable 
fluids and areas with the risk of 
fire/explosion.    
Observe whether there is good fire 
hygiene. 
Evaluate whether the ban on 
smoking is adhered to. 
Evaluate whether it, to a sufficient 
extent, is secured against 
unauthorised access to flammable 
fluids and areas with the risk of 
fire/explosion.    
Evaluate whether there is good fire 
hygiene. 
Follow any ban on smoking. 
Respect protection against 
unauthorised access to hazardous 
areas. 
Ensure there is good fire hygiene.  
Inform management about faults 
and deficiencies and about the 
possibilities for arson. 
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D 16 INFO CARD for Suffocation, poisoning or drowning 
In the WORM project, risk types such as these are described through 4 different situations where the risk of 
contact with hazardous atmosphere occurs. These include:  
 
1. Work in a closed room   
2. Work wearing a respirator   
3. Work in/on/under water  
4. Work above/in the proximity of water 
 
These 4 different risk types have different types of requirements and safety barriers, which there is 
legislation for or guidelines drafted for.  In WORM analyses these risk types fundamentally contain 6 
generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
 
1. Protection of inhaled air  
2. Monitoring of inhaled air  
3. Personal protective devices  
4. Equipment’s state 
5. User ability  
6. First aid 
 
Protection of inhaled air refers to, that there is protection against reduced oxygen concentration in the 
inhaled air e.g. from the presence of organic material or of inert gas, or protection against the presence of 
hazardous substances/poisonous gasses/vapour e.g. from work activities (solvents, combustion engines, 
welding), lack of cleaning, unwanted processes in materials (fertilizer, sludge, biomass, etc.) that can rot or 
degrade with the aid of heat or due to a lack of barricading of installation parts from rooms containing 
hazardous substances. 
 
This is done e.g. by ensuring that there is respiratory supply before the room is entered and during work or 
for mechanical ventilation.  Finally, it is about that the supplied respiratory air is in order, among others, it 
is suctioned from a location with clean air, is connected and secured correctly, that it is furnished in the 
correct mixture and amount, not too much or too little, e.g. due to incorrect settings on the device and 
about that there is not pollutants in the respiratory air, either from the pollution of valves or from earlier 
use. 
 
Monitoring of inhaled air is about measuring the atmosphere prior to access and monitoring during the 
work by measuring oxygen and/or poisonous gasses/vapour. 
  
Personal protective devices are about respiratory protection e.g. respiratory protective device and for work 
near/under water, having the right clothing and rescue equipment such as diving suits, survival suits, life 
vests or suitable swimwear. 
 
Equipment’s condition is about that equipment for air supply and the platform that is worked on is in order, 
cleaned and maintained. It is about the supply system for air is CE marked and maintained, that gas bottles 
are filled up and that valves and other equipment are in order, that the equipment is put together correctly 
that the right gas mixture is used, and that there is no contamination of the inhalation air.   
It is also about the work platform and its ability to float, its securing at/against collision or being bumped 
into, loading of the platform with regard to weight distribution and overloading, if there are railings on the 
work platform, that surfaces to not slope against the water and are not slippery and that it is ensured 
objects cannot move, roll or swing close to the water.  Finally, it is about persons on the floating object 
have the necessary experience especially in poor sight close to the water and in poor weather.   
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User ability is about being fit when using the respiratory protection and when working in water, also being 
able to swim and being able to tolerate stays in water and finally being aware of the hazards in relation to 
this.  
With the use of a respiratory protective device it is about having good physical fitness when work is 
performed with respiratory air supply, attention to danger at extreme temperatures (under -10°C, over 30 
°C) and attention to danger during heavy physical work.  
 
When working in and near water it is about good physical condition in water, access to and the use of 
suitable swimwear that, among others, protects against the cold, good swimming ability and attention to 
surroundings in or close to the water, which can quickly lead to exhaustion. It is also about attention to 
danger during high waves or strong current and cold water, when there are cables, constructions, net or 
other objects in the water. Finally, it is about attention to danger when driving a car close to the water. 
 
First aid is about the saving of people in the water and from closed rooms.  
It is about the company’s skeleton staff being in place and sufficiently prepared regarding accident 
situations that multiple employees can come into contact with each other during the work that promotes 
fast intervention when an error occurs. It is about there being sufficient control for people in the water, the 
presence of a rescue team when there are people in the water, which can offer first aid, of access to 
effective medical help (aids) which arrive quickly (within 15 minutes).  
When working in closed rooms, it is also about good means of access to closed rooms in association with 
lifesaving and supervision with working in closed rooms.  
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: for suffocation, poisoning or drowning 
This includes work in closed rooms, work wearing a respiratory protective device, work in/on/under water 
or work above/in the proximity of water.  
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Protection 
of 
inhalation 
air  
Investigate whether work in a 
closed room is necessary and 
whether there can be reduced 
oxygen content or hazardous 
substances present.  
Observe the need for ventilation 
and the supply of respiratory air 
before work is begun, during the 
work and cleaning up. 
Investigate whether the ventilation 
and respiratory air is in order, 
cleaned and well maintained. 
Evaluate whether work in a closed 
room is necessary and whether 
there can be reduced oxygen 
content or hazardous substances 
present.  
Evaluate the need for ventilation 
and the supply of respiratory air 
before work is begun, during the 
work and cleaning up. 
Evaluate whether the ventilation 
and respiratory air is in order, 
cleaned and well maintained. 
Ensure that work in closed rooms 
only occurs when it is necessary. 
Ensure there is sufficient 
ventilation and respiratory air.  
Ensure there are procedures for 
work, repairs and maintenance. 
Motivate and instruct employees in 
how they shall work in closed 
rooms and near/in water and what 
feedback they shall give for faults 
and deficiencies. 
Monitoring 
of 
respiratory 
air  
Investigate the atmosphere in the 
closed room and the respiratory air 
for oxygen content and for the 
content of hazardous substances 
when measuring before the work 
begins and while the work is being 
performed. Investigate limit values 
for safe atmosphere.  
Evaluate the atmosphere in the 
closed room and the respiratory air 
for oxygen content and for the 
content of hazardous substances 
when measuring before the work 
begins and while the work is being 
performed. 
Ensure that there is measuring 
equipment for monitoring of work 
and that it is calibrated and in 
order. Inform employees about the 
measurements and instruct them 
in how they shall act when there is 
a lack of measurements or limit 
values are exceeded.   
Personal 
protective 
devices  
Investigate which personal protect-
tive devices are necessary for the 
work and whether they are in 
order. Investigate whether 
employees know how they shall be 
used. 
Evaluate which personal protective 
devices are necessary for the work 
and whether they are in order. 
Evaluate whether employees know 
how they shall be used. 
Ensure there are the necessary 
personal protective devices. 
Ensure there are procedures for  
usage, repairs and maintenance. 
Train employees in the use. 
Equipment’s 
state 
Observe the work platform and/or 
ventilation and respirator is in 
order cleaned and maintained. 
Observe the placement of the 
platform. 
Evaluate whether the work 
platform and/or ventilation and 
respirator is in order cleaned and 
maintained.  
Evaluate the placement of the 
platform. 
Ensure that the work platform is 
safely placed, that the platform, 
ventilation and respirator are in 
order and cleaned.  
Ensure there are procedures for 
usage, repairs and maintenance. 
User ability  Observe whether employees are fit 
for the use of respiratory 
protection and for working in 
water.  
Investigate whether they can swim 
and tolerate stays in water.  
Evaluate whether employees are fit 
for the use of respiratory 
protection and for working in 
water. 
Evaluate whether they can swim 
and tolerate stays in water.  
Check employee’s fitness in 
relation to the use of respiratory 
protection and for working in 
water. 
Train employees in swimming and 
stays in water.  
First aid Observe whether the company’s 
preparedness is sufficient. 
Investigate whether there is the 
possibility for professional medical 
help to come quickly (within 15 
min.) 
Evaluate whether the company’s 
preparedness is sufficient. 
Evaluate the possibility for 
professional medical help to come 
quickly (within 15 min.) 
Ensure there are training, 
instruction and education for 
preparedness. 
Ensure there is an agreement for 
professional medical help (within 
15 min.) 
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: for suffocation, poisoning or drowning  
This includes work in closed rooms, work wearing a respiratory protective device, work in/on/under water 
or work above/in the proximity of water.  
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Protection 
of 
inhalation 
air  
Investigate whether work in a close 
d room is necessary and whether 
there can be reduced oxygen 
content or hazardous substances 
present.  
Observe the need for ventilation 
and the supply of respiratory air 
before work is begun, during the 
work and cleaning up. 
Investigate whether the ventilation 
and respiratory air is in order, 
cleaned and well maintained. 
Evaluate whether work in a closed 
room is necessary and whether 
there can be reduced oxygen 
content or hazardous substances 
present.  
Evaluate the need for ventilation 
and the supply of respiratory air 
before work is begun, during the 
work and cleaning up. 
Evaluate whether the ventilation 
and respiratory air is in order, 
cleaned and well maintained. 
Only work in closed rooms when 
necessary and ensure there is 
sufficient ventilation and 
respiratory air.  
Follow procedures for  work and 
for repairs and maintenance. 
 
Monitoring 
of 
respiratory 
air  
Investigate the atmosphere in the 
closed room and the respiratory air 
for oxygen content and for the 
content of hazardous substances 
when measuring before the work 
begins and while the work is being 
performed. 
Investigate limit values for safe 
atmosphere.  
Evaluate the atmosphere in the 
closed room and the respiratory air 
for oxygen content and for the 
content of hazardous substances 
when measuring before the work 
begins and while the work is being 
performed. 
Use the results from 
measurements. 
Stop the work when there is a lack 
of measurements or if established 
limit values are exceeded.   
Inform colleagues and 
management about deficiencies 
and excesses. 
Personal 
protective 
devices  
Investigate which personal 
protective devices are necessary 
for the work. 
Investigate whether they are in 
order. Investigate whether you 
know how they shall be used. 
Evaluate which personal protective 
devices are necessary for the work. 
Evaluate whether they are in order. 
Evaluate whether you know how 
they shall be used. 
Use the necessary personal 
protective devices. 
Follow procedures for usage, 
repairs and maintenance. 
 
Equipment’s 
state 
Observe whether the work 
platform and/or ventilation and 
respirator is in order, cleaned and 
maintained. 
Observe the placement of the 
platform. 
 
Evaluate whether the work 
platform and/or ventilation and 
respirator is in order, cleaned and 
maintained. 
Evaluate the placement of the 
platform. Evaluate your experience 
in working near/in water.  
Follow procedures for usage, 
repairs and maintenance. 
Inform colleagues and 
management in the event of errors 
and deficiencies. 
User ability  Observe whether you are fit 
enough for the use of respiratory 
protection and work in water. 
Investigate whether you can swim 
and tolerate stays in water.  
Observe the dangers of the work. 
Evaluate whether you are fit 
enough for the use of respiratory 
protection and for working in 
water. 
Evaluate whether you can swim 
and tolerate stays in water.  
Evaluate the dangers of the work. 
Inform management if you are in 
doubt whether you are in a 
position to perform the work. 
  
First aid Investigate the company’s 
preparedness in the case of 
explosions.  
Evaluate the company’s 
preparedness in the case of 
explosions.  
Participate in education and 
training of preparedness. 
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D 17 INFO CARD for Personal injury by explosion 
In the WORM project, risk types such as these are described through 5 different situations where the risk of 
contact with hazardous chemicals occurs. These include:  
  
1. Work near pressurized apparatus, containers or other items 
2. Work near/with explosive vapour, gasses  
3. Work near/with (fine) dust that can cause explosion  
4. Work near/with solid explosives    
5. Work near/with substances that can cause exothermic reactions 
 
These 5 different risk types have different types of requirements and safety barriers, which there is 
legislation for or guidelines drafted for.  In WORM analyses these risk types fundamentally contain 6 
generic safety barriers, namely questions of:   
 
1. Equipment and materials condition and placement  
2. Process control and monitoring 
3. Explosion protection  
4. Personal protective devices 
5. First aid 
6. Behaviour 
 
Equipment and materials condition and placement is about that equipment and materials are suited for the 
chemicals used, and that the equipment is placed in secure surroundings and is in order. 
Equipment and materials condition refers to that a container is used which can resist pressure, 
temperature and the characteristics of the contents, and where the construction material is in a good 
condition, that the containers are correctly constructed and/or connected together, that explosives are 
packaged, transported and stored correctly. Also that equipment is arranged so that the spread of 
flammable dust to the room is avoided and it is avoided that dust in the room is spread. 
Placement means that containers are located so they are protected against external sources of heat, such 
as hot work, external fires and the sun's heat, and against external influences such as collision and falling 
objects and that the base is stable. 
 
Process control and monitoring is about having knowledge of the chemicals’ hazardous properties and 
ensure that processes are planned and carried out so that the risk of explosion is avoided or reduced or, 
that a potential explosion-like reaction is controlled safely in relation to the equipment and that this is 
monitored, also to ensure good cleaning, order and tidiness.  
 
Familiarity with the chemicals’ properties refers to, among others, that employees know safety and 
workplace usage instructions, and that there is attention to danger when work is performed in 
buildings/systems where fine dust is found.  
 
Process control refers to any increase in pressure is controlled, among others, by regulating the fill level to 
ensure that it is not filled incorrectly/too large a quantity of reagent, at temperature, pressure or fluid level 
in the receptacle is observed and controlled, and that it is ensured that there is always space for the fluid’s 
expansion.  Also that it is secured against undesirable/unconscious mixture of substances (separate storage 
and process), among others, to safeguard against undesired exothermic reactions.   
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By process control it is also meant that raw materials are controlled prior to use with regard to their 
specification (particle size, moisture, impurities, other) and solid substances and raw materials are secured 
against pollution that can lead to dust explosions, and finally that the production of solid substances is 
guaranteed the right quality and finally, that for work with solid explosives, ignition occurs at the correct 
point in time.  
 
Good cleaning, order and tidiness refers to cleaning and keeping the system free, to rinse (containers, 
pipes, etc.) from flammable solid substances, to clean the workplace and remove flammable solid 
substances, to ensure effective cleaning, where explosive gasses/vapour can otherwise be formed and 
finally that systems that solely contain oxygen are not contaminated with flammable substances (such as 
grease and lubricants) when working with solid explosives.  
 
Explosion protection is about ensuring against conditions occurring with the hazard of explosion, among 
others, by avoiding or limiting explosive atmospheres, to remove sources of ignition and finally to reduce 
consequences of a potential explosion.  
 
By avoiding explosive atmospheres it is meant, among others, to secure suitable ventilation to remove 
explosive gasses, vapour and dust, and at the same time ensure that the ventilation, including natural 
ventilation, does not whirl up dust or to remove explosive atmosphere by adding a nitrogen cover and 
ensuring that the cover is intact.  
 
By removal of sources of ignition, it refers to securing against ignition in an explosive atmosphere by 
avoiding contamination with metals, to ensure that electrical equipment and cables are in good condition, 
that mechanical equipment is in good condition,  that heat sources in the proximity are insulated, that 
there is sufficient cooling of systems and foundations, that devices are earthed, that the transport speed of 
solid substances through pipes is passing slowly in order to avoid static electricity, to have good control 
over activities (such as welding, sanding) that cause flames and sparks, to avoid processes in substances 
that may cause self-heating.  
 
Reducing consequences of explosions means to ensure there is pressure relief, among others, through the 
use of safety valves, relief hatches and doors. 
 
Personal protective devices is about wearing personal protective devices, as protection against explosion 
effects when working, which can lead to explosion such as work near/with (fine) dust, solid explosives and 
substances that can cause exothermic reactions.  
 
First aid is about the company’s readiness sufficiently being prepared for accident situations, that the 
company’s skeleton staff is in place, that multiple employees can come into contact with each other during 
the work, which promotes a fast intervention when faults occur and the presence of employees that can 
offer first aid, and that professional medical help arrives quickly (within 15 minutes). 
 
Behaviour is about having the knowledge and being aware that there is a risk for conditions that can lead to 
explosions and by its behaviour contribute to preventing ignition and not increase the risks.  It is about 
avoiding sources of ignition in surroundings where explosive atmosphere can occur, among others, by 
avoiding the unmotivated discharge of substances, to have secured, that one cannot cause ignition from 
e.g. static electricity by the open discharge of substances or in association with cleaning. 
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MANAGEMENT 
Hazard: for personal injury – hearing damage, damage to lungs, injury from being knocked down from 
shrapnel or being killed    
This includes when working near/by pressurized apparatuses, explosive vapours, gasses, (fine) dust that can 
cause explosion, solid explosives or substances that can cause exothermic reactions  
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Equipment 
and 
materials 
condition 
and 
placement  
Observe whether equipment and 
materials are suited/approved for 
the used chemicals,  
Observe whether the equipment is 
placed in secure surroundings  
Observe whether the equipment 
and materials are in order. 
Evaluate whether equipment and 
materials are suited/approved for 
the used chemicals,  
Evaluate whether the equipment is 
placed in secure surroundings 
Evaluate whether the equipment 
and materials are in order. 
Ensure that equipment and 
materials are suitable.  
Ensure that the equipment is 
placed safely. 
Ensure there are procedures for 
the repair and maintenance of 
equipment. 
Process 
control and 
monitoring 
 
Investigate employee familiarity 
with the chemicals. 
Investigate whether processes can 
be carried out so the hazard for 
explosion is reduced or controlled 
safely in relation to the equipment. 
Observe whether processes are 
sufficiently monitored. Observe 
whether grounds and buildings are 
clean and tidy. 
Evaluate employee familiarity with 
the chemicals. Evaluate whether 
processes can be carried out so the 
hazard for explosion is reduced or 
controlled safely in relation to the 
equipment. 
Evaluate whether processes are 
sufficiently monitored. Evaluate 
whether grounds and buildings are 
clean and tidy. 
Instruct and train employees in 
work with chemicals and 
processes. 
Ensure there is sufficient 
monitoring of the processes. 
Ensure there are procedures for 
cleaning grounds and buildings.  
. 
Safeguardin
g against 
explosion  
 
Observe whether there are 
sufficient safeguards against 
explosion in the form of pressure 
relief and the removal of sources of 
ignition. 
Observe whether safety measures 
are sufficient to ensure against 
damage in the event of an 
explosion.   
Evaluate whether there are 
sufficient safeguards against 
explosion in the form of pressure 
relief and the removal of sources of 
ignition. 
Evaluate whether safety measures 
are sufficient to ensure against 
damage in the event of an 
explosion.  
Ensure there are sufficient 
safeguards against explosion in the 
form of pressure relief and the 
removal of sources of ignition. 
Ensure there are sufficient safety 
measures to ensure against 
damage in the event of an 
explosion. Ensure there are 
procedures for control, repair and 
maintenance of the safety 
measures. 
Personal 
protective 
devices 
 
Investigate the need for personal 
protective devices that protect 
against the effects of explosion.  
Observe employee use of personal 
protective devices.  
Evaluate the need for personal 
protective devices that protect 
against the effects of explosion.  
Evaluate employee use of personal 
protective devices.  
Ensure there are personal 
protective devices that protect 
against the effects of explosion.  
Ensure there is instruction, repairs 
and maintenance.  
First aid 
 
Observe whether the company’s 
readiness is sufficient in the case of 
explosions. Investigate whether 
there is the possibility for 
professional medical help to come 
quickly (within 15 min.) 
Evaluate whether the company’s 
readiness is sufficient in the case of 
explosions.  
Evaluate the possibility for 
professional medical help to come 
quickly (within 15 min.) 
Ensure that the company has 
sufficient readiness. Ensure there is 
training, instruction and education 
for preparedness. Ensure there is 
an agreement for professional 
medical help (within 15 min.) 
Behaviour 
 
 
Observe whether employees are 
aware of conditions that can lead 
to explosions and have a safe 
behaviour.  
Evaluate whether employees are 
aware of conditions that can lead 
to explosions and have a safe 
behaviour.  
Motivate and instruct employees in 
safe behaviour.  
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EMPLOYEE 
Hazard: for personal injury – hearing damage, damage to lungs, injury from being knocked down from 
shrapnel or being killed    
This includes when working near/by pressurized apparatuses, explosive vapours, gasses, (fine) dust that can 
cause explosion, solid explosives or substances that can cause exothermic reactions  
Barrier type 
 
Observe/ 
investigate 
Understand/interpret 
evaluate 
Act/perform 
 
Equipment 
and 
materials 
condition 
and 
placement  
Observe whether equipment and 
materials are approved for the 
used chemicals,  
Observe whether the equipment 
and materials are in order. 
Evaluate whether equipment and 
materials are approved for the 
used chemicals,  
Evaluate whether the equipment 
and materials are in order. 
Follow procedures for the repair 
and maintenance of equipment. 
Inform management in cases of 
faults and deficiencies. 
Process 
control and 
monitoring 
 
Observe your knowledge of 
chemicals and processes. 
Observe whether processes are 
sufficiently monitored.  
Observe whether grounds and 
buildings are clean and tidy. 
Evaluate your knowledge of 
chemicals and processes. 
Evaluate whether processes are 
sufficiently monitored.  
Evaluate whether grounds and 
buildings are clean and tidy. 
Follow procedures for work with 
chemicals and processes. 
Take action on the monitoring of 
processes.  
Ensure the grounds and buildings 
are cleaned.  
Inform management about faults 
and deficiencies. 
Safeguardin
g against 
explosion  
 
Observe whether pressure-
relieving devices are in order and 
sources of ignition are removed.  
Observe whether safety measures 
against damage in case of 
explosion are in order.  
Evaluate whether pressure-
relieving devices are in order and 
sources of ignition are removed.  
Evaluate whether safety measures 
against damage in case of 
explosion are in order.  
Follow procedures for control, 
repair and maintenance of the 
safety measures. 
Personal 
protective 
devices 
 
Investigate the need for personal 
protective devices that protect 
against the effects of explosion.  
 
Evaluate the need for personal 
protective devices that protect 
against the effects of explosion.  
. 
Use the necessary personal 
protective devices that protect 
against the effects of explosion.  
Inform management about faults 
and deficiencies. 
First aid 
 
Investigate the company’s 
preparedness in the case of 
explosions.  
 
Evaluate the company’s 
preparedness in the case of 
explosions.  
 
Participate in education and 
training of preparedness. 
Follow procedures in case of 
explosion. 
Behaviour 
 
 
Observe conditions that can lead to 
explosions and have safe 
behaviour. 
Evaluate conditions that can lead 
to explosions and have safe 
behaviour. 
Exhibit safe behaviour. 
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Dan-WORM is an expression for the Danish version of WORM, which is a large Dutch project carried 
out during the period 2003-2008. WORM stands for Working group for Occupational Risk Model.
This report describes the result of the Dan-WORM project, where the goal has been to give Danish 
businesses the possibility to use the Dutch results, and to seek to simplify the rather complicated 
results in WORM in such a way that the knowledge and tools can be used in small and medium sized 
businesses.
The report contains a thorough introduction into the therory about accident prevention, a descrip-
tion of the Dutch WORM project, and what tools have been developed in the Dan-WORM project.  
The report presents suggestions for using the tools and preventative processes. 
The Dan-WORM project is financed by the Danish Working Environment Research Fund and has also 
been included in the Centre for research in production, management and working environment in 
smaller businesses  “DAVID”, which the National Research Centre for Working Environment  NFA has 
been responsible for.
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